Article74 Magazine

A |Look at the Past - Perspectives for the Future 

Starting with this issue, ARTICLE 74 will regularly present analysis and opinions of activists and researchers on the Palestinian refugee question. In this way, we hope to contgribute to the debate about strategies for the protection of refugee rights. In the current issue, we present the contributions of Salah Abed Rabbo and Dr. Adel Samara. 

A UNIFIED STRATEGY AGAINST ALL ODDS:  
THE POPULAR REFUGEE MOVEMENT 
By Salah Abed Rabbo 

Salah Abed Rabbo lives in Deheishe refugee camp/Bethlehem and  is the spokesperson of the Union of Youth Activity Centers/West Bank and of the Campaign for the Defense of Refugee Rights. He is a refugee activist involved in the popular refugee initiatives in the West Bank.   

Article 74 (December 1997) 

The 1960s marked a period of  struggle for national liberation and the end of colonial regimes in many parts of the world. Palestinians understood that tears could neither liberate their homeland, nor feed their refugee families. Thus, the PLO was born. Palestinian refugees everywhere joined their movement for national liberation. The PLO raised the slogan of return for  the millions of refugees and of a democratic Palestinian state encompassing all the religious denominations present in Palestine. However, the numerous attacks, massacres, and conspiracies conducted against the PLO in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and abroad, diverted the PLO's program and reduced its struggle for return to a minimum. The most recent expression of this diversion are the Oslo Accords signed on 13 September 1993. They allowed for the return of  no more than a few thousands of  PLO leaders and activists to the cities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 

The question of the refugees, like Jerusalem a taboo for Zionist politics, has remained a hairy and complex problem. Palestinian refugees are confronted with a series of challenges: 

The challenge presented by the Oslo Accords themselves which aim to  lull refugees into illusions about final status negotiations, while even the negotiations over interim solutions have gone into a coma. 

The challenge presented by the Palestinian leadership which formed the Palestinian Authority, and agreed to cancel parts of the Palestinian National Charter - i.e. the expression of a broad Palestinian consensus - without any reciprocity. These steps cause deep concern among refugees, who worry about their present as well as about the final destination of their torn vessel on the heavy sea. The fact that the Oslo Accords limit the authorities of the Autonomy Authority to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and that elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council - as we like to call it self-satisfactorily - were restricted to the same areas, left Palestinian refugees in the diaspora in the rain without protection. The Palestinian National Council (PNC) contributed to this misery by conceding to the change of the Charter, instead of providing an umbrella to the diaspora. The PLO leadership followed suit by merging with the PA, leaving the members of its Executive Committee competing for posts as PA ministers. Consequently, the PLO - weakened by the PNC policy - has become unable to stand up on behalf of refugee communities in distress, as illustrated in the case of Lebanon. The return of the PLO leadership and its exclusive effort to build the Palestinian Authority has caused harm to both the refugees and the PLO institutions in the diaspora. It cut one of the two legs of the Palestinian national struggle which must be conducted simultaneously inside and outside the homeland. PLO institutions and representations outside were closed down. The absence of PLO infrastructure and services undermined the capacity of refugees in the diaspora to fight the pressures of resettlement, an infringement of their basic rights. Refugees' civil and social rights - including those of prisoners' and martyrs' families - are neglected. The frustration and disappointment created thereby make refugees susceptible to the promises of resettlement, such as naturalization and camp rehabilitation programs. As the PLO lost its power and authority, other groups gained strength, started legal measures against refugees (e.g. Jordanian landlords petitioning in court for the evacuation of refugee camps from their lands), or launched public initiatives for the integration of camps into the local municipal system (e.g. in the West Bank and Gaza Strip). 

The third challenge is UNRWA and the policy of its donor governments aimed at reducing the budget for UNRWA services. Despite the renewal of UNRWA's mandate until the end of 1999, discussion about the agency's future continues. Three scenarios are being raised: 

1) The first scenario ties the termination of UNRWA to the regional peace process and not to the implementation of UN Resolution 194. UNRWA, according to this view shared by the European governments, must be linked with the PA and gradually transfer its responsibilities to the latter. Or, in the view of the US government, UNRWA must be transformed into a development agency and operate in coordination with the PA without being subsumed by the latter. 

2) The second scenario calls for the continuation of UNRWA until the establishment of the Palestinian state as the outcome of the final status negotiations. Then UNRWA responsibilities, both inside and outside Palestine, should be transferred to the PA. This view is promoted by various Israeli academics, e.g. Emanuel Marx. 

3) The third scenario rejects termination of UNRWA until UN Resolution 194 is fully implemented. This is the refugees' position. 

The UNRWA donor meeting in Amman in March 1995 showed that there is a broad consensus about the need for UNRWA services until a political settlement of the refugee question is found. UNRWA has thus become linked to the progress of the current peace process and is no longer linked to the international resolutions. This is also the source of UNRWA's Peace Implementation Program. A new strategy for UNRWA has been designed, based on a distinction between UNRWA tasks in the PA areas and its tasks in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. 

For three years now, Palestinian refugees have been raising their voices against the termination of UNRWA services in protest leaflets, sit-ins, strikes, and press releases. Refugees everywhere have contended this donor policy. They have demanded the continuation of UNRWA services and have rejected the transfer of its tasks to the PA. Moreover, refugees call for coordinated action by the Arab host countries to stop the liquidation of UNRWA. They call upon the rich Arab states, especially the Arab Gulf States, to compensate for all funds which may be withdrawn by the United States. Refugees do not oppose coordination between UNRWA and the PA in the field of services. However, they consider the  status of the PA similar to the status of other Arab host countries. 

Fifty years after exile, Palestinian refugees have expressed their concern in various ways, the most serious and organized expression being the popular initiative launched in the West Bank by the 1995 al-Far'ah Conference. This Conference, organized by the Union of Youth Activity Centers/West Bank was unique in that it was the first popular refugee response to the Oslo Accords clearly stating refugees' positions and fears. It called upon refugees in Palestine and in the diaspora to organize themselves and to conduct regional conferences, a call which lead to the First Popular Refugee Conference in Bethlehem on 13 September 1996. Gaza refugees held a similar conference at the same time. Since then, popular refugee initiatives based on the program of al-Far'ah have continued, among them the Campaign for the Defense of Refugee Rights launched by three Palestinian organizations (Union of Youth Activity Centers/West Bank, BADIL-AlternativeInformation Center, al-Quds University/Refugee Studies Center) in 1997. These popular initiatives and debates have been documented and widely disseminated. 

Refugee criticism has found the support of Arab and Palestinian groups, critical Palestinian individuals outside and inside the PLO (e.g. Farouq al-Qaddumi, head of the PLO/Political Department), and Palestinian intellectuals in the West (e.g. Edward Sa'id) who oppose the Oslo Accords and criticize Arafat's leadership. Some of them (Hisham Sharabi, Nassir Arouri, Clovis Maqsoud/former Arab League representative to the UN) have called for the establishment of a lobby that will pressure Arab governments, the PLO, and the PA on behalf of refugee demands, i.e. for an alternative to the PLO. Other refugee organizations in the western diaspora (e.g. Palestinian Congress/USA, Foundation Conference of the Arab-Palestinian Community in Germany, Conference for the Right of Return/Belgium and Netherlands) have made attempts to re-organize Palestinians to defend  refugee rights, to resist resettlement, and to remain committed to the agenda of national liberation in the world in general, the Arab World in particular.  Palestinian officials and negotiators, on the other hand, have been on the defensive - as they say - forced to concentrate their efforts to prevent the implementation of destructive foreign plans. A clear Palestinian strategy and program on the refugee question is lacking. The Palestinian negotiators failed to obtain more than a vague mention of the 1948 refugee question in the Oslo agenda. Surprisingly enough, the emergence of the popular refugee initiatives has so far been overlooked by Palestinian experts and academics. Elia Zureik, for example, in his latest book (Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process, IPS, 1996/English, 1997/Arabic) does not include any references to the popular refugee conferences in Palestine, even in the chapter dedicated to official Palestinian positions and the unofficial refugee stand. 

The question is not "What Do Refugees Want?", but  
"How Strong Can We Become?" 

Refugee demands are based on a broad consensus: the right of return and a solution to be negotiated in the framework of the United Nations, and not in the framework of Oslo. The popular refugee conferences after Oslo have issued the required strategic program (e.g. recommendations of the 1996 conference in Bethlehem, published in ARTICLE 74/17). However, due to the diversity of opinion among refugees regarding the proper relationship to the PLO and the PA, the program of the popular refugee conferences has not yet been implemented, and refugees have remained unable to elect their leadership. The main obstacles encountered are the following: 

1. The PA and some Palestinian political parties regard an independent refugee leadership as a threat, because it may present itself as an alternative to the PLO and the PA. 

2. The PA fears that an independent refugee leadership will strengthen the Palestinian opposition inside the PLO and from among the Islamic movement. 

3. A large sector of the Palestinian leadership views the PA as a personal economic project. In their view, the PLO is no longer needed - at least in the 1967 occupied territories - and the right of return has become obsolete. 

4. Part of the Palestinian opposition believes that a new representative refugee body will eventually be integrated into the PA and its negotiation teams. It is therefore wiser to abstain from the establishment of such a body. 

5. The fact that refugees in the diaspora (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) have not joined the initiative of popular refugee conferences has weakened the movement in Palestine. 

Given the broad refugee consensus on their central demands, the question is not "what do refugees want?" The question at stake is whether refugees in the 21st century will be able to overcome the above mentioned obstacles despite the unfavorable balance of forces, locally, regionally, and internationally.