Palestinian Public Perceptions, Report VII (excerpts)

Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva

The Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED) at the University of Geneva has been monitoring the socio-economic status of Palestinians in the OPTs since the onset of the second intifada. The following excerpts from IUED's 7th monitoring report cover the situation of Palestinian refugees which covers the situation in the OPTs from July 2003 – February 2004.

Overall, refugees are comparatively poorer than non-refugees. In terms of household income, this means that the percentage of refugees below the poverty line (60 percent) (including the hardship cases, i.e. those who earn half or less than the level of income needed to be on the poverty line) is higher than non-refugees (53 percent).

Refugee camps clearly emerged as a focal point of poverty, with proportionally more hardship cases (38 percent), than in cities and villages (22 percent and 15 percent respectively). Hardship cases constitute the majority of the camp population, while in other areas the majority of the population is above the poverty line. However, this pattern in refugee camps is mainly due to conditions in the Gaza Strip, where nearly half of camp residents are hardship cases. In the West Bank one finds more hardship cases outside the camps.

Levels of poverty among refugees are lower than in July 2003 when 66 percent, i.e. an additional six percent, were considered below the poverty line and hardship cases. Non-refugees are slightly worse-off than in July 2003, as percentages of non-refugee hardship cases and those below the poverty line climbed from 51 percent to 53 percent.

The refugees better socio-economic situation is due to the improvement in their employment conditions. Between July 2003 and February 2004, the percentage of full-time employed among refugees increased by 6 percent (from 48 percent to 54 percent), while the percentage of unemployed decreased by 5 percent (from 25 percent to 20 percent). During the same period, non-refugees experienced a decline in the full-time employment by 5 percent (from 48 percent to 43 percent), while the number of unemployed increased by 2 percent (25 percent to 27 percent).

The overall socio-economic status improvement observed among refugees reflected the improvement of conditions for West Bank camp dwellers (98 percent of them being refugees), who appear to have benefited more from the relative relaxing of Israel's closure policy. The percentage of hardship cases in this group declined by 12 percent (from 28 percent to 16 percent), while the percentage of people above the poverty line increased by 10 percent (from 35 percent to 45 percent).

In contrast, conditions for Gaza camp dwellers (94 percent of them being refugees) deteriorated dramatically, with the percentage of hardship cases among Gaza refugee camp residents rising from 36 percent to 46 percent and the proportion of those above the poverty line dropping from 31 percent to 23 percent.

Perceptions of purchasing power do not match improved socio-economic status

The refugees perceptions of their purchasing power do not significantly reflect their overall improved socio-economic status between July 2003 and February 2004. Hence, the percentage of refugees who perceived their income as lower than needed was significantly higher than average: 71 percent of them believed their income to be much less (41 percent) or slightly less (30 percent) than needed. Non-refugees were less dissatisfied about their income.

These perceptions are nevertheless more positive than those of July 2003, however the perception of improved conditions is slightly more prevalent among non-refugees. Between July 2003 and February 2004, the percentage of respondents who considered their income less than needed decreased by 6 percent among non-refugees and by 5 percent among refugees. Over the same period, the percentage of respondents who considered their income higher than needed increased by 7 percent among non-refugees and by only one percent among refugees.

The comparatively underprivileged status of refugees is generally ascribed to the latter's lack of access to capital, land and alternative sources of income, to greater expenses due to persistent unmet needs or to a decrease in the socio-economic assistance provided, rather than conjectural factors linked to mobility problems or to types of employment available.

Refugees are affected less than military closure that non-refugees

The closure policy imposed by Israel in the OPT affected refugees less than non-refugees. In general, 66 percent of the latter experienced a lot of mobility problems versus 51 percent of the former. And while relatively similar percentages of both categories encountered difficulties in getting access to places of work, fewer refugees suffered from business losses due to curfew (28 percent versus 40 percent of non-refugees). Also, the construction of the Wall prevented more non-refugees (36 percent) from getting to their place of work than refugees (21 percent).

When examining area of residence, camp residents (88 percent) (and residents of cities) are in general less exposed to mobility restrictions than villagers (95 percent), with regards to reaching place of work (47 percent versus 62 percent, respectively), or to suffering business losses because of curfews (21 percent versus 45 percent, respectively). In addition, the camp residents comparative advantage vis-à-vis residents of villages is all the more obvious when it comes to Wall-related access to work problems: 18 percent of camp residents were affected in this respect, versus 22 percent of city residents and 47 percent of village residents.

Refugees are more vulnerable to variations in the job market

There is no significant difference between refugees and non-refugees regarding employment situation and unemployment status per se. Students (11 percent) and retired people (2 percent) excluded, 13 percent of refugees are not employed. In addition, around half of the main breadwinners (54 percent) have gone through various periods of unemployment since the beginning of the intifada, most of those periods extending from 7 to 24 months (26 percent). When employed, however, refugees tend to receive their salaries more regularly and fully than non-refugees (75 percent versus 61 percent), perhaps because they are employed in more sustainable job sectors, such as the public sector (where 32 percent of refugees are employed versus 27 percent of non-refugees) or in international agencies (where 12 percent of refugees are employed versus 6 percent of non-refugees).

Conversely, refugees seem to be more vulnerable to variations in the local job market. These variations have had a comparatively larger impact on their level of income, as they enjoy fewer alternative sources of income, such as work in Israel or in another country (14 percent versus 16 percent of non-refugees), independent income (27 percent versus 40 percent of non-refugees) or property renting (10 percent versus 14 percent of non-refugees). Likewise, they are less in a position to sustain the hardship by selling property (5 percent versus 8 percent of non-refugees) or by cultivating land (10 percent versus 31 percent). bot program sender.services for dating sites Financial help from international organizations somehow helps allay difficulties: 21 percent of refugees benefit from this kind of assistance versus 11 percent of non-refugees but international aid is not stable.

Ultimately, one finds refugees more likely to resort to short-term measures in order to sustain the hardship, such as reducing expenses (79 percent versus 74 percent of non-refugees) or not paying water and electricity bills (45 percent versus 39 percent of non-refugees). Fewer opportunities for alternative sources of income result in higher percentages of refugees ascribing a drop in income to job losses: 34 percent of refugees versus 25 percent of non-refugees reported themselves in that situation. Among other causes of income decline, our survey underscored working hour losses (27 percent versus 24 percent of non-refugees) and business/cultivable land damaged (9 percent versus 10 percent of non-refugees).

Job loss was also the major cause of income decline in refugee camps (48 percent) and in villages (29 percent), ahead of working hour loss (23 percent for refugee camp residents and 22 percent for villagers). The impact of job losses was more marked in Gaza refugee camps, where the percentage of camp residents naming job loss as the reason for their drop in income was over twice as great as among those residing outside camps.

Refugees generally satisfied with assistance but want UNRWA to improve services

Refugees satisfaction with international assistance inevitably reflects upon UNRWA. The austerity measures the Agency was bound to adopt as a result of budget restrictions, and the persistence of gaps in the levels of employment and financial aid delivered, do not seem to have altered the overall favorable opinion refugees have towards the Agency. This attitude may stem from the safety net constituted by its various emergency and regular programs. It may also be due to the political significance of the its mandate, which is widely interpreted by the OPT population as the embodiment of the refugees political rights as enshrined in paragraph 11 of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III).

Whatever words refugees have used to portray the Agency, from our father to the contemptuous stepmother, UNRWA has over the years become part of the OPT social fabric. The only question remaining to be discussed here relates to how the refugees see the future of UNRWA within the context of the peace process. A significant proportion of refugees and non-refugees stated that UNRWA should be preserved until the refugee issue is solved. On average, respondents suggesting that the advent of a Palestinian state trigger the dismantlement of UNRWA services were three times fewer and those advocating the immediate dismantlement of UNRWA were fourteen times fewer than those who advocated its continuation. Refugee status here is relevant in the sense that non-refugees were more ready to opt for a dismantling of UNRWA once a Palestinian state is established or as soon as possible.