Position and Strategy of the Palestinian Negotiating Team:

Position and Strategy of the Palestinian Negotiating Team:

As the PLO/PA prepares its teams and strategy for the final status negotiations, the Palestinian public as well as close observers remain unable to answer the crucial questions, such as: What are they up to? Who will be the central actors in the negotiations? The conduct of Palestinian negotiators in the interim status negotiations, the current lack of clarity about the composition of the final status teams, and contradictory messages concerning the strategic guidelines for the negotiations all provide ample reason for Palestinian public concern and criticism. The following major points require urgent clarification:

Hierarchy of the Negotiation "Tracks" - Who will lead the important talks?

As many as four negotiation tracks are mentioned by insiders at this point: i) ongoing secret talks between Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Palestinian coordinator for both the interim and final status negotiations, and Yossi Beilin, Israeli Minister of Justice. These talks are most likely based on the earlier Beilin-Abu Mazen plan; ii) the official negotiation track re-opened in September but not yet active; and, iii) two additional tracks on which no information is available. Given the fact that Abu Mazen is heading the final status negotiations, it must be assumed that the talks conducted directly by him will be influential.

What is the role of the Refugees and the PLO/Department of Refugee Affairs in the Negotiations?

None of the members in the Palestinian High Commission for the Final Status Negotiations (see box) represents refugee organizations or has expertise on the refugee question. In addition, the PLO/Department for Refugee Affairs is not represented in the Commission. The Refugee Department has since long been short of finances, and rumors about the fact that it will play a marginal role in the negotiations are persistent, although they are not confirmed by the Department itself. The recent, still unofficial, resignation of Dr. As'ad Abdelrahman as head of the Department may be interpreted as yet another indicator concerning the marginalization of the PLO Department for Refugee Affairs in the final status negotiations.

What will be the Role of the Negotiators Legal Advisory Team?

For the first time in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, a special legal advisory team will assist Palestinian negotiators. While this is positive step in itself, many questions remain open. First, it is still unclear, even to the legal team, who will be the negotiators they are to assist. Second, the impact of the legal input provided by the team will depend on whether they will serve a major or secondary negotiation track (see point 1, above). Third, the legal position to be adopted by the legal team once negotiations are comence is yet unclear. While the two foreign consultants are veteran experts in international refugee law and the right of return, the bulk of the drafting will be done by a young team of Palestinian lawyers, who lack direct experience with the Palestinian refugees and their issues. Arguments for a Palestinian position which is guided by "what is feasible", and by "what can be achieved in the refugees' life-time" may be raised and used against a Palestinian negotiation strategy based on principles of international law, mainly the right of return. (see below)

Refugee Rights Principles versus Dangerous Pragmatism:

Palestinian debate, conducted in recent months both in public and among experts, about the optimal negotiation strategy crystallized into two contradictory approaches. The first approach, promoted most actively by the PLO Department for Refugee Affairs, holds that the only acceptable negotiation strategy with Israel must be based on the principles affirmed by existing UN Resolutions and international law, especially UN Resolution 194 and the refugees' right of return. The second approach, most strongly expressed in the Beilin-Abu Mazen plan (see box), suggests a solution based not on legal principles, but on Palestinian recognition of what is acceptable to Israel. Refugee re-settlement and compensation are the preferred options in this approach. The fact that the pragmatic line finds support at the highest level (the Palestinian High Commission), but also among negotiators and some legal advisors engaged in the various negotiation forums, must give rise to serious concern.

 

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Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations' Schedule
(according to the Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum)
Final Status Negotiations
13-9-99: Opening ceremony at Erez checkpoint/Gaza
1-2-2000: Signing of the framework agreement
1-9-2000: Signing of final status agreement

Interim Negotiations (continuation)
1-10-99: Reopening of quadripartite negotiations on the repatriation of 1967 displaced persons.

 

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Palestinian High Commission for the Final Status Negotiations
Head of Delegation: Yasser Abed Rabbo, PA Minister of Information/PLO Executive Committee; Nabil Sha'ath, PA Minister of Planning and International Cooperation; PA Minister for Jerusalem, Faisal al-Husseini/PLO Executive Committee; PA Minister for Bethlehem 2000 Nabil Qassis, and; Akram Haniyeh, journalist and political adviser to Yasser Arafat. Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), PLO Executive Committee will oversee both the final status and interim teams.
NOTE: At press time, the DFLP confirmed its participation in the final status negotiations.

 

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New Details from the Beilin-Abu Mazen Plan
NO to the Right of Return
excerpts from Palestine Report Online interview (22 September 1999) with Palestinian analyst Khalil Shikaki (Center for Palestine Research and Studies)
"On refugees, the plan establishes an international committee to manage the refugee solution. In other words, the burden of the solution is lifted from Israel and placed on the international community. The plan has four interlinked solutions to the refugee problem.

"First, it allows the Palestinian state to absorb those who are already living in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as any refugee willing to return to the state of Palestine. Secondly, it authorizes an International Commission for Palestinian Refugees (ICPR) to conduct negotiations and consultations with host countries and the refugees themselves for the purpose of exploring and enabling resettlement and rehabilitation of those Palestinians residing in those countries. Third, the plan authorizes ICPR to consult with donor countries for the purpose of ascertaining their willingness to allow the refugees to immigrate to those donor countries. Finally, the fourth component is compensation. The plan authorizes ICPR to "raise money for compensation for moral loss, immovable property and financial and economic support," enabling rehabilitation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees. Israel will continue the so-called policy of family reunification."

Palestinian Participants in drafting the document: Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Dr. Ahmad al-Khalidi, Hussein al-Agha, Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, Hasan Asfour, Dr. Mahdi 'Abd al-Hadi, Dr. Bernard Sabella. (al-Quds al-'Arabi [London], 16/9/99, p. 6, trans. by FBIS/WNC)