How Civil Society Organizations Respond to Contemporary Situations

by Eileen Kuttab*

Pre Oslo - A Civil Society Responsive to National Priorities and National Resistance

In the mid-1970s, the Palestinian national movement, represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), pursued a policy of democratization to mobilize large sectors of the public – mainly youth, women, workers, and students. The goal was not only to face Zionist settler colonial policies of transfer, expansion, and destruction, but also to mobilize and organize the masses, and serve their practical and strategic needs based on national priorities.

This was a revolutionary restructuring of Palestinian political space, where traditional elite, comprised of “notable” families, and landowners, now politically weakened, were replaced by a new leadership of a different caliber that included secular, educated, urban middle-class activists from different geographic locations in oPt.[1] This prompted the emergence of a new wave of grassroots organizations that were often linked to the progressive political factions that comprised the crux of the Palestinian social movement.[2]  The Palestinian social movement encompassed women’s committees,[3] student movements, labor unions, and volunteers, and adopted a democratic, decentralized outreach structure that allowed it to reach all geographic locations.[4] This method of organization posed a significant challenge to Israeli control of the Palestinian economy and politics, and to Israeli efforts to destroy Palestine’s cultural heritage and socio-economic infrastructure.[5]

These organizations were successful in politically engaging many sectors of Palestinian society. They promoted collective resistance, raised public consciousness on social issues and comprehensive development, helped to mainstream an alternative discourse that emphasized the context of continuing colonial aggression, and reprioritized local needs within the national movement.

Women and workers were the first to start organizing and mobilizing the masses for national resistance, notably through the provision of services in fields such as health, agriculture, and popular education (ibid.).   This model of service provision was centered around responding to community needs. Volunteers and small donations made by the general public, political parties, and a few international partners in political solidarity were critical to supporting these activities and services.

Over time, these organizations formed an organic bond with the masses who came to see them as an informal national authority, and as their guardians and representatives in the absence of a formal government. The high esteem in which they came to be held by the people gave rise to a kind of accountability. 

Democratic activism in this period laid the basis for the first Intifada that erupted in 1987. Participation in the Intifada took different forms. This included boycotts of Israeli goods, which prompted the formation of women’s productive cooperatives and new models of household-based economic activity, as alternative forms of market production.[6] Whilst feminist discourse had not yet taken root in women’s committees, they still focused on women’s rights as an integral component of national liberation. The closure of schools and universities during the Intifada led to the formation of neighborhood education committees that taught students about the history and geography of Palestine – subjects that were banned in the official curriculum as set by the Israeli civil administration.[7] Few university  administrations  also established alternative, informal spaces in which to continue their education during this period.

Specialized committees in sectors such as health and agriculture expanded their activities, creating mobile services to improve their public reach.  These grassroots organizations successfully brought together cultural, economic, social, and political considerations through the conduit of service provision, promoting political awareness amongst Palestinian communities and centering development as a means of empowerment and a tool with which to strive for independence. 

In the early nineties, new structural impediments forced Palestinian grassroots organizations to undergo processes of transformation. Policies of colonial oppression of road-blocks and siege had weakened grassroots organizations’ capacity to organize and mobilize, leading to a gap between the leadership and the grassroots.   These developments were the outcome of a set of intertwining factors at the local and international levels.[8] A series of interventions by the Palestinian leadership in exile, who had come to feel threatened by the nascent, local leadership that Palestinians saw as more legitimate and accountable than them, also had a negative impact. A political crackdown by the official leadership necessitated a change in direction for the grassroots movements.

Thus, a wave of 'NGOization',[9] endorsing the professionalization and formalization of grassroots organizations as a way of developing programs across agriculture, health, and social issues, began to take place. The EU was one of the main donors who helped finance these newly configured programs, which worked on a range of issues including gender rights, domestic violence, the imposition of the veil, policy, early marriage, alternative models of development, and policy research, as well as other areas.  There were also programs focused on developing the health and agricultural sectors – which required a greater degree of professionalization and personnel training, in addition to financial assistance. NGOs working on these issues became important players in the political arena.

How this transition affected the existing progressive political parties, and the position of these parties towards the Oslo agreement, is discussed in the second section. 

Civil Society Organizations Endorsing Neoliberal Agendas

The signing of the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel in 1993 reshaped the political environment and  culture which had a drastic impact on Palestinian social and economic well-being. The local leadership of the oPt was massively undermined by the Accords, and NGOs were also outflanked by the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA), in terms of political legitimacy and international financial support. An atmosphere of optimism mixed with panic governed the mood and attitude of political parties, NGOs, grassroots organizations, and the masses.

Many outside observers optimistically believed that Palestinian autonomy would hasten the end of the conflict and would decrease the daily pressures of occupation – this expectation was detached from reality, a fact which quickly became evident. The new leadership had long been based outside of Palestine, and thus lacked experience of the situation in the occupied territories. As existing civil society organizations were relatively larger, and more experienced, the new leadership’s future relationship with them and the future of social movements were uncertain.

Politically, the Oslo agreement also caused a deep divide within the national movement over the issue of uniting in resistance versus negotiating with the occupiers. In the face of colonial policies that structurally dismantled democratic political parties, opposition to the Oslo agreement remained weak.

The agreement has mechanically brought about the globalization of the Palestinian economy, which had the effect of undermining the development of its production sectors and deepened reliance on the Israeli labor market for job opportunities and manufactured goods. Most organizations were forced to adapt to the new situation by adopting a neo-liberal discourse and stance, which promoted a western model of state-building but undermined national resistance.

Factors like international funding, which flourished post-Oslo in occupied Palestine to stabilize and further the so-called “peace process” and to build a future, autonomous Palestinian state, made Palestine dependent on global networks. This meant that economic survival, and the manner in which national priorities were determined, became contingent on external factors.  The emergence of conditional funding affected the Palestinian economic and political space, as well as the preservation and celebration of Palestinian cultural heritage in different ways. Integrating Palestine into the global economy had negative repercussions, as it led to the neo-liberalization of the Palestinian economy – a process which was at odds with strategic priorities and local needs. In addition, the economic restructuring mandated by the Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements such as the Paris Protocol (1994) ensured that development would be carried out largely   according to  international agencies, and resulted in the Palestinian economy becoming completely reliant on   Israeli markets.

This process of cooptation into a global framework necessitated change and adaptation. Calls for transparency and accountability, as well as  professionalization of formerly grassroots institutions, ultimately led to the weakening of mass-based social movements. While some organizations were transformed into professional institutions which adapted to the new political climate and remained viable, others did not.  The interests of the World Bank started to take precedence over local priorities in a trickle-down manner, reorienting  the political and economic agenda to address global rather than local issues. Civil society organizations required new bureaucratic procedures in order to apply for funding. National discourse was refocused on state-building. Internationally standardized practices were adopted, including formats for writing applications and technical proposals, financial regularization through the opening of bank accounts, and an increased use of technocratic language and discourse. This marginalized cultural and political discourse with concepts such as “colonialism” being excised. 

This period of globalization saw a lot of civil society work relocated to international offices, distancing them geographically and conceptually from the Palestinian masses.  Social movements became increasingly weakened and alienated as a result.   The unity and solidarity of the Intifada disappeared and competition among organizations became the norm post-Oslo, as funding for NGOs was limited. Civil society organizations that aligned with international agendas were more likely to receive funding, while other organizations failed to secure any funding at all. This politicized model of funding forced civil society organizations to adopt a neoliberal orientation in accordance with global interests, and subsequently shift their focus away from their commitments to the basic needs of the people in favor of developing the national agenda. This impacted the orientation of their project work, posing a challenge to the old agenda that had centered on supporting steadfastness and resistance. The dominance of international donors and mainstream politics prompted the emergence of a new leadership, comprised of a globalized, technocratic, and depoliticized elite, who have come to play an important role in decision-making and in imagining the future of the so called Palestinian “state.” The dominant forum became that of the "globalized office", disconnected from the masses, and accountable only to donors rather than constituents. Civil society organizations thus no longer derive their legitimacy from the people, by merit of their symbolic and historic role; instead, they mainly exist for donors.[10]

Current Situation: Shrinking Space for NGOs

Civil society organizations are presently facing serious challenges on account of a range of factors, the most pressing being an escalation of Israeli colonial violence against the Palestinian people and Palestinian civil society organizations. This aggression takes different forms: arrests of activists, forced closure of institutions in Jerusalem, raiding offices and confiscating property, surveying, as well as delegitimization through allegations of terrorism, such as that faced by the six organizations who were blatantly targeted due to their national role and democratic principles.

A further challenge is the PA and its authoritarian, undemocratic practices, such as restricting freedom of expression and marginalizing grassroots voices in decision-making processes related to development strategies , and politics. New policies of international donors, especially those from the European Union, were characterized by conditional funding arrangements and a fixation on funding programs on marginal issues that suited Western agendas that have no relation to the urgent Palestinian needs and national priorities. The result is that only a select few civil society organizations survive, with a greatly diminished ability to promote the democratization of the political system and the rights of the most vulnerable social groups. A shrinking civil society sector has deprived Palestinians of valuable social and political services that reinforce their steadfastness.

Solutions to these complex political, financial, and structural challenges require revisiting the lessons of the first Intifada, such as promoting the decentralized, alternative structures that were prominent at that time. Responding to the occupation’s closure of institutions by decentralizing the means and methods of civil society outreach hampers the occupation's efforts to control this sector. Decentralization means that the activities of civil society organizations become better tailored to community needs rather than to donor agendas. This strengthens grassroots activism and shifts the focus away from bureaucracy, as was the case during the first Intifada.

Ending reliance on foreign aid through the use of volunteers is another practical solution. As demonstrated by the first Intifada, volunteers can carry out many different programs and activities, can effectively mobilize broad sectors of society, and kindle a connection between leadership and the grassroots. Although the professionalization of the non-governmental sector has left civil society irreversibly reliant on international funding in structural terms, it is still important to revive volunteer work in civil society spaces.

Local NGOs must operate with a degree of collective awareness, and be in conversation and coordination with each other, if they are to reach a common understanding of future challenges and find potential solutions to combat the structural obstacles.  At the same time, more engagement with international partners is needed to reach a consensus where both local organizations and international partners can sustain their work and re-center Palestinian solidarity, both in their operations and in the allocation of funding.  It is crucial to recognize that aid to the Palestinian people is a right and an obligation that international organizations should commit to, rather than use as a tool to erase or partially obscure Palestinian identity. Palestinian NGOs are an extension of the Palestinian people and their pursuit of human dignity. Partners who finance programs and stand in political solidarity with Palestinians should not acquiesce in the denouncing of resistance or framing of it as terrorism. Furthermore, terminating economic assistance when organizations reject political funding conditions should be understood as part and parcel of a raft of punitive economic measures which are enforced globally to subjugate Palestinians, to deny their political rights, further enhance  de-development, and coerce them into surrendering their national and political rights.