Refugee Protection

The last three months of 2001 witnessed a significant rise in the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces as well as a steep rise in damage to private properties and public infrastructure in the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories. According to figures from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 223 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces between 28 September and 20 December 2001, and increased of 50% over the previous 12 month period. In Bethlehem alone, the Israeli reoccupation of the city in October resulted in more than US$ 17 million in damage, including heavy damage to ‘Aida and ‘Azza/Beit Jibrin refugee camps.

 A follow-up survey (previous surveys were conducted in January and June 2001) conducted by the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED), University of Geneva, in early November, highlighted the ongoing vulnerability of Palestinian refugees in relation to the non-refugee sector of the population in the occupied territories. Palestinian refugees, who comprise over 50% of the population in the occupied territories continue to represent one of the most vulnerable sectors of the population in relation to both physical protection and protection of basic social and economic rights.

Deaths and Injuries

In a statement to the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 5 December, UNRWA Commissioner-General Peter Hansen noted that more than half of Palestinian killed since October 2000 were refugees registered with UNRWA. UNRWA data is consistent with previous studies conducted by IUED and BADIL fieldwork. As noted in the June IUED survey, moreover, a significant proportion (nearly 50%) of those killed are from West Bank and Gaza Strip refugee camps.

The number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces over the last three months increased by 50% from the previous three-month period. A total of 871 Palestinians were injured. Thirty-one percent were injured by live ammunition with the remaining injuries resulting from rubber/plastic bullets, tear gas and miscellaneous causes. (For more statistics, see www.palestinercs.org)

Unemployment

Unemployment has almost tripled since the intifada began at the end of September 2000. There was no change in this trend over the past three months. The IUED November survey found that there is a statistically significant relationship between loss of job, poverty status, and refugee camp status. On average, 37% of refugees in West Bank and Gaza Strip refugee camps were unemployed in November compared to 33% of Palestinians not in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (not including Jerusalem). Nearly 50% of Palestinian refugees in Gaza Strip refugee camps were unemployed.

Palestinian refugees residing in camps in the Gaza Strip also suffer from substantially lower incomes. Nearly 60% of refugee households in Gaza camps reported a monthly income of NIS 2000 (US$ 460) or below with more than 60% of Palestinians outside Gaza refugee camps reporting an income above NIS 2000. The distribution of income between refugees in camps and Palestinians outside camps in the West Bank is more equally spread.

The loss of day labor inside Israel also has a particularly significant impact on Palestinian refugees residing in camps. According to the IUED survey, of those respondents who were employed in Israel and now have a household income below the poverty line, 91% are respondents residing in refugee camps. Some 58% of those day laborers rendered unemployed, according to UNRWA, are registered refugees.

Poverty Level

As of November, 40% of the population in the occupied territories was living below the poverty line (defined as an income of less than NIS 1600 or less than US$ 400 per month). The World Bank estimates poverty will rise to 43.7% by the end of 2001. Again, studies continue to indicate that Palestinian refugees, especially those living in camps, face significantly greater economic problems as a result of Israel’s 15 month military and economic siege. Gaza Strip refugee camps are the poorest. While 46% of West Bank camp households fall below the poverty line, in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, the rate is as high as 65%. These rates exceed those households outside of camps falling below the poverty line by 10-14% with similar rates only in the West Bank villages (64%) according to the November IUED survey. In a statement to the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA noted that approximately 75% of refugee households in camps are living below the poverty line.

Damage to Property

Damage to property from Israeli military attacks continues to be widespread in the occupied territories. Between July and November 2001 over 50% of Palestinians surveyed by the IUED suffered some type of damage. As with other indicators mentioned above, Palestinian refugees, especially camp refugees, continue to experience a significantly higher rate of damage to private property, particularly in relation to the destruction of homes. The number of respondents reporting damage to housing in West Bank refugee camps in the November IUED survey, for example, was over three times higher than Palestinians living outside of refugee camps. The number of households reporting multiple damages inside refugee camps is double to triple that of households outside of refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively. The number of households reporting no damages in refugee camps is also notably smaller than households outside of refugee camps.

According to UNRWA, by the end of November 2001, Israeli forces had bulldozed 205 refugee shelters that accommodated 1,573 persons and 74 non-refugee shelters accommodating 470 persons. In total 461 shelters have been demolished or destroyed since September 2000 accommodating 3,333 persons of whom 2,636 are refugees. In the West Bank 4 shelters in refugee camps and 12 shelters outside refuge camps have been demolished. In total during the last year 51 refugee shelters have been demolished as well as destroyed by shelling.

Sources: UNRWA Emergency Appeals Progress Reports, Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva – IUED (Report III, December 2001), Palestinian Public Perceptions on Their Living Conditions, The Role of International and Local Aid during the Second Intifada.

UN and International Protection

Despite the ongoing urgent need for international protection of the Palestinian population in the 1967 occupied territories, in general, and Palestinian refugees, in particular, the United Nations and the international community remains largely paralyzed by the US monopoly over the political process and the US veto in the UN Security Council. Over the past 15 months every major relevant body of the United Nations has called for the deployment of international monitors in the 1967 occupied territories, including the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights Commission of Inquiry (Falk/Dugard/Hussein Committee), and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.

Efforts to facilitate some form of international protection over the past several months – including 4 attempts in the UN Security Council –have been blocked repeatedly by Israel and the United States. The continued US obstruction has led to the creation of an International Civil Protection Force, composed of European and American activists, launched on 24 December. The civilian force has been carrying out non-violent resistance to challenge Israel’s 15 month long military and economic siege on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention: On 7 November, the Swiss government, as depository of the Geneva Conventions called for a "Conference of High Contracting Parties" to be convened in Geneva on 5 December. Under US pressure a previous conference in 1999 dispersed after 20 minutes. Both Israel and the United States announced early on that they would boycott the conference. Palestinian NGOs, meanwhile, expressed their shock that the outcome of the conference had already been determined in advance, in the form of a weak draft Declaration of the High Contracting Parties.

In response, NGOs organized a parallel conference in Geneva during the same period. (See pages 10-11 above) The High Contracting Parties to the Convention eventually adopted the Declaration in its original form. The Declaration lacks reference to concrete enforcement actions to be undertaken by the High Contracting Parties themselves to enforce Israel's compliance with the Convention. This lack of enforcement is completely unacceptable under Article 1 of the Convention as a legal matter, given Israel's openly-admitted policies of deliberate, mass-scale commission of "violations" and "grave breaches" of the Convention (equivalent to "war crimes," under international law) against the civilian Palestinian population throughout the 34-year-long occupation, and especially during the current intifada.

** A copy of the Declaration is available at the PCHR website, www.pchrgaza.org

US Vetoes Draft Security Council Resolution for International Monitors: For the fourth time in 12 months the United States obstructed international efforts in the UN Security Council in December to authorize the deployment of international monitors in the occupied territories. While the United States had successfully garnered enough support to avoid using its veto to obstruct two of three previous draft Resolutions, the overwhelming support for the creation of the international monitoring mechanism in the Council meant that the US was forced to use its veto to prevent the adoption of the draft resolution (SC/7242, 14 December 2001).

The draft resolution was voted in favour by 12 members with two abstentions (Norway and UK). In explaining the US veto, US representative on the Council John Negroponte, stated that the resolution, which also condemned violence on all sides and encouraged the parties to return to the negotiating table, would not “make a meaningful contribution to improving the situation in the Middle East.” The veto represents the continued effort by the United States to keep the Middle East conflict off the agenda of the UN and maintain the American monopoly over the political process.

** The full text of the draft resolution is archived on the BADIL website www.badil.org/Resources/Intifada/al-Aqsa_Intifada.htm

UN General Assembly Calls for the Creation of an International Monitoring Mechanism: Four days after the US veto in the Security Council, Egypt (on behalf of the Arab League) and South Africa (on behalf of the non-aligned movement) submitted a similar resolution for consideration in the UN General Assembly during an emergency session on 19 December.

The resolution condemned “acts of terror” against Israelis and Palestinians, demanded an end to nearly 15 months of Mideast violence and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to bring in observers to the occupied territories. The resolution (A/Res/ES-10/8) was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 124-6 with 25 abstentions. The Assembly also adopted a resolution demanding Israel as an occupying power to immediately refrain from such acts as willful killing, torture, and extensive destruction of property. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 133-4 with 16 abstentions. The US voted against both resolutions.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Protection Activities: The ICRC continued to issue appeals calling upon Israel and the Palestinian Authority to abide by international humanitarian law. ICRC staff have intervened to negotiate safe passage for members of the Palestine Red Crescent Society delivering bread and milk to civilians unable to leave their homes and temporary lifting of curfews to enable civilians to leave their homes to stock up on food, water and other necessities. In October ICRC was called in to negotiate access for a family in Bethlehem from one room in their home to other rooms, which they were unable to access because of the heavy shooting. In another case, in the northern West Bank, ICRC negotiated safe passage for a surgeon into Qalqilya, which was under strict curfew in order to perform a life-saving chest operation. The Committee continues to negotiate transportation of supplies, sick and wounded and during the fall access of farmers to their fields to collect olives.

** For more information see the ICRC website, www.icrc.org and follow the country links.

UNRWA Emergency Protection Activities: According to the statement made by Peter Hansen, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, to the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, “UNRWA is still facing serious constraints on the access necessary to deliver its humanitarian aid to Palestine refugees. We will continue to protest and oppose the arrangements made by the Israeli authorities, which adversely affect our humanitarian access to Palestinians in need. Such impediments are contrary to the UNRWA’s rights under international law and the agreements we have with the Occupying Power.” Against this background the Operations Support Officers (OSO’s) continue to monitor routes, negotiate passage for staff and supplies at checkpoints, and ensure the security of Agency installations. In October OSO staff were called upon once again evacuate a family from their home in the ‘Aida refugee camp, after Israeli forces took up positions on the upper floors and confined the family to one small apartment on the ground floor.

UN Special Rapporteur Calls for International Protection Mechanism but fails to Mention Specific Status of Palestinian Refugees: In October the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, John Dugard, issued his latest report, affirming the urgent need for an international protection mechanism and calling in clear terms for the end of Israel’s military occupation. The Special Rapporteur found it “difficult to understand why no serious attempt has been made by the international community to persuade Israel to accept such a presence (the Palestinian Authority having already agreed to an international presence). International monitors or peacekeepers have been employed in many less threatening situations in the world and there is no reason why the Occupied Palestinian Territories should be treated differently.”

The Special Rapporteur went on to note that “[v]iolence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel during the past several months has tended to obscure the fact that the root cause of the present conflict in the region is military occupation.” “The United States-brokered "Tenet ceasefire plan" (Ha'aretz, June 14, 2001), while a laudable attempt to end the violence in the region, nowhere mentions the military occupation in its concern for security and crisis management. It should not, however, be forgotten that Israel occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip by force in 1967; that this occupation should be brought to an end, as by its very nature military occupation is a temporary phenomenon pending an acceptable peace settlement; and that until the occupation is terminated, Israel, as the occupying Power, is obliged to comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention.” Unlike the report of the previous Special Rapporteur, however, Dugard failed to mentioned the specific status and protection needs of Palestinian refugees residing in the occupied territories. (UN Document, A/56/440, 4 October 2001)

Protection Issues inside Israel

Former Israeli Prime Minister and Internal Security Minister Testify at Or Commission: In November Ehud Barak and Shlomo Ben Ami testified before the Commission of Inquiry (“Or Commission”), investigating the events in Israel that led to the killing of 13 Palestinian civilians by Israeli security forces in October 2000. The testimonies addressed the foreseeability of the demonstrations, the orders they issued to the police during the events, and their investigations directly following the events. While both Barak and Ben Ami testified that they had not forseen the events as they had unfolded, facts and testimony already provided to the Commission indicate that the events were foreseen days before they happened and that preparations had been made for such events months prior to their occurrence. This included a request by Barak to the police following the 29 September 2000 to prepare for widespread demonstrations inside Israel. Previous training for such scenarios had taken place earlier in the year.

Ben Ami was present at some of these training exercises. When the Commission asked Barak why he commented on the evening of 2 October (the day with the highest number of killings and injuring of demonstrators) that, “The work of the police was excellent,” he replied that the police cannot function without support. When Ben Ami was asked about his declarations of support to the police after 2 October 2000, he answered that he only gave support publicly and that his orders to the police during closed meetings were of a different tone. The Commission noted that the official protocols of these closed meetings reflect that Ben Ami continued to support the police during such meetings as well.

Based on both national and international legal standards, Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, which is providing legal counsel to the victims’ families, believes that both Barak and Ben Ami have a direct responsibility for the killing of 13 Palestinian Arab citizen demonstrators of Israel and the injury of hundreds more during October 2000. Both had foreseen the demonstrations of October 2000; issued orders to the police to open main roads by any means necessary; gave their full support to the police in their handling of the demonstrations, including the failure to prevent further killings and injuries; and, made no effort to launch an immediate investigation into the events of October 2000. (Adalah press release, 9 December 2001)

** For more information and regular reports about the Commission hearings, see the Adalah website, www.adalah.org

Israeli Government Rejects Return of Internally Displaced Palestinians: In October Israeli government deliberations about whether to respect a 1951 Israeli High Court ruling and allow Palestinian villagers of Iqrit and Bir'am to return to their homes and properties appeared to finally come to an end when the security cabinet decided against their return. Cabinet members argued that the residents of the two villages should not be permitted to return because of fifty-year-old "security concerns" and because it "would set a precedent for other displaced Palestinians who all demand to return to their homes and lands." Attorney Wakim Wakim of The National Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Uprooted in Israel, said in response to government decision: "This decision is a continuation to the racial attitudes of the Israeli governments, and the claim that other uprooted will ask to return is rejected." (Kul Al-Arab, 12 October 2001).

Residents of Iqrit and Bir'am and their descendents are part of the approximately 250,000 internally displaced Palestinians from some 60 displaced communities inside Israel. Although they are citizens of the state, they have been denied their right to return to their villages since 1948. Their lands have been confiscated, declared "state lands", and leased to Jewish-Israeli agricultural and urban settlements. In July 1972 Gold Meir’s government turned down a request from the villagers to go home, however, in 1977 Menachem Begin promised to let them return. The recent government deliberations about Iqrit and Bir'am were launched under the Rabin government in 1995 by then Minister of Justice David Liba'i.

Liba'i proposed to settle the case if the Palestinian residents of the villages agreed to, a) partial return (only heads of households accompanied by two descendents); b) to forgo land restitution (only a small parcel of land would be leased to returning households); and, c) not to engage in agriculture. This proposal was rejected by the villages, who by then numbered some 8,000 persons with claims to 36,972 dunums of land. In total, the government had offered to lease 1,200 dunums of the villagers' original land (about 3%) back to the returning households. In 1997 the residents of Iqrit re-filed their case with the Israeli High Court, however, the issue remained unresolved under the Netanyahu and Barak governments.

In late November, the High Court ordered the state of Israel to present a detailed plan for compensating the former residents of the Palestinian villages either with money or land. The government was given 90 days to present a clear program involving lands that could be given to the residents or compensation that it is prepared to pay. After the state makes it proposal the petitioners will have 15 days to respond. According to Awni Sbeat, a spokesperson for the residents, the villagers “reject any decision that will not support our full rights as it was decided in 1951 by the Supreme Court. Expropriating our lands for the sake of nearby settlements or classifying them as State property prevent any possibility of rightful solution.” (Kul al-Arab, 30 November 2001) Some members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee who disagree with the government decision have decided to form yet another sub-committee to review the case.

Meanwhile residents of the villages and other internally displaced Palestinians continue public protest activities to raise awareness about their outstanding claims to return to their villages and receive real property restitution. Activities have included a mass at the church in Iqrit attended by hundreds of people from Palestinian towns and villages and a demonstration in front of the Supreme Court in Jerusalem attended by nearly 1000 people. Mohammad Baraka, a Palestinian member of the Knesset (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality/Hadash), who participated in the event stated “we realize that most of those who were evicted from Iqrit in 1948 are dead, and this protest stresses the fact that years and time will not let us forget and will not take our right of return.” (al-Ittihad, 19 November 2001)

The cases of Iqrit and Bir'am and many other Palestinian villages inside Israel demonstrates the complete absence of adequate remedies for internally displaced and dispossessed Palestinians inside Israel. The response of the Israeli judiciary and successive governments to date constitute a blatant violation of international law. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, for example, which were developed to enhance protection and assistance for internally displaced persons, based on a review of relevant principles of international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law, clearly affirm both the right of internally displaced persons to return to their homes or places of habitual residence (Principle 28), and the right to restitution of properties (Principle 29). (The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are archived on the BADIL website, www.badil.org/Law/Refugee_Law/GDIP.htm)

** For more background see www.birem.org. Translations from the Palestinian press inside Israel from Arab Human Rights Association (AHRA), Discrimination Diary. To read the Diary visit the AHRA website, www.arabhra.org.

Confiscation of Palestinian Land inside Israel: At the same time that the Israeli government is rejecting the right of internally displaced Palestinians to return to their homes of origin, the government continues to confiscate land from its Palestinian citizens. Approximately half of the land that remained in the hands of Palestinian citizens of Israel after the 1948 war has since been confiscated by the Israeli government, leaving a community that comprises 20% of the population of the country with access to only 3% of the land. Israel's official response to the Palestinian position of "land for land" in the context of negotiations over compensation for expropriated property, is illustrated by the state's offer to Palestinian residents from the villages of Taibeh and Tira whose land is subject to confiscation for construction of the new Trans-Israel Highway. The Israeli government offered the residents land from a third Palestinian village, Zimar.

Following continued protests by the two communities, during which Israeli police forces beat and wounded 20 landowners and several Palestinian members of the Knesset (Jewish solidarity demonstrators were not beaten), the government finally presented a more equitable proposal to the landowners. The agreement is to provide alternative tracts of land of equal value. Tira residents will be offered 80 dunams purchased from the nearby Kibbutz Eyal, land tracts within the jurisdiction of the Drom Sharon and Lev Sharon regional councils and other land in Tira that is now owned by local residents. Taibeh residents will be offered 160 dunums of land in She’ar Ephraim and another 1,100 dunums within the jurisdiction of the Zemer Regional Council, as well as 50 building plots within Taibeh. Land offered would not include strips with power lines or those earmarked for future transportation projects. If the alternative lands are not handed over in 18 months, the Trans-Israel Highway Company is to compensate the landowner as stated with the sum of NIS 5,000 per (expropriated) dunum per year. (Ha’aretz, 1 November 2001)

The Israel Lands Administration (ILA) also bulldozed 2000 dunums of olive trees in early December in Palestinian village of Ein Mahel to clear 80 dunums of land for building a new Jewish neighborhood in Nazareth Illit. Nazareth Illit was created adjacent to historic Nazareth as part of a government plan to “Judaize” the Galilee. The land was originally expropriated for military purposes in 1976 and residents of the village planted trees on the land in order to maintain their right to their land. In 1994 the Rabin government changed the land’s purpose to public. Ein Mahel is surrounded by Nazareth Illit and the construction of the new Jewish neighborhood will close the last possible way for natural expansion of the Palestinian village. Residents of the village are planning to replant the land.

Destruction of Palestinian Holy Sites in Depopulated Villages: In October the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) also demolished a protest tent set up in the destroyed Palestinian village of Sarafand located 20km south of Haifa by the Sarafand Mosque Committee and Al-Aqsa Society for the Protection of Islamic Holy Sites. The village mosque, the last remaining structure in the village, was demolished in 2000 when the ILA claimed ownership of the land. The Islamic Movement appealed to the Supreme Court, which approved re-construction and protection of the site. The ILA, however, has continually obstructed the reconstruction of the mosque and maintenance of the cemetery by displaced villagers. The request to rebuild the mosque has since been overturned. (Sawt Al-Haqq Wal Hurriya, 26 October 2001).

Israeli Government Establishes Mechanism to Restitute Jewish Heirs of Absentee Property: In late November, the Israeli Justice Ministry set up a special unit to seek and locate the Jewish heirs of bank accounts and property belonging to holocaust victims. “Up to now, the General Custodian, who managed abandoned property, had to wait for missing persons or their heirs to turn up and claim their property. The new unit will operate from the General Custodian’s office with 5-12 workers and will start work in 2002. (Ha’aretz, 20 November 2001) No such unit has ever been established to search for Palestinian owners and heirs of absentee property in Israel. Jewish property owners constitute only a small minority of persons falling under the Absentees’ Property Laws, the majority being Palestinian refugees.

From Rights to Reality: An Introduction to Mechanisms for Return and Restitution

Since the first popular refugee conference was held in 1996 (Deheishe refugee camp) – delineating the broad outlines of an agenda for the defense of Palestinian refugee rights – grassroots mobilization and lobby efforts have focused predominantly on raising awareness about the right of return, restitution, and compensation, as affirmed in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 and international law. The success of these efforts can be measured in the clarification of terminology, deeper understanding of basic rights, unification of language at all levels of Palestinian society (i.e., grassroots, media, leadership, etc.), development of a global right of return network, as well as increasing awareness and support for Palestinian refugee rights at the international level among non-governmental organizations (e.g., Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International), United Nations and governmental officials.

Over the past year it has become increasingly evident, perhaps spurred on by the experience of the complete absence of a protection mechanism (i.e., international body) in the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories in the context of the al-Aqsa intifada, that there is an increasingly urgent and timely need to begin examining mechanisms to facilitate implementation of Palestinian refugee rights – i.e., return, restitution and compensation. The need for information resources and discussion/debate was illustrated in several responses from the refugee community during hearings conducted in the region in September 2000 by the British (Parliamentary) Commission of Inquiry into refugee choice. When refugees were asked about what type of mechanisms would be needed to implement the durable solution set forth in UN General Assembly Resolution 194, some responded that the ‘mechanism’ was simply the right of return. Others stated that the United Nations and the international community provided possible mechanisms, as had been the case in Bosnia. Few, however, were able to provide a more detailed response.

The first indication of the official position of the Palestinian leadership as regards mechanisms for the implementation of the right of return, restitution, and compensation came several months later when the Paris-based newspaper Le Monde Diplomatique published a draft proposal for a resolution of the refugee issue presented by the Palestinian negotiating team during the last round of final status negotiations at Taba, Egypt (January 2001). (See al-Majdal, Issue No. 12) The proposal was circulated widely in the refugee community. More recently, Palestinian refugee activists participating in the second annual meeting of the Coalition for the Right of Return (see page ?) participated in a lecture and discussion with an expert on Bosnia concerning mechanisms for return and restitution applied in the case of Bosnian refugees.

Tasks and Types of Mechanisms

The return and restitution of refugees, particularly in the case of mass exodus, is a complex process. Numerous mechanisms – i.e., institutions or bodies – are required to facilitate implementation of hundreds of tasks that transform return and restitution from a right to reality.

Mechanisms for return, for example, facilitate a wide range of tasks from determination and registration of refugee choices, creation of demographic and socio-economic profiles of the refugee community to assist in crafting plans for return and reintegration of refugees in their home communities, development and implementation of the return (i.e., repatriation) plan, provision of personal documents, basic relief and health assistance, monitoring of human rights and reintegration programs, and socio-economic rehabilitation.

Mechanisms for restitution carry out an equally wide range of tasks from property documentation, creation of profiles concerning land use and housing stock, legislative analysis, identification of problems relating to secondary occupation of refugee homes, development and implementation of restitution procedures, creation of a new property database, mediation and/or adjudication of property claims, repeal or reform of discriminatory property legislation, and reconstruction of refugee homes.

In both cases – i.e. return and restitution – mechanisms may include UN agencies, independent multilateral institutions, state bodies, as well as international and local non-governmental organizations. Refugee problems are too complex to be solved by a single mechanism. In Bosnia, for example, over 100 international organizations have participated in the implementation of the return process.

The primary UN mechanism mandated to facilitate solutions for refugees is the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), often working alongside numerous other UN agencies, such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), as well as UN peacekeeping operations such as the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In many cases, UNHCR plays the role of ‘lead agency’ providing a focal point for the coordination of multi-agency programs to facilitate return and real property restitution.

In other cases new institutions, often multilateral in character, may be established to facilitate return and/or restitution. In Bosnia, for example, the international community established the Commission for Real Property Claims (CRPC) to implement the right of refugees and displaced persons to real property restitution as affirmed in the 1995 Dayton Agreement. The Commission is composed of 9 members, including three that are appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, and has a staff of over 300 working in its Executive Office in Sarejevo and in a network of regional offices. The CRPC works in partnership with numerous other bodies, including the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UNHCR, and the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Many states often set up their own mechanisms to coordinate implementation of the various tasks associated with return and restitution with UN and other international partners. In Tajikistan, for example, the government established a Central Department for Refugees and Forced Migrants in 1994 to act as UNHCR’s main domestic partner in charge of returning Tajik refugees and internally displaced persons from abroad as well as resolution of property issues.

In other cases refugees may establish their own organizations to not only lobby for but also participate in the design and implementation of return and restitution. In Guatemala, for example, refugee leaders formed Comisiones Permanentes and negotiated the terms of collective repatriation directly with their own government. Bhutanese refugees who are still struggling to return to their homes have engaged in a documentation project, through the Association for Human Rights Activists (AHURA), as an advocacy tool to authenticate the refugee’s nationality status and property rights and promote their right to return and property restitution.

UNCCP, UNRWA, UNHCR and Others

The issue of mechanisms for the implementation of the right of return, restitution, and compensation would not appear to be an immediate problem in the Palestinian case. After all, the United Nations established a unique institution to facilitate implementation of the durable solution for Palestinian refugees (i.e., paragraph 11, UN Resolution 194), a second institution to provide humanitarian assistance (UNRWA), and, in addition, authorized UNHCR to carry out this mandate in the event that either institution ceased to fulfill its mandate.

During initial years of its existence, the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) attempted to carry out many of the tasks identified above, including intervention with state parties to protect and promote refugee rights, collection of basic information for the creation of refugee profiles, and investigation of methods for determining refugee choices. The Commission also created a fairly comprehensive (though not complete) database of refugee properties that is currently stored in UN Archives in New York.

The problem of mechanisms in the Palestinian case arises, however, from the fact that the UNCCP ceased to carry out its mandate to implement a durable solution based on Resolution 194 in the early 1950s (See BADIL Brief No. 5) and UNHCR has not stepped in to fill the gap created by the cessation of UNCCP protection. UNRWA, while it may play a valuable role with respect to a variety tasks associated with return and restitution (See BADIL Brief No. 6), does not have a mandate or the broad experience to facilitate return and restitution. In other words there are no mechanisms currently functioning to facilitate a durable solution for Palestinian refugees.

The Palestinian proposal for a resolution of the refugee issue presented at Taba in January 2001 addresses this problem by proposing the creation of an alternative approach to the regime established by the United Nations. Rather than seeking to revive the UNCCP or request UNHCR intervention, the proposal outlines the creation of several new, independent, multi-lateral institutions. This includes a Repatriation Commission comprised of the Parties, United Nations, UNRWA, Arab host countries, US, EU, and Canada. The Repatriation Commission is to: verify refugee status, determine priorities for certain categories of refugees and certain areas, determine procedures for repatriation, process applications, repatriate the refugees, provide assistance to returning refugees, and ensure the protection of returning refugees.

A Compensation Commission is mandated to evaluate Palestinian material and non-material losses, administer implementation of provisions of the agreement, and administer and adjudicate claims of real property by refugees. The Commission is to be composed of the Parties, US, EU, UN, World Bank and Donor States. Finally, the proposal calls for the creation of an International Fund with a steering committee composed of Palestine, US, World Bank, EU, donor countries with the World Bank and the UN acting as a joint-secretariat. (See BADIL Bulletin No. 10 for further details, analysis and a copy of the proposal)

Palestinian researcher Salman Abu Sitta further suggests that refugees should form a Palestinian Land Commission (PLC) comprised of representatives from the 531 depopulated refugee villages. The PLC would act as a custodian for all properties until individual owners are identified and ownership of property is verified. Abu Sitta suggests that refugee properties should be transferred directly from the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) to the PLC.

Choosing the Right Mechanisms

There is a wide array of choices when it comes to deciding upon the most appropriate mechanisms for the implementation of Palestinian refugee rights, including UN agencies, multi-lateral institutions, domestic bodies, and non-governmental organizations. Choosing the appropriate set of mechanisms is critical to the success of return and real property restitution. The decision making process should pay close attention to legal, political and practical considerations.

For example, potential intervention by the UNHCR should include, among many other issues, discussion of whether the Agency understands the legal obligations imposed by General Assembly Resolution 194 – i.e., return and restitution based on individual refugee choice. The Agency has been criticized for promoting resettlement in some cases where it considers return to be not ‘practical’ or not in the best interests of the refugees according to its own criteria. In a situation where Israel refused to permit the return of refugees, or where the Agency considered it in the best interests of the refugees not to return to places where they would be a minority, would UNHCR promote resettlement?

If the UNCCP were to be revived, would the Commission’s membership, composed of the US, France, and Turkey, militate against objective implementation of Resolution 194? How would the position of the United States vis-à-vis a solution for Palestinian refugees affect the neutral operation of the Commission? What are the practical implications of setting up new multi-lateral institutions which do not have a track record or experience in the design and implementation of durable solutions? Can sufficient resources be seconded from existing mechanisms that have experience in other refugee cases?

Additionally, close attention should be paid to whether mechanisms have adequate financial and human resources (including an on-the-ground presence in host and country of origin). Adequate donor funding is often linked to a detailed implementation plan as well as energetic public information and external relations with donors. Is there sufficient international political support for relevant mechanisms? What is the role of refugees in relation to the mechanisms? Is there adequate attention to monitoring and effective enforcement procedures?

These are only few of many questions, which must be tackled prior to the determination of the proper mechanisms to effectively facilitate return and real property restitution for Palestinian refugees. International experience in numerous other refugee cases, including Kosovo, Bosnia, Guatemala, Mozambique, Rwanda, Cambodia, providing ample experience to study and drawn lessons from, which may be applied to the Palestinian case.

** This article is drawn from a comparative study of return and restitution forthcoming from BADIL (2002).

“From Refugees to Citizens at Home” (Excerpts from a new Book by Palestinian Researcher Salman Abu Sitta)

In late September 2001, a new book – From Refugees to Citizens at Home - outlining a plan for the phased return of Palestinian refugees to their homes of origin inside Israel was presented to an audience of members of Parliament, diplomats, journalists and NGOs at Westminster Hall in London. The plan, prepared by Palestinian researcher Salman Abu Sitta, builds on previous research demonstrating the feasibility of return based on a detailed study of the demography and land use inside Israel. The book includes 27 maps/figures, illustrating the mass displacement of Palestinians between 1947 and 1949, the availability of space in the refugees’ areas of origin, and a phased plan for return, including maps of major urban areas.

The book includes several unique contributions not found in other research. This includes a set of two maps covering the northern and southern areas of Israel, which show the current built-up area and the location of Palestinian refugee villages. (See, for example, Figure 10) Careful study of the relationship between built-up areas and the location of refugee villages reveals that the return of refugees from 90% of the depopulated villages would not engender displacement or eviction of Israeli Jews. Of the remaining 10% of the villages (the study provides a list of specific villages), a slight adjustment would be required for the return of residents from 7% of these villages. Difficulties related to secondary occupation arise in only 3% of the villages.

The plan also includes a set of 13 maps outlining a 7-phase plan for the return of refugees to areas of origin inside Israel, including 10 maps providing a schematic framework for urban areas. (See, for example, Figure 15) It is estimated that 8-10 years would be required to implement all 7 stages of the plan: 1) return of registered refugees from Lebanon and Syria; 2) return of registered refugees from Gaza; 3) return of registered refugees from the West Bank; and 4) return of registered refugees from Jordan; followed by a three stage plan for the return of refugees to cities in Israel.

The location of the present built-up area shows that over 90% of the sites of Palestinian refugees remain vacant. Thick black lines define high Jewish density ‘natural regions.’ Medium lines indicate Jewish medium density and light lines indicate low Jewish density.

Figure 15 illustrates the return of refugees in the northern areas of Israel (See Figure 10 detailing built-up areas). The approximate number of registered refugees from these two areas of exile is 500,000. Refugees originate from the districts of Haifa, Acre, Tiberias, Safad and Nazareth – excluding cities (covered in phases 5-7 of the return plan). There are only a few affected villages in this area, where the village has been partially or fully built-over. The only two villages fully built-over are Tira, and Wa’arat es-Saris in the Haifa district.

The book can be ordered from the Palestinian Return Centre, 100 A Crown House, North Circular Road, London, NW10 7PN, UK. Email: [email protected]