

THE ISRAELI REGIME'S EVACUATION ORDERS IN GAZA AND LEBANON:

A COVER FOR FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND POPULATION TRANSFER

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Position Paper:

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The Israeli Regime's Evacuation Orders in Gaza and Lebanon: A Cover for Forced Displacement and Population Transfer

INTRODUCTION

The Israeli regime's recent policies and practices to reshape political and territorial realities are neither new nor ambiguous; they are central to sustaining its colonial-apartheid regime and broader settler-colonial project. As the world observes the live-broadcast genocide in the Gaza Strip, a parallel escalation is unfolding in Lebanon through the same underlying doctrine of territorial control and population removal. Enabled and supported by the United States (US), these actions encompass a range of violations, including forced displacement, domicide, denial of return, territorial consolidation, and demographic restructuring. To obscure their function and illegality, these crimes are framed under the language of "evacuation" and "security." Rather, these longstanding policies are rooted in settler-colonial expansion and the consolidation of control that have defined the Israeli regime since its creation.

According to the international legal framework on lawful evacuations, Israeli "evacuation orders" in Gaza and Lebanon must be assessed against whether they are justified by imperative military necessity or civilian protection, and not used for punitive or coercive purposes.¹ They satisfy none of the conditions required for lawful evacuation and have no protective character or purpose. Rather, they function as

¹ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Rule 129. The Act of Displacement," Customary IHL Database, accessed June 15, 2026, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule129>.

a mechanism of colonial expansion and domination. This is evidenced by their scale, frequency, suddenness, and geographic scope, alongside sustained bombardment and destruction of civilian infrastructure, which exclude any genuine reliance on military necessity or civilian protection.²

2 “Israeli Forces Using Gaza Playbook in Lebanon, Decimating Water Infrastructure,” Oxfam International, March 24, 2026, <https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/israeli-forces-using-gaza-playbook-lebanon-decimating-water-infrastructure>.

SECTION ONE:

ISRAELI FORCED DISPLACEMENT UNDER THE GUISE OF “EVACUATION”

1.1 The Legal Framework Governing Evacuations

Under international humanitarian law, evacuation is defined as the temporary relocation of civilians facing an imminent threat within a conflict zone to safer areas where they can be protected. As defined under the Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 49)³ and Additional Protocol II (Article 17),⁴ it is an exceptional, last-resort measure that may only be used when all other protections have failed. Crucially, evacuations must be coordinated by humanitarian actors, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), based on rigorous, risk-based assessments to protect life and dignity.⁵ Therefore, a lawful evacuation can be defined by three core principles: it must be strictly voluntary, based on the informed and non-discriminatory consent of affected populations; it must be safe, ensuring protection, dignity, and adequate conditions; and temporary, allowing for return as soon as conditions permit. These principles form the legal framework against which the Israeli regime’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon must be assessed.

The broader prohibition on forcible displacement under international humanitarian law reinforces this framework. The Fourth Geneva

3 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Article 49 – Deportations, Transfers, Evacuations,” IHL Databases, accessed June 30, 2026, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49>.

4 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),” IHL Databases, June 8, 1977, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/apii-1977/article-17/commentary/1987>.

5 “Humanitarian Evacuations by Humanitarian Organizations in Situations of Armed Conflict,” UNHCR, September 19, 2025, <https://emergency.unhcr.org/protection/protection-mechanisms/humanitarian-evacuations-humanitarian-organizations-situations-armed-conflict>.

Convention explicitly forbids both the transfer of protected populations and the use of coercive conditions—such as threats, violence, or terror—to induce displacement, particularly where such practices are linked to territorial control or demographic engineering.⁶ This prohibition extends to both individual and mass displacement and is further affirmed under customary international humanitarian law, including Rule 129 of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Customary International Humanitarian Law.⁷ Unlawful deportation and forcible transfer constitute grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention⁸ and are recognized as war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).⁹ Accordingly, the legality of any purported evacuation cannot be determined by its formal designation or stated security rationale; it must be assessed through its actual conditions of implementation and its impact on the affected population.

1.2 Coercion and Forced Displacement

First, lawful evacuation under international humanitarian law requires displacement to remain genuinely voluntary, informed, and non-discriminatory. In both Gaza and Lebanon, displacement has not occurred through free or informed choice, but under conditions of coercion sustained by continued Israeli attacks and bombardment. In the Gaza Strip, evacuation orders have been systematically accompanied by intensive bombardment, the destruction of infrastructure, and

6 Médecins Sans Frontières, “Evacuation The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law,” Guide-Humanitarian-Law, May 10, 2026, <https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/evacuation>.

7 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Rule 129. The Act of Displacement,” Customary IHL Database, accessed June 15, 2026, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule129>.

8 International Criminal Court (ICC), *Elements of Crimes*, Legal document (2013), 4, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf>.

9 International Criminal Court (ICC), *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, Legal document (The Hague, Netherlands, 2021), 6, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf>.

the denial of humanitarian aid, leaving Palestinians in Gaza with no sufficient time to think and with no meaningful alternative but to flee.¹⁰ As a result, nearly all 2.1 million Palestinians have been internally displaced at least six or seven times.¹¹ As of September 2025, more than 93% of the Gaza Strip has been placed under these unlawful evacuation orders.¹²

Similarly, “evacuation warnings” have been issued suddenly and alongside widespread and sustained airstrikes by the Israeli regime on Lebanon. Over 1.1 million people have been displaced,¹³ with blanket “evacuation orders” covering 14% of Lebanon, including areas stretching from the Litani River to regions north of the Zahrani River, roughly 40 km from the border.¹⁴ Between 2 March and 1 May alone, more than 3,688 Israeli strikes were recorded across the country, concentrated particularly in south Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley.¹⁵

In both Gaza and Lebanon, homes, vehicles, farmland, and infrastructure were repeatedly hit, producing conditions in which everyday life itself becomes increasingly unviable, effectively forcing both populations to

10 Forensic Architecture, *Inhumane Zones: An Assessment of Israel's Actions with Respect to the Provision of Aid, Shelter, Safe Passage, and Assistance to Evacuees in Gaza; Response to Questions Raised in the ICJ on 17 May 2024* (2024), <https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/humanitarian-violence-in-gaza>.

11 OCHA, “Humanitarian Situation Report 26 June 2026,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory, June 26, 2026, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-26-june-2026>.

12 OCHA, “Israeli Military Displacement Orders,” September 13, 2025, <https://bit.ly/456K6Ld>

13 “UNRWA Situation Report #10 on the Lebanon Emergency Response 2026,” UNRWA, accessed July 31, 2026, <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-10-lebanon-emergency-response-2026>.

14 “Secretary-General’s Press Conference in Beirut Secretary-General,” United Nations, Beirut Lebanon, March 14, 2026, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-events/2026-03-14/secretary-generals-press-conference-beirut>.

15 “Vision of Destruction: Israel’s Assault on Southern Lebanon in Video, Maps and Charts,” The Guardian, May 11, 2026, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/11/vision-destruction-israel-assault-southern-lebanon-video-maps-charts>.

flee under the pressure of continuous bombardment and infrastructural collapse. Under such conditions, displacement cannot meaningfully be characterized as voluntary, but rather as coerced movement produced through the systematic use of force and fear.

The deliberate mass destruction extends beyond residential infrastructure to the wider networks that sustain community existence, isolating communities and dismantling the material foundations necessary for recovery. In Gaza, one way this policy is manifested is in the systematic targeting and destruction of healthcare. Since the beginning of 2026, there have been 28 attacks on hospitals and health centers, further weakening an already fragile system.¹⁶ Of the 683 health service points across Gaza, only 296 remain functional, and just 23 are operating at full capacity, including hospitals, field hospitals, and primary healthcare centers.¹⁷ In Lebanon, this policy was especially visible in the targeting of bridges crossing the Litani River.¹⁸ The Israeli regime destroyed these crossings, claiming they were being used for the transport of fighters and weapons.¹⁹ In practice, the destruction of bridges severed critical routes to medical care, supplies, transportation, and escape routes.²⁰ For those trapped in the south, every destroyed bridge represented another connection to the outside world cut off.

16 World Health Organization, "Attacks on Health Care in the Gaza Strip (Since 1 January 2026 - 30 June 2026)," July 23, 2026, <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/attacks-health-care-gaza-strip-1-january-2026-30-june-2026>.

17 OCHA, "Gaza Aid Grows, but Health System Still Struggling - OCHA," *Question of Palestine*, April 28, 2026, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-aid-grows-but-health-system-still-struggling-ocha/>.

18 Mohammad Sio, "Israeli Prime Minister Orders Army to 'Immediately' Bomb Bridges over Litani River in Southern Lebanon," Anadolu, March 22, 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israeli-prime-minister-orders-army-to-immediately-bomb-bridges-over-litani-river-in-southern-lebanon/3874740>.

19 "Israel Struck Two Bridges over Lebanon's Litani River, Defence Minister Says," Middle East, *Reuters*, March 18, 2026, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-struck-two-bridges-over-lebanons-litani-river-defence-minister-says-2026-03-18/>.

20 Human Rights Watch, "Lebanon: Israeli Bridge Attack a Potential War Crime," Human Rights Watch, April 16, 2026, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/16/lebanon-israeli-bridge-attack-a-potential-war-crime>.

1.3 The Absence of Safe and Humane Conditions

Second, evacuations must uphold the rights of the population affected, ensuring safety, dignity, and family unity, and must be carried out under humane conditions. In both Gaza and Lebanon, these conditions are fundamentally absent. Safety in this context requires the existence of genuinely safe zones—areas not subjected to bombardment, targeted attacks, or arbitrary arrest, where people can realistically seek protection. In Gaza, areas designated as “safe” have repeatedly been targeted, reinforcing that movement is not a choice but a survival strategy under threat of death.²¹ For example, on 18 May 2026, an Israeli airstrike hit makeshift shelters in Jabalya Camp, damaging tents belonging to 35 families.²² This is also evident in the ongoing Israeli aggression against Lebanon, where continued attacks and killings have occurred in designated “safe zones.”²³

Dignity entails access to: adequate shelter, humanitarian aid, healthcare, education, and the basic conditions necessary for sustaining life.²⁴ In both Gaza and Lebanon, the Israeli regime systematically undermines dignity through the obstruction of humanitarian access, siege and blockade

21 Ground Truth Solutions and Ground Truth Solutions, Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD), *Save What Remains of Gaza.* “Community Perspectives on Aid, Survival and Humanity during the Genocide” (2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/save-what-remains-gaza-community-perspectives-aid-survival-and-humanity-during-genocide-september-2025>.

22 OCHA, “Humanitarian Situation Report 25 May 2026,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory, May 25, 2026, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-25-may-2026>.

23 “Israel Escalates Attacks on Lebanon, Killing at Least 7 in ‘Safe Zone,’” Bastille Global Post, April 7, 2026, <https://www.bastillepost.com/global/article/5753507-israel-escalates-attacks-on-lebanon-killing-at-least-7-in-safe-zone>.

24 Susan Forbes Martin et al., eds., *Handbook for applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (UN, OCHA ; The Brookings Institution, 1999), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/533004>.

measures,²⁵ and the banning of UNRWA.²⁶ These, combined with the already overwhelming and limited shelter capacity, lack of health care, and other services, undermine basic human dignity and rights, in addition to not meeting the requirements for safety and security.

Moreover, communities and families are cut off from one another through repeated displacement, bombardment, and the destruction of infrastructure. In the Gaza Strip, an estimated 20,000 children are currently separated from their families and living with host families.²⁷ Many children have lost one or both parents, and in a significant number of cases, reunification is no longer expected, leaving children in prolonged conditions of uncertainty and legal vulnerability. Similar patterns are emerging in Lebanon, where children have been separated from their families amid rapid displacement, ongoing insecurity, and the obstruction and breakdown of protection systems.²⁸

1.4 Displacement Without Return

Third, for an evacuation to remain lawful, it must be temporary and must guarantee return. In both Gaza and Lebanon, however, the Israeli regime's policies increasingly point in the opposite direction: toward

25 Palestinian Rights Committee, "Two Months Under Siege: UN Palestinian Rights Committee Bureau Demands Immediate Lifting of Gaza Blockade and Welcomes Ongoing ICJ Proceedings," *Question of Palestine*, n.d., accessed July 31, 2026, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/cripp-press-release-gaza-siege-6may2025/>.

26 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Engineered Collapse: The United Nations' Strategic Assessment of UNRWA and Palestinian Refugee Rights, Position Paper (BADIL, 2025), 26, https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2025/08/04/pp-engineeredcollapseofunrwa-1754313775.pdf.

27 The International Rescue Committee (IRC), "New IRC Assessment Warns Gaza's Children Face Grave Protection Risks Following War and Family Separation | The IRC," The International Rescue Committee (IRC), March 30, 2026, <https://www.rescue.org/press-release/new-irc-assessment-warns-gazas-children-face-grave-protection-risks-following-war-and>.

28 "NEWS QUOTE: 'Many Children Are Separated from Their Families and Loved Ones in Lebanon. Our Teams Are Working around the Clock to Reunite Them,'" Save the Children International, April 9, 2026, <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/news-quote-many-children-are-separated-their-families-and-loved-ones-lebanon-our-teams-are>.

preventing return. Return is denied directly through military control, exclusion zones, and explicit prohibitions on re-entry, and indirectly through demographic restructuring and the destruction of homes, infrastructure, livelihoods, and essential services that make life possible. The cumulative effect is not temporary displacement but the production of conditions in which return becomes impossible in practice.

1.4.1 Territorial Control and the Permanent Prevention of Return

The Israeli regime has attempted to present its plans to push Palestinians out of Gaza as “voluntary migration,” despite all the documented coercive conditions under which any such departure would take place. In March 2025, the Israeli Security Cabinet established a dedicated directorate to facilitate this “voluntary migration” of Palestinians to third countries.²⁹ In June 2026, Israeli officials had rebranded the initiative as the “Free Movement Plan,” reportedly to make it more internationally acceptable and revive support for it.³⁰ Changing the terminology does not alter the policy: it merely seeks to disguise forcible transfer by presenting Palestinians’ displacement as a matter of individual choice rather than the result of coercive conditions deliberately imposed by the Israeli regime. This discursive rebranding is accompanied by material measures that entrench displacement and prevent return through demographic restructuring and consolidation of territorial control.

The Israeli regime’s current approach to territorial control and demographic restructuring is taking shape through the imposition of the

29 Euro-Med Human Rights, “Disguised as ‘Voluntary Migration’, Israel’s Forced Displacement Campaign Unfolds in Gaza amid Deafening Int’l Silence,” Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, April 24, 2025, <https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/6693/Disguised-as-%E2%80%98voluntary-migration%E2%80%99,-Israel%E2%80%99s-forced-displacement-campaign-unfolds-in-Gaza-amid-deafening-int%E2%80%99l-silence>.

30 Said Amori, “Israel Rebrands Gaza Displacement Plan amid Backlash over Forced Transfer Concerns: Report,” Anadolu, JERUSALEM, June 29, 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-rebrands-gaza-displacement-plan-amid-backlash-over-forced-transfer-concerns-report/3980749>.

“yellow line,” a *de facto* colonial boundary that is quickly becoming a blueprint for long-term expansion and consolidation.³¹ In the Gaza Strip, developments since the fake ceasefire and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2803,³² alongside Trump’s 20-point plan, reveal the reality of ongoing territorial expansion and control on the ground.³³

In addition to the siege of the Gaza Strip, from within the internal yellow line has steadily advanced in multiple areas, placing around 60% of the Gaza Strip under direct Israeli control. Netanyahu has clearly stated the goal of expanding this control even further, saying: “We currently control 60% of the Gaza Strip, and my directives are to move toward controlling 70%.”³⁴ In parallel, the emergence of a secondary “orange line” further deepens this layered system of control ³⁵ cutting off an additional 11% of the Gaza Strip and marking further zones of restricted or lethal access.³⁶ This system of territorial control also directly obstructs humanitarian access, with 126 UNRWA facilities behind the “yellow line,” while others lie within the “orange line,” where access is restricted and subject to Israeli approval or coordination.³⁷

31 Tarek Chouiref, “Israel Plans to Widen Gaza’s ‘Yellow Line,’ Shrinking Available Living Space for Palestinians,” Anadolu, June 5, 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-plans-to-widen-gaza-s-yellow-line-shrinking-available-living-space-for-palestinians/3957097>.

32 United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2803 (2025)*, S/RES/2803 (United Nations, 2025), [https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803\(2025\)](https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025)).

33 “Full Text: Trump’s 20-Point ‘Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict,’” *The Times of Israel*, September 29, 2025, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-trumps-comprehensive-plan-to-end-the-gaza-conflict/>.

34 Abdel Ra’ouf Arnaout, “Netanyahu Says Israel Controls 60% of Gaza, Aims to Expand to 70%: Report,” May 28, 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/netanyahu-says-israel-controls-60-of-gaza-aims-to-expand-to-70-report/3950646>.

35 Tarek Chouiref, “Gaza’s ‘Orange Line’: Israel Expands Control beyond Ceasefire Limits,” Anadolu, May 3, 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/gaza-s-orange-line-israel-expands-control-beyond-ceasefire-limits/3925346>.

36 “Orange Line: Israeli Occupation Army Tightens Deadly Grip on 65% of Gaza Land,” Reports, *The Palestinian Information Center*, May 11, 2026, <https://english.palinfo.com/reports/2026/05/11/362923/>.

37 “UNRWA Situation Report #224 on the Humanitarian Crisis in the Gaza Strip and the Occupied West Bank, Including East Jerusalem,” UNRWA, June 3, 2026, <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-224-humanitarian-crisis-gaza-strip-and-occupied-west-bank>.

The expansion of these lines has been accompanied by an expanding, unmarked zone where any Palestinian presence is targeted, with at least 269 Palestinians shot near the yellow line in the first six months following the “ceasefire” alone.³⁸ Through these newly imposed corridors, the Israeli regime is not only entrenching this boundary but also fragmenting and enclaving Gaza internally, controlling aid, isolating communities, and compressing millions of people into an increasingly restricted enclave.³⁹ These measures fundamentally undermine the temporary nature required for lawful evacuation and instead indicate an effort to permanently alter territorial and demographic realities on the ground, imposing permanent displacement.

The Israeli regime is replicating this model in Lebanon. The “yellow line” has been extended 10 kilometers into Lebanese territory,⁴⁰ establishing a “security buffer zone” that encompasses roughly 6% of the country’s south.⁴¹ Established following the 17 April “ceasefire,” the zone includes more than 50 villages currently occupied by Israeli forces.⁴² Treated as a “free-fire area,” Israeli forces assert power by fire, mirroring the Gaza doctrine to facilitate territorial control. This zoning has pushed the scale of forced displacement to keep escalating, while residents of dozens of southern towns have been explicitly told

38 Seham Tantesh and Julian Borger, “Gaza’s Yellow Line Creeps Forward as Israeli Forces Expand Zone of Control,” World News, The Guardian, April 22, 2026, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/22/gaza-yellow-line-creeps-westwards-israel>.

39 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, The Israeli Apartheid Spatial Regime: Fragmentation and Enclavement of Palestine, Working Paper no. 33 (BADIL, 2026), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2026/03/30/wp33-fragmentation-and-enclavement-of-palestine-1774864495.pdf.

40 Yusra Asif, “Israel’s ‘Yellow Line’ in Lebanon Deepens Tensions with Hezbollah,” Al Arabiya English, April 30, 2026, <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/04/30/israel-s-yellow-line-in-lebanon-deepens-tensions-with-hezbollah>.

41 Hélène Sallon, “In Lebanon, Israel establishes an uninhabited buffer zone behind a ‘yellow line,’” World, Lebanon, Le Monde, April 23, 2026, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/04/23/in-lebanon-israel-establishes-an-uninhabited-buffer-zone-behind-a-yellow-line_6752747_4.html.

42 William Christou et al., “Vision of Destruction: Israel’s Assault on Southern Lebanon in Video, Maps and Charts,” World News, The Guardian, May 11, 2026, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/11/vision-destruction-israel-assault-southern-lebanon-video-maps-charts>.

they will not be permitted to return. What the Israeli regime calls a “security zone” is, in every meaningful sense, a permanent seizure of land achieved through the mass expulsion and the destruction of the conditions of life necessary for survival and return.

1.4.2 Domicide and the Destruction of the Conditions for Return

The prevention of return is also enforced through domicile, the systematic destruction of the built environment to ensure that return is not just prohibited, but physically impossible.⁴³ Domicide and sustained bombardment form a central component of the Israeli regime’s strategy, materializing its policies through the large-scale, calculated destruction. In the Gaza Strip, the level of infrastructural devastation has effectively reversed development by decades, with approximately 81% of structures destroyed, including an estimated 92% of housing, rendering vast areas fundamentally uninhabitable.⁴⁴ This destruction is not simply a result of urban warfare, but a calculated dismantling of the conditions necessary for human life. The widespread erasure and domicile in Gaza are intended to ensure that, even if Palestinians attempt to return, they encounter a landscape stripped of its social fabric, infrastructure, and means of survival.

In Lebanon, more than 11,000 buildings have been demolished and entire frontier villages rigged for remote detonation.⁴⁵ Since 17 April, at least 120 towns and villages in Lebanon have experienced Israeli

43 United Nations Human Rights Council, Domicide: Mass Destruction of Housing and Civilian Infrastructure in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine, A/HRC/61/43/Add.3 (2026), <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/domicide-report-26feb26/>.

44 United Nations Institute for Training and Research, “UNOSAT Gaza Strip Comprehensive Damage Assessment,” *Question of Palestine*, n.d., accessed July 31, 2026, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unosat-gaza-strip-damage-assessment-31oct25/>.

45 “Israel Has Completely Destroyed More than 11,000 Buildings in Southern Lebanon since Start of War, According to UNDP,” *L’Orient Today*, June 22, 2026, <https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1538967/more-than-11000-buildings-completely-destroyed-since-the-start-of-the-war-in-southern-lebanon-according-to-undp.html>.

bombardment at least once.⁴⁶ As in Gaza, this destruction operates not merely as a consequence of hostilities but as a mechanism that denies return by eliminating the physical and service infrastructure, including roads and bridges, required for communities to re-establish themselves.

These mechanisms do not operate independently, but as a coordinated Israeli colonial system. Forced displacement removes the population; territorial control, materialized through military force and the imposition of the “yellow line,” secures the land; demographic restructuring consolidates this transformation; and domicile and infrastructure destruction ensure its permanence by eliminating the material conditions necessary for return.

⁴⁶ BBC Monitoring, “Israel ‘Destroyed, Damaged over 10,000 Homes’ in Lebanon in a Month, Report Says,” ACLED, May 14, 2026, <https://acleddata.com/media-citation/israel-destroyed-damaged-over-10000-homes-lebanon-month-report-says-bbc-monitoring>.

SECTION TWO: A UNIFIED ISRAELI COLONIAL SYSTEM OF DISPLACEMENT

2.1 Replication in the West Bank

The Israeli regime frames its evacuation orders as a security necessity, issued to protect civilians by separating them from militant infrastructure, often with only 10 to 30 minutes to a few hours' notice.⁴⁷ However, this justification is legally incorrect, as "evacuation" does not permit strikes on hospitals, tents, schools, and religious sites. For example, medical facilities have special protections to ensure their continued ability to care for both combatants and civilians.⁴⁸ Even within the logic of the Israeli regime's own claims, this protection is repeatedly undermined by its mass bombardment and targeting of such facilities in both Gaza and Lebanon. The use of legal language to justify and cover up its crimes, while simultaneously violating the core protections it invokes, does not erase the crimes it continues to commit. Nor is this model confined to Gaza and Lebanon. The same logic of displacement, territorial control, and demographic restructuring as "evacuations" is increasingly evident in the refugee camps in the northern West Bank.

On 21 January 2025, Israeli forces launched "Operation Iron Wall,"⁴⁹ framed as a response to armed resistance and alleged "threats" in the

47 "Lebanon: Israel's Evacuation 'Warnings' for Civilians Misleading and Inadequate," *Amnesty International Canada*, October 10, 2024, <https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/lebanon-israels-evacuation-warnings-misleading-inadequate/>.

48 Khang Phan and Thao Nguyen, "Hospitals under Fire: Legal and Practical Challenges Protection," *Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog*, March 6, 2025, <https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2025/03/06/hospitals-under-fire-legal-and-practical-challenges-to-strengthened-protection/>.

49 OCHA, "Northern West Bank Humanitarian Response Update 21 January - 30 April 2025," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 11, 2025, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/northern-west-bank-humanitarian-response-update-21-january-30-april-2025>.

area.⁵⁰ The operation began in Jenin before expanding to Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps, involving large-scale military incursions, airstrikes, ground operations, and armored units. While justified through the language of military necessity, it has extended beyond short-term raids into a prolonged Israeli forces presence and an ongoing process of spatial transformation. In Nur Shams, more than 3,000 housing units have been destroyed or rendered uninhabitable.⁵¹ At the same time, in Jenin refugee camp, approximately 43% of structures have been damaged, alongside the widespread destruction of roads and essential infrastructure.⁵²

Israeli large-scale evacuation and demolition orders⁵³ have displaced more than 33,000 Palestinians from Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nur Shams refugee camps.⁵⁴ With no places to “evacuate,” severe restrictions on humanitarian access, and the banning of UNRWA, have further undermined conditions for return.⁵⁵ Entire camp areas have been emptied of residents, while continued military control, mass demolitions, and

50 Ameneh Mehvar and Nasser Khmour, *Iron Wall or Iron Fist? Palestinian Militancy and Israel's Campaign to Reshape the Northern West Bank* (ACLED, 2025), https://acleddata.com/report/iron-wall-or-iron-fist-palestinian-militancy-and-israels-campaign-reshape-northern-west-0?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=iron-wall-or-iron-fist-palestinian-militancy-and-israels-campaign-to-reshape-the-northern-west-bank.

51 UNOSAT, “Comprehensive Damage Assessment and Security Analysis of Tulkarm, Nur Shams and Jenin Refugee Camps in Tulkarm and Jenin Governorates, West Bank, Occupied Palestinian Territory (23 February 2026),” March 5, 2026, https://unosat.org/static/unosat_filesystem/4149/UN-OCHA_027_UNOSAT_CE20231007PSE_WestBank_RefugeeCamps_CDA_SA_20250519.pdf.

52 Ibid.

53 OCHA, “Northern West Bank Humanitarian Response Update 21 January - 30 April 2025,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 11, 2025, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/northern-west-bank-humanitarian-response-update-21-january-30-april-2025>.

54 OCHA, “Humanitarian Situation Report 5 June 2026,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory, June 6, 2026, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-5-june-2026>.

55 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Engineered Collapse: The United Nations' Strategic Assessment of UNRWA and Palestinian Refugee Rights*, Position Paper (BADIL, 2025), 26, https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2025/08/04/pp-engineeredcollapseofunrwa-1754313775.pdf.

plans for a permanent Israeli military base near Jenin refugee camp have rendered return increasingly impossible.⁵⁶ Refugee camps are not merely residential spaces but material expressions of the Palestinian right to return. Their transformation reflects the extension of a unified colonial logic exercised by the Israeli regime across Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank: displacement through force, consolidation of territorial control, and the gradual foreclosure of return.

2.2 International Complicity and the Production of Impunity

The ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip and aggression in Lebanon have been consistently concealed through the so-called announcements, ceasefire talks, and the manipulation of media narratives that present escalation as restraint. “Evacuation orders” are used as a cover with manipulated interpretations of events that allow the Israeli regime to continue its crimes while projecting the illusion of de-escalation. Since October 2023, at least 72,599 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip as of 29 April 2026.⁵⁷ Despite the announcement of a ceasefire, the Israeli regime has continued its killings, with a further 1,185 Palestinians killed in Gaza since then.⁵⁸ Moreover, ongoing Israeli attacks on displacement sites and shelters have continued the cycle of forced displacement, driving Palestinians from their land while advancing Israeli consolidation and control.⁵⁹ In Lebanon, since March

56 “First Permanent Israeli Base Since Oslo Rises near Jenin amid Continuing Resistance Attacks,” *Palestine Chronicle*, June 11, 2026, <https://www.palestinechronicle.com/first-permanent-israeli-base-since-oslo-rises-near-jenin-amid-continuing-resistance-attacks/>.

57 “UNRWA Situation Report #220 on the Humanitarian Crisis in the Gaza Strip and the Occupied West Bank, Including East Jerusalem,” UNRWA, May 7, 2026, <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-220-humanitarian-crisis-gaza-strip-and-occupied-west-bank>.

58 Médecins Sans Frontières, “Gaza: This Is Not a Ceasefire. It Is Structural Violence by Another Name,” USA, July 28, 2026, <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/gaza-not-ceasefire-it-structural-violence-another-name>.

59 “UN Experts Call for End to Attacks on Gaza Shelters, Forced Displacement in West Bank,” OHCHR, GENEVA, April 13, 2026, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/un-experts-call-end-attacks-gaza-shelters-forced-displacement-west-bank>.

2026, despite “ceasefire” agreements,⁶⁰ at least 4,300 people have been killed in Israeli attacks, with numbers continuing to rise both in Lebanon and Gaza.⁶¹

The role of the US remains central in providing political cover for Israeli crimes. Framed through statements such as “Israel is not attacking Lebanon. Israel is attacking Hezbollah,” US discourse recasts ongoing widespread attacks across Lebanon as targeted and justified.⁶² This framing obscures and attempts to justify the scale of destruction, displacement, and harm, while presenting the expansion of military operations, displacement, and domicile as contained and limited. In this context, US support operates not only as background alignment but as an enabling force that allows the Israeli regime to avoid accountability, just as it did with the ongoing genocide in Gaza.⁶³ As attacks intensify and territorial control deepens, this sustained military, political, and diplomatic backing makes the US once again a co-perpetrator in the Israeli regime’s crimes.

Israeli impunity is further reinforced by the broader failure and complicity of third-party states. The EU and member states have contributed to this dynamic through political narratives that shield the Israeli regime from accountability. In a joint statement issued on 31 March 2026, the EU High Representative and foreign ministers of ten European states explicitly declared that “the responsibility for this situation lies

60 Caolán Magee, “Lebanon’s Latest Truce: What Is Different from the April Agreement?,” Al Jazeera, June 4, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/4/lebanons-latest-truce-what-is-different-from-the-april-agreement.Moreover>

61 “Lebanon: UN Experts Alarmed by Killings, Displacement and Gender-Specific Harm as Israel Escalates Hostilities,” OHCHR, GENEVA, July 22, 2026, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/07/lebanon-un-experts-alarmed-killings-displacement-and-gender-specific-harm>.

62 “US Democrats Warn Trump That Iran Ceasefire Must Apply to Lebanon,” Al Jazeera, April 9, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/9/us-democrats-warn-trump-that-iran-ceasefire-must-apply-to-lebanon>.

63 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Colonial States’ Complicity in Gaza: Arming and Shielding Genocide*, Working Paper no. 32 (BADIL, 2025), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2025/07/29/wp32-complicity-eng-1753786452.pdf.

with Hezbollah,” while merely calling on the Israeli regime to “avoid a further widening of the conflict.”⁶⁴ The statement frames the Israeli regime’s ongoing military aggression as a potential future escalation rather than confronting its existing attacks and violations, contributing to the normalization of Israeli impunity and providing political cover for its continued crimes.

Moreover, beyond expressions of concern⁶⁵ and calls for a ceasefire⁶⁶—knowing that such agreements were never upheld by the Israeli regime—states have largely refrained from taking concrete measures. In this sense, their inaction is not neutral—it functions as tacit approval and legitimization of Israeli crimes. The absence of comprehensive sanctions creates the conditions in which the Israeli regime continues its crimes unchecked.⁶⁷

64 “Joint Statement on the Situation in Lebanon,” EEAS, March 31, 2026, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-statement-situation-lebanon_en.

65 Edna Mohamed, “World Reacts to ‘Brutal’ Israeli Attacks on Lebanon after US-Iran Truce,” Al Jazeera, April 8, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/8/world-reacts-to-brutal-israeli-attacks-on-lebanon-amid-us-iran-ceasefire>.

66 Necva Taştan Sevinç, “France Reiterates Deep Concern over Lebanon, Backs Ceasefire, Sovereignty,” Anadolu, İstanbul, May 5, 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/france-reiterates-deep-concern-over-lebanon-backs-ceasefire-sovereignty/3928105>.

67 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Action Plan: What States, UN Agencies, International Organizations and Businesses Can Do (BADIL, 2024), 7, https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2024/11/26/confront-israeli-crimes-action-plan-en-1732632553.pdf.

CONCLUSION:

DECOLONIZATION AND REPARATIVE RECONSTRUCTION

Ultimately, the issue is not only that the Israeli regime's "evacuation orders" fail to comply with the legal framework governing evacuation. It's the systematic violation of these principles that reveals their essential function. In both Gaza and Lebanon, Israeli "evacuation orders" operate as part of an ongoing colonial process of displacement, land confiscation, territorial expansion, and population fragmentation. Recognizing this is an analytical necessity, as well as a legal and political imperative: as long as these practices are framed as lawful evacuation or security necessity, states remain complicit by providing political cover and military support, enabling the Israeli regime's crimes to remain obscured, normalized, and reproduced.

States must therefore take immediate and concrete measures to prevent further forcible displacement and end their complicity in Israeli crimes. This requires an end to military, political, and diplomatic support that enables the Israeli regime's crimes; effective sanctions and arms embargoes; accountability for those responsible for forcible transfer and other international crimes; and measures to ensure that displaced Palestinians can safely return under conditions that ensure their rights and needs are met. This includes fully ensuring that UNRWA has the political backing and financial means to operate in all its areas of operation, but especially in the areas the Israeli regime has slated for its colonial expansion. In Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon, reparative reconstruction is required for all those displaced by the Israeli regime's crimes.

A rights-based decolonization approach is the only way forward—one that dismantles the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime and the structures that sustain it, provides reparations to remedy the harms and uphold the

Palestinian people's rights, and establishes a new rights-based political structure in Mandatory Palestine that guarantees human rights for all.⁶⁸ The Palestinian people's right to reparations (return, restitution, compensation and guarantees to non-repetition) must be upheld, rather than accepting and enabling ongoing displacement or treating territorial control and demographic restructuring as irreversible realities.

States' inaction and complicity not only enable the continuation of these crimes but reinforce the structures of impunity that allow the Israeli regime's colonial system of displacement and dispossession to persist and escalate.⁶⁹

68 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Decolonization: The Case of Palestine - Introduction*, Working Paper no. 30 (BADIL, 2025), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2023/06/09/wp30-decolonization-intro-eng-1686312277.pdf.

69 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Rights-Based Reconstruction: Decolonization and Reparations*, Position Paper (BADIL, 2025), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2025/07/07/pp-reconstruction-vs-reparations-eng-1751895094.pdf.



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