Youth Movements and Political Action in Palestine

by Ahmad Hammash*

Introduction

Youth movements are among the most prominent and significant modern social and political activities that have spread out throughout the Arab region over the past few years, namely, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolutions. Palestine has not been immune to this new political phenomenon.

Since 2010,[1] the Palestinian landscape has seen the evolution of several youth movements, which have emerged to express the desire of young people to bring about political, social, and economic change. In the Palestinian context, these movements have played a pivotal role, attempting to revive and reinstate Palestinian political action as a broad-scale mass effort. However, many questions and criticisms have been raised about the evolution of youth movements and their efforts to make change.

Criticism is a key factor to developing and ensuring the right process of political action. However, criticism has not been tailor made to improve youth movements as a political action, but to weaken and eliminate them from the political stage. Monopolising political action, powerful official political agencies[2] have spearheaded the attack on and demonised youth movements in order to prevent any attempt to put forward alien political action. At a bare minimum, the official political authority has tried to contain or place youth movements under its control and use them as a tool of its own. In addition, benefiting from the current situation, some small marginal political parties and elites have contributed to this attack, sometimes reaching the point of using the language of treason against youth movements and organisers.

This article mainly attempts to understand the spread of movements in Palestine and provide answers to some questions. Namely, what reasons have prompted the emergence and proliferation of this new form of political action? Why do youth movements insist to declare political independence while they seek to bring political and social change? Can non-political action introduce substantial political changes? Perhaps most importantly, can political action be separated from the struggle for liberation in such contexts of settler colonisation as in Palestine?

It should be stressed that this article does not attempt to underestimate or criticise the role of youth movements for the sake of criticism. It aims at shedding light on weaknesses that have fragmented and mostly dissipated these movements with a view to enhancing their performance and ensuring continuity and ability to devise change.

Developments and Shifts in Political and Social Action: An Overview

In the early 1920s, the Palestinian landscape saw a liberation and revolutionary movement against the British colonial regime and Zionist immigration to Palestine. Many resistance political parties and groups were established with the aim of liberation and self-determination across the Palestinian territory.[3] The majority of these parties played an important role in resisting colonisation. Ultimately, however, they failed to achieve their vision of repelling the British colonisation and putting an end to the Zionist immigration to Palestine. On the other hand, the colonial project managed to establish the so-called “Israel” in 1948, resulting in the displacement of 85 percent of the Palestinian people and breaking up political parties and entities.

The 1948 Nakba did not pose an obstacle to the Palestinian people’s ability to reorganise and initiate their struggle against colonisation. Between 1948 and the early 1990s, many Palestinian political parties and fronts were created, mainly seeking to decolonise and liberate Palestine from the river to the sea. Displaying different ideologies and tools of liberation, political parties were a turning point in the history of the Palestinian people and liberation movement. Meantime, the bipolar world order and spread of liberation movements around the world contributed to developing the Palestinian liberation movement, gaining international momentum as a central global cause.

With the Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s, a new world order emerged under control of the United States. In different societies and States, political and social action was impacted by this change in the world order. Changes aimed at consolidating US dominance as the world’s policeman and rolling out US ideology, then viewed as the end of history and optimal approach to addressing human issues. Within this framework, with the decreasing relevance of parties, non-state actors, including international institutions and transnational NGOs, started to play a greater role in the world order, politics, and societies.

Represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Palestine and the Palestinian leadership were not disconnected from these international shifts. Under the ‘aegis” of the United States, the PLO engaged in a peace process with Israel, even minimal results of which have not materialised to this day. Regarding the question of Palestine, changes in the world were not limited to entry into an open-ended peace process, but also largely reflected on the Palestinian domestic social,  economic, and political situation. Since the early 1990s, the Palestinian political stage has witnessed a “State” building process on part of the Palestinian territory, giving rise to critical political, social, and economic transformations within Palestinian society.

Perhaps foremost among these transformations is the shift of political and social action as an inclusive public activity, engaging all Palestinians, into a political action monopolised by the dominant power from its premises. In the West Bank, since the early 1990s, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has had a monopoly on political action in relevant offices and institutions. In the light of receding mass and popular activity, political focus has been redirected to international agencies and advocacy work outside Palestine. This activity has taken over the lion’s share of Palestinian political action.

After Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2006, political action has been dealt with in a purely military fashion. Any “non-military” person has no longer been able to engage effectively in political or organisational activity. It has been difficult to present any vision or ideology under a policy different from that embraced by Hamas, the faction controlling the Gaza Strip. As is the case in the West Bank, Hamas persecuted all forms of or demands for change, which Palestinian youth attempted to introduce or bring forward.

Since the early 1990s, in consistence with the colonial establishment, the majority of Palestinian organisations inside the Green Line have shifted their political discourse from liberation to one of citizenship and equality. Coinciding with the signing of the so-called Oslo peace agreement, participation in the Israeli Knesset grew increasingly within the framework of the discourse of citizenship and improvement of living conditions. A significant impact could no longer be made by those parties or groups, which did not take part in colonial institutions. Remotely from the Palestinian public, political participation and attempts to “realise rights” from within Israeli colonial institutions have been the formal course of political action inside the Green Line.

It can, therefore, be argued that political action in Palestine has been expropriated and monopolised by three major poles, which govern a segment of the Palestinian people. These work towards prohibiting and demonising any new organised political activity. Over three decades, these poles have attempted to dominate other Palestinian political parties and thwarted the emergence of any organised political action that could be built on. This policy has had a significant bearing on the awareness of young generations, who have dealt with existing political parties as a “fate” and with alternative political action as a “vice” that one needs to move away from.

Besides, many NGOs have played a key role in promoting a “depoliticised” discourse, which integrated with the course of action led by political poles. “Impartiality” and disengagement from the political process were a precondition for institutions to receive funding and support. On the other hand, the fact that the youth were independent of political action served as an entry point to benefit from institutional programmes, which would rehabilitate young people to be employed by those institutions. Hence, a depoliticised, human rights, and demand-oriented discourse has dominated Palestinian political action, driving a shift from addressing root causes to focusing on effects and consequences of the cause.

This discourse has negatively reflected on the Palestinian people, who have been stripped of self-action. To achieve political goals, failure of self-reliance has been the prevalent strategy. On one occasion, we demand that the international community redress us, and on another we place the burden on future generations and the youth. Under the “depoliticisation” strategy, the concept of the “youth” has eventually turned into a bubble and non-existent entity. The youth, particularly “activists” and organisers of movements, have adopted this discourse, now talking about the role of the “independent” and depoliticised youth from an objective standpoint, while at the same time isolating their role from any material action.   

Youth Movements and Political Action

With wide youth participation, the 2010 Tunisian revolution played an important role that has reflected on politics throughout the Arab world in general, and in Palestine in particular. Although it was different in Palestine, the political situation was influenced by the wave of change demands that grew prominent in some Arab States. Many Palestinian youths took the initiative and attempted to simulate ongoing events throughout the Arab world. Commonly referred to as “activism”, a new framework involved a broad participation of young people.

In Palestine, the rise of these movements coincided with ossified, stagnant, and regressed political action in view of the declining role of Palestinian parties and increased Israeli persecution of any organised political activity in the aftermath of the second Intifada. As the role of the youth was marginalised in Palestine, youth movements have played a critical role in activating and integrating young people in political life. It can be argued that these movements have assumed a central role in Palestine for two main reasons. Firstly, they have furnished an opportunity to the Palestinian youth for political participation, albeit temporarily. Secondly, they have brought Palestinian political action back to track both in the street and among the public at large. Especially in the West Bank, political action had been confined to offices and focused abroad.

Contrary to political parties, the youth movement and organisers lacked a clear definition of activism and an ideology that reflected their vision. Still, activism has allowed considerable room to assimilate young people and youth potential, who sought change and were of all ideological backgrounds. It should be emphasised that the lack of a definition of activism is not an academic or theoretical luxury. Contrarily, it is necessary to understand this political framework, tools of change, and more importantly political programme and perception of the form of desired change.

A cursory glance shows that, over the past few years, youth movements have not presented a comprehensive political programme, making clear their vision of the future or the change they seek to bring about. On the contrary, these movements have mostly dealt with social and political dimensions as specific and miscellaneous issues, well out of the broader context. In other words, youth movements have addressed the consequences, rather than the underlying causes, of the problem. It can be argued that, apart from movement demands, a politically fragmented and decontextualised approach to addressing community issues suggests that the status quo is the ideal situation. This gives rise to many questions, mainly: Does the current situation pose an existential or behavioural problem? If the challenge is “existential”, there is a need to put in place a clearly defined political programme, including solutions and perceptions of various “demand-oriented” problems. If it is “behavioural” and linked to a particular abuse, the problem can be overcome by resolving the issue at hand. Of note, many movements advocate themes that go beyond demand-based issues.[4]

The problem of lacking a political programme most clearly manifests itself in the absence of an alternative perception of the future by youth movements. As a result, these movements are turned into passive frameworks, focusing on rejection, while at the same being unable to present or impose alternatives.[5] Clearly, youth movements agree to the need for and importance of change. They advocate themes that reject the so-called “political regime”, but have no perception of the form of such a change, depriving movements of a key part of their activity, debilitating their political action, and waiting for those who seek change to do so.

On the other hand, due to the lack of a political programme, most movements could not maintain their demands and were soon disintegrated or contained and used to serve the interests of existing authorities. This illuminates an important aspect, namely, political action is neither haphazard nor reactive to a certain incident. Conversely, it is organised and can be built on. It puts in place a perception of various social and human issues. It is capable of dealing with urgent variables and issues in line with a clearly defined vision, which reflects its own strategy and ideology.

Additionally, youth movements are often unable to address problematic issues from within because of the lack an ideology or strategy, by which they can address these problems. Joining a certain movement, activists agree to minimum standards that are directly related to devising the desired change in a demand-oriented context. However, when the issue is “existential”, a strategy is needed to determine the movement/framework’s approach to the different problems encountered by the framework itself, individuals, and society. For example, leadership is one problematic issue within movements, clearly reflecting on performance and engagement with developments associated with the establishment of these movements. As no clear mechanisms or entities are in place to make decisions to handle such developments, a resolution is open to improvisation, which is not always in the interest of movements.

On the other end, it can be argued that youth movements are a manifestation of the “depoliticisation” policy, which current authorities in Palestine have instilled in the minds of young people over a period of 30 years. This practice mainly involves demonising any political action and entrenching human rights and legal discourse remotely from the colonial context. This is one of the most important reasons that have driven the youth away from political action. This hypothesis is further supported by the fact than once it is established, a movement hastens to announce its political independence. Although its demands are all political, the movement states that it is “apolitical”. What does an independent movement mean, then? Can an apolitical movement bring about political and social change? Can “depoliticised” action be performed in a complex political setting such as Palestine?

An “independent movement” might mean that it is not affiliated with any existing Palestinian party. However, why is politics confined to and monopolised by current parties? Has it been impossible to exercise politics within a political framework away from these parties? Adopted by the majority of youth movements, this depoliticisation discourse serves the interests of the powerful few and their strategies of monopolising political action and demonising any political process beyond their reach. This discourse also suggests that movements are a reaction, devoid of clear political goals that serve the people and preserve the land. Hence, it is easy to persecute and contain that reaction.

Giving them a degree of legitimacy, dominant organisations have clearly defined political programmes, regardless of how consistent and responsive these are with the people’s needs. Hence the importance of social “legitimacy” and “recognition” for political action. In Palestine, dominant organisations in monopoly of political action derive their legitimacy from their action of resistance or history of struggle. The former has often been part of history, but is sometimes invoked to renew legitimacy and provide a reminder that these organisations came into being thanks to the sacrifices made by respective members.

By contrast, the majority of youth movements largely concentrate on internal criticism of existing authorities. Without a clear programme tied to the colonial regime, these movements are linked to particular political, social, and economic changes. It is imperative to stress here that such an approach does not derogate from the national dimension of either the movements or their organisers. At the same time, however, it does not give these movements the necessary legitimacy to devise change. In Palestine, a political, social, or economic issue is not connected to temporary reform movements, but to a programme that can present real and tangible alternatives on the ground. In the colonial context, legitimacy is not endowed on grounds of justice or demands of the cause. Rather, it is extracted through a national programme that stands in the face of colonisation, handles colonial consequences, and puts in place a clear perception of the future.

Conclusion

Beyond doubt, youth movements in Palestine have played a pivotal role in Palestinian political action over the past ten years. In particular, they have attempted to bring political and mass action back to the street and public space. They have contributed to highlighting many social and political issues, which are actually in need of social debate and political action to be addressed. More importantly, youth movements have tried to reinstate and take part in political action, which was traditionally monopolised by the ruling parties, as a collective activity that affects all walks of Palestinian life.

These movements have successfully reached out to and mobilised a great number of young people, precisely at the time when many political parties did not manage to issue a statement or call for a mass event. Most often, however, youth movements could not achieve their goals or demands. This was not exclusive to a failure to materialise goals or demands. In view of the nascent creation and lacking experience of this political framework, failure might be natural and acceptable. Worse is the dissipation and disintegration of youth movements after they burn themselves out or are persecuted. The main reason behind disintegration is probably that these movements mostly address specific individual issues. As Palestine involves a complex case of colonisation with many political distortions and divisions, every day marks an urgent event that draws attention of the people, weakening or distracting youth movements.

Albeit important, a focus on social and living conditions does not give political legitimacy to activism, particularly in the context of persisting colonial policies. As far as youth movements are concerned, accumulating expertise becomes irrelevant because they do not act along the lines of a political programme that can be built on. Rather, they rely on day-to-day events, which drive them to react to particular policies. While the central cause of Palestine is existential vis-à-vis colonisation and its consequences, a discussion or treatment of this issue will have a negative impact on the question of Palestine. In this vein, it is imperative to emphasise that the importance of the violations committed by powerful parties should not be ignored. Also, one should not lose sight of the root causes of the problem of lacking a real political programme, which falls within a permanent and sustainable organisational framework and seeks to bring about change in consistence with the aspirations set by that political frame.

It might be argued that although they have failed to accomplish their goals and demands, youth movements are still important to build up and produce change in the future. However, the question is why are the experience of existing Palestinian organisations and parties not put to use and delivered on? Current Palestinian organisations did not mark the start of history or initiate the Palestinian struggle, but were an extension of previous Palestinian organising.

In essence, all political issues advocated by youth movements agree to “rejecting” political practices of the ruling parties. However, these issues are fragmented and dealt with separately from others. To avoid a transcendental discussion, it should be noted that may movements have linked their demand-oriented struggle to the political colonial context. In most cases, however, the link is theoretical and cannot be translated into reality. Further, to associate an issue per se with the colonial setting might strip it of its context and isolate it from other problems.

Many movement organisers have been aware of this predicament. Some attempts have been made to promote encounters between different movements to ensure standardised operation and integration. However, this goal cannot be accomplished without a common ideology for such an “assembly” as well as clearly defined regulations and bylaws for membership. Affiliation with a political framework implies consent to relevant objectives, vision, and strategy. In other words, agreement involves the maximum threshold of rights and objectives, with a thin margin of disagreement over unessential tools and matters. It is impossible that members of a liberation movement are at odds about the goal of liberation or partisan vision of the form of the would-be State after liberation. Still, there is a room for disagreement and debate over the mechanisms and tools needed to achieve the party’s goals and visions. By contrast, movement “activists” agree to the minimum rights associated with the goals and demands of their movement.

In conclusion, the experience of liberation movements of all forms emphasise that the process of liberation and reform does not materialise by addressing the consequences of the problem in question, but by removing the problem ab initio. Perhaps interestingly, the efforts made to establish demand-oriented movements are in fact sufficient to crystallise a national programme that dismantles this system in its entirety. Nevertheless, firmly impressed on our minds, depoliticisation forces us to exclude any action of an eminently political essence. Clearly, youth movements have conflated the struggle for “reform” and “demands” in the sovereign nation State with the struggle for liberation for colonialisation.

The magnitude of existential threats to the Palestinian people and need for developing a national (political, economic, and social) programme have become more urgent than ever. A prompt review of the history of liberation movements around the world demonstrates that they have experienced many setbacks and instances of disempowerment. Still, these movements need to keep in mind that failure to address the root causes of the issue at hand does not mean to change it or attend to its consequences, but to change and/or develop the means and tools to do so.

* Ahmad Hammash has served as the coordinator of the mobilization unit at BADIL Resource Center and is currently a member of it’s General Assembly. He holds a master’s degree in International Studies.