Palestinian Youth's Opinions on the Palestinian National Project:

Its Nature, Means of Realization, and the Role of Palestinian Parties

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BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights is an independent, non-profit human rights organization working to defend and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Our vision, mission, programs and relationships are defined by our Palestinian identity and the principles of international humanitarian and human rights law. We seek to advance the individual and collective rights of the Palestinian people on this basis.

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Introduction

With the call to hold Palestinian legislative and presidential elections on 28 November 2026,[1] the term "Palestinian national project" has reemerged frequently in the statements of Palestinian political factions and leaders. It is well-known that the Palestinian National Project is no longer clearly defined or unified in terms of content, scope, methods of realization, or the roles of the Palestinian parties involved in achieving it. Concepts such as Palestine, the Palestinian people, Jerusalem, liberation, resistance, and all other integral components of the national project hold different meanings for different groups. Undoubtedly, the confusion deepens in the absence of a national program outlined by all the parties defining the bare minimum strategic political priorities (known as the "minimum program"), combined with fragmented, contradictory, divided, and ambiguous political discourse. This situation has a destructive impact on the consciousness and sense of belonging of emerging generations, as well as on their participation in the struggle. The lack of a unified or agreed-upon understanding of the Palestinian national project is neither a trivial comment nor a fleeting phenomenon: it lies at the heart of the factional divisions and is a primary cause of the declining liberation struggle. Most alarmingly, this lack of clarity is a reality that is spreading among Palestinian youth.

In 2014, BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights launched a youth empowerment program designed to enhance national and rights-based awareness, as well as skills in mobilization, advocacy, and the organization of community campaigns and initiatives.

1 This survey was implemented before the Palestinian President issued a decree on 10 October 2026 postponing the elections until 11 September 2027. This postponement does not affect the findings or accompanying analysis; rather, it reinforces the validity of the youths' views, particularly their assessment that the call for legislative and presidential elections and the formation of the Palestinian National Council were driven more by Western demands than by current and pressing national priorities.

Since its inception, the program has targeted Palestinian youth (young men and women) between the ages of 18 to 29 from across historic Palestine (within its Mandate-era borders). Over the years, the program has evolved in both scope and depth, qualitatively and quantitatively. It includes at least ten days of education and training annually, delivered through an intensive curriculum known as the "Al-Awda Training School." Building on the success of the Al-Awda Training Schools and the growing engagement of their graduates, the Palestinian Youth Forum (PYF) was established to bring together the most active and committed participants. The PYF is an advanced awareness-raising and skills-development program designed for the Forum's members, featuring three annual gatherings, each lasting three days. Currently, an additional Palestinian youth group is being established in Lebanon with the aim for its eventual integration into the PYF.[2]

With more than a decade of continuous work with Palestinian youth in the Al-Awda Schools and the PYF, BADIL has made three fundamental observations regarding awareness, sense of belonging, and national identity.

- There is confusion regarding fundamental political and rights-based concepts among youth participating in the training school and PYF programs. This includes a lack of clarity and/or complete absence of knowledge concerning historical facts related to Palestine, the Palestinian cause, and the inalienable rights of return and self-determination.[3]

- Youth have divergent opinions and perspectives on facts that are ostensibly self-evident, such as the definition of Palestine and the

2 For further details on BADIL's youth awareness-raising and training programs, see: BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Community Mobilization*, https://badil.org/programs/community-initiatives.

3 United Nations, *Resolution 3236 (XXIX): The Palestine Question and the Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories*, A/RES/3236(XXIX) (1974), https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ARES3236XXIX.pdf.

Palestinian people, as well as on core issues like the concept and scope of inalienable national (political) rights.

- The gap between the youth's understanding, views, and perceptions of the Palestinian national project, and the visions for that project presented by various Palestinian leaders and factions is widening at an alarming rate.

Calls for public Palestinian general elections amidst deep internal divisions, alongside the factors shaping youth consciousness and sense of belonging, laid the groundwork for conducting this opinion poll on the Palestinian national project. The poll examines its nature, the means of achieving it, and the roles of various Palestinian stakeholders. The implementation of this survey was accelerated due to the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 4, which set the Palestinian legislative elections for 28 November 2026.[4] Promoted by Palestinian leaders, their spokespersons, and affiliated media, the slogans, narratives, and political statements regarding the Palestinian national project and the paths to its realization began to dominate public discourse and the public sphere. These issues became the focal point of political competition. Calls by Palestinian parties participating in the Israeli Knesset elections, scheduled for 27 October 2026, to increase voter turnout (ostensibly to remove the far-right government) further underscore the need to examine the Palestinian national project and clarify the roles of its various stakeholders.

The significance of this survey at this juncture lies in the urgent need for a serious review of the Palestinian political system, which has transitioned from a national liberation framework into a hybrid framework that combines the historical legacy and narratives of national liberation with political practices increasingly shaped by institutional interests and alignment with powerful external states. Within the new framework,

4 Palestinian Central Elections Commission, "Decree No. (4) of 2026 on Calling Legislative Elections," July 9, 2026, https://www.elections.ps/Portals/0/GE2026_%20call%20EN.pdf.

the Palestinian national movement's history of struggle is rehashed to market its anti-colonial nationalist credentials, while its key figures vie to align themselves with the policies of powerful colonial states. Amidst this rehashing of the past and alignment with external powers, the Palestinian national project has become fragmented and ambiguous. It is no longer clearly defined or truly national in an all-encompassing sense. The survey results have revealed not only a widening gap between official discourse and the perspectives of the youth but also an urgent need for comprehensive, radical transformation of the Palestinian political system and the strategy for navigating national liberation.


Research Methodology and Sample

BADIL Resource Center reviewed the evolution of the Palestinian national project from the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) onwards. This involved examining the political programs adopted by successive Palestinian National Councils (PNCs), alongside resolutions issued by key Palestinian political factions. The review provided the basis for drafting the initial survey questions, which were circulated internally and subsequently refined in consultation with a specialized statistical team. The questionnaire underwent two stages of pilot testing. The first involved participants from the PYF and Al-Awda Training School, where explanatory workshops were held, and participants completed the questionnaire and discussed its content and format. The feedback and suggestions gathered from these workshops and discussions were incorporated into the questionnaire. The revised questionnaire was distributed to a broader pilot sample – both locally and internationally – to ensure content clarity and ease of use, particularly for the online version.

Developed by BADIL, the questionnaire included a section on respondents' personal information and 15 multiple-choice questions examining specific aspects of the Palestinian national project, the means and tools for its realization, and the roles of key actors. Formulating the questions was no easy task; but developing response options proved even more demanding, given the need to encompass the widest possible range of responses. The options are numerous, diverse, and complex, reflecting the confusion, divergence, and widening gap between the rhetoric of the Palestinian leadership and political factions and the youth targeted by the survey. For most questions, an open-ended option was included to allow for responses that BADIL staff and the statistical team might not have anticipated.


The questionnaire was designed for both in-person administration covering Palestine within its mandatory borders (including areas colonized since 1948, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip), Lebanon, and Jordan, and online completion by Palestinian youth in the wider *shatat* (diaspora) across the globe. An identical format of the questionnaire was provided for both sample groups.

The in-person sample comprised of 1,024 completed questionnaires, was distributed as follows: 205 in the Gaza Strip, 254 in the West Bank, 155 in 1948 Palestine (the area colonized since 1948), 200 in Jordan, and 210 in Lebanon. Geographically, the survey covered 154 locations across these regions, involving participants originally from over 336 cities, villages, and refugee camps throughout historic Palestine. A random sampling methodology was employed to select households in the target locations. Focusing on respondents aged 18 to 35 years old and prioritizing a gender balance approach resulted in near-equal participation of 509 males and 515 females.




The in-person sample also accounted for diversity based on displacement status: 84.4% of the participants were refugees or internally displaced persons, while 15.4% had never experienced displacement. This distribution largely reflects the significant scale of displacement among the Palestinian people.[5]

5 "Humanitarian Situation Report | 15 October 2026," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory, October 19, 2026, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-15-october-2026.



As for the online sample, 230 Palestinians participated; with 51.3% residing in Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia, while the remainder are distributed across Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and other Arab nations. Identical translated versions of the online questionnaire were provided in English, Spanish, German and Arabic to facilitate online participation and comprehension of the content.



While the results of the online and in-person samples were not combined into unified tables, the online sample results are provided, analyzed and compared with the in-person results where necessary. From a methodological standpoint, the decision not to combine the results of the two samples was made to ensure accuracy and minimize potential error.

At the same time, it is politically important to ensure that the voices of Palestinian youth across all places of residence, including those in the *shatat* (diaspora), are heard and represented. This reflects the unity of the Palestinian people across geographic boundaries and affirms their shared connection to the Palestinian national project, regardless of where they live. Undoubtedly, comparing the results during the analysis contributes to understanding the influence of the surrounding environment on the opinions of young people. This, in turn, reinforces the necessity of a comprehensive Palestinian liberation strategy that unites all Palestinians, regardless of their location.

It is also important to highlight the level of interest in Palestinian public affairs and the Palestinian cause. (See the table below: "Level of Interest in public affairs and the Palestinian cause.") The online sample showed an interest rate of 97%, with 17.4% generally interested plus 79.4% very interested. Among the in-person sample, the interest rate was 75.4%, with 38.9% generally interested, in addition to 36.5% very interested. Beyond reflecting the high level of interest among youth across various regions in general Palestinian affairs, these figures also highlight the active and influential role played by Palestinian youth in the distant *shatat* in mobilizing solidarity for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip facing genocide. Furthermore, this underscores the futility of attempts to marginalize or to downplay the significance and presence of Palestinians in exile within international and official Palestinian calculations.

Level of Interest in Public Affairs and the Palestinian Cause						
Sample type	In-person Sample			Online Sample		
Level of interest	Very interested	Generally interested	Total	Very interested	Generally interested	Total
Number	374	398	772	183	40	223
Percentage	36.5%	38.9%	75.4%	79.6%	17.4%	97.0%

This paper focuses on highlighting key findings and providing an initial analysis of the survey results. It does not, however, address every

finding or provide an exhaustive analysis of each sub-question and response option. Instead, the full survey results are presented in the accompanying tables, providing a resource for researchers to conduct further investigation and analysis. BADIL Resource Center welcomes collaboration with interested researchers and organizations on follow-up studies and further analysis, including facilitating access to relevant data files.

Rather than analyzing the survey on a question-by-question basis, BADIL adopted an analytical methodology organized around six key thematic areas, which structure the analysis presented in this paper: **the nature of the Palestinian national project; national priorities; means and tools for realization; trust in the Palestinian leadership, factions, and representative institutions; international solidarity; and the role of youth.** The analysis examined connections between factors and issues addressed in different survey questions but linked by a common theme. For example, under the theme of the nature of the Palestinian national project, the analysis explored the relationship between young people's understanding of the project and their level of interest in public affairs, political awareness, and attachment to Palestinian national identity. Under the theme of national priorities, it examined the links between strategic objectives and the methods and means proposed for achieving the national project. Within the theme of trust in leadership and representative institutions, the analysis considered the relationship between young people's levels of trust in key actors and their assessment of those actors' performance. Finally, under the theme of the role of youth, it explored the relationship between young people's vision for change and the extent of their engagement in advancing that change.

Summary of Key Findings

The most striking result of this youth opinion poll is the widening gap between the rhetoric of Palestinian political leadership and parties – particularly those prominent during the Oslo Accords and the subsequent peace and negotiations process (referred to in this paper as the "Oslo-era") – and the attitudes and views of Palestinian youth in historic Palestine and the diaspora. Before detailing the survey's six thematic areas and analyzing the results, the key findings within the aforementioned themes are summarized here.

The Palestinian National Project and its Components

In the view of the overwhelming majority of youth in both the in-person and online samples, the Palestinian national project entails: "The liberation of historic Palestine (within its borders from the river to the sea), the return of refugees, and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state."

Conversely, only a small percentage of youth in both samples view the Palestinian national project as the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders – even if this includes an agreed-upon solution to the refugee issue.

For the overwhelming majority in both samples, "Palestine" refers to historic Palestine (from the river to the sea) in contradiction to official Palestinian discourse and mainstream international rhetoric, which restrict "Palestine" to the 1967 borders.

In the view of the overwhelming majority of youth surveyed, the Palestinian people consist of anyone of Palestinian origin and their

descendants – regardless of their current nationality, citizenship, or place of residence – as well as any Palestinian who wishes to return to Palestine. This also contradicts official discourse, which excludes Palestinians living in 1948 Palestine and categorizes refugees who have acquired the citizenship of their host countries merely as "Palestinian communities" abroad.

National Priorities

The following was selected by youth respondents as the most important national priorities: ending settler-colonialism in historic Palestine and securing the return of refugees; lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip and undertaking reconstruction; improving the economic and living conditions of Palestinians; and ending the internal fragmentation to achieve Palestinian national unity.

Ranking lowest on their list of national priorities were the objectives championed during the Oslo-era and by the official Palestinian leadership: replacing the Palestinian Basic Law with an interim Palestinian constitution; forming an Arab list to participate in Israeli Knesset elections; holding general Palestinian elections; securing further international recognition of the State of Palestine within the 1967 borders; establishing a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders; and increasing litigation with international courts.

Means and Tools for Realizing the Palestinian National Project

The survey revealed that the youth tend to favor resistance, self-reliance, and disobedience approaches over negotiation strategies that rely on states and international bodies as the means for achieving the Palestinian national project.

The tools and methods selected by youth were: steadfastness and remaining on the land; grassroots resistance in all its forms; mass civil disobedience; a complete boycott of the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime; and widespread global solidarity.

This aligns with the key factors identified by youth that would influence the success of the Palestinian struggle: the level of popular participation; the existence of a unified national strategy; the level of youth political participation; ending internal fragmentation to achieve national unity; and widespread global solidarity.

Conversely – and in contrast to the official Palestinian discourse – youth selected the least effective means and tools for realizing the Palestinian national project as: participating in Knesset elections; the Palestinian President's approach of peaceful popular resistance; diplomatic engagement with international bodies; the policy of "blocking pretexts" which means not responding to Israeli forces and colonizers' violations under the pretext of not giving them excuses/opportunities for escalating their attacks; and legal action involving or pursued through international judicial bodies.

Trust in Existing Palestinian Leadership, Political Factions, and Representative Bodies

The majority of Palestinian youth surveyed believe in the necessity to renew the Palestinian political system through significant, radical, and comprehensive change. Furthermore, they expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of influential leaders and the Oslo-era parties. This has resulted in widespread mistrust regarding the role played by individuals and institutions of these parties in the Palestinian liberation struggle. Youth trust in the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and in its ability to achieve national goals was low. This stems from youth's perceptions of the PLO as an entity

dominated by the Palestinian Authority (PA), one that has lost its status as an inclusive representative body for the Palestinian people, or merely a nominal entity with no actual influence in shaping national policies.

Youth's trust in the PA scored the lowest (see Table 10 in Appendix 2), as they view it as a body that has supplanted the PLO or one that serves the agendas of influential powers in managing the conflict. This aligns with the lack of trust in the leadership and factions that subscribe to the Oslo Accords and "peace process," which represent the official political platform of the PLO and the PA – a platform rejected by the majority of youth across both surveyed groups.

Forms of Global Support for Palestine

In general, the majority of young people view mass global solidarity, including demonstrations, comprehensive boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, blocking port operations (preventing loading and unloading), and disrupting the operations of companies complicit with the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime as highly impactful actions for the success of the Palestinian struggle.

The youth surveyed expressed broad support for state-imposed sanctions, which they regard as the most effective tangible measure. This reflects a conviction that states are obligated to take concrete, practical steps against Israeli crimes through actions that go beyond mere statements of condemnation or empty threats. Furthermore, it reflects the youth's lack of confidence in the international justice system, which has failed to provide any form of protection for the Palestinian people, let alone hold the Israeli regime accountable. The youth's perspectives stand in contrast to the official Palestinian strategy, which confines the struggle to pleading with states while awaiting the application of international legitimacy.

The Role of Youth and Political Paralysis/Inaction

There is a wide, seemingly unbridgeable gap between the convictions and orientations of the youth and those of the Palestinian leadership, specifically the rhetoric of the Oslo-era leadership and its associated parties. Meanwhile, in practical terms, the youth remain in a state of stagnation, unable to move forward. The overwhelming majority of young people believe that Palestinian political life requires a significant, very significant or radical and comprehensive renewal of the leadership and political structures. They support the emergence of new Palestinian political parties and view themselves as capable of developing new tools and methods of struggle. At the same time, however, there is a vast gap between the convictions and orientations of the youth and the reality of actual practice.

Thematic Section 1:
The Nature of the Palestinian National Project

This theme forms the foundation of the opinion poll, from which various related topics and questions branch out. It is crucial to emphasize that engaging in the Oslo peace process while currently dealing with Trump's Twenty Point Plan does not invalidate the legitimacy of questioning the nature and transmutation of the Palestinian national project. The focus here is on its evolution over time. What began as a full liberation project as envisioned in the original National Charter[6] and the 1968 Palestinian National Charter (prior to amendments)[7] transformed into a conciliation agreement framework capped by international legitimacy resolutions that were once nationally rejected (such as in the Ten-Point Program[8] and the Declaration of Independence in Algiers[9]). Subsequently, it devolved further into a conciliation project approximating a deal to liquidate the Palestinian cause and inalienable rights—as seen in the Oslo Accords and their annexes,[10] and in Trump's current plan within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2803 of 2025.[11] In other words, while discourse regarding the necessity of protecting

6 Palestinian National Information Center (WAFA), *The Palestinian National Charter, 28 May 1964*, https://info.wafa.ps/pages/details/32445. For the English version, see Yasser Arafat Foundation, "Palestinian National Charter (1964)," https://yaf.ps/page-1513-en.html.

7 Palestine Liberation Organization, *The Palestinian National Charter*, July 17, 1968, https://www.plo.ps/ar/article/43678/. For the English version, see The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, "The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July 1–17, 1968," https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/plocov.asp.

8 Palestine National Council, "Political Programme of 9 June 1974," adopted at the Twelfth Session of the Palestine National Council, Cairo, June 1–9, 1974, *United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL)*, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-206681/.

9 Palestine National Council, "Palestinian Declaration of Independence," November 15, 1988, Yasser Arafat Foundation, https://yaf.ps/page-1205-en.html.

10 *"Agreement – Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (a.k.a. 'Oslo Accord')*," September 13, 1993, United Nations, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180015/.


11 United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2803 (2025)*, S/RES/2803 (United Nations, 2025), https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

the Palestinian national project intensifies, it is no longer uniform in the minds and agendas of Palestinian individuals, factions, or institutions.

In response to the first question, "What does the term Palestinian national project mean to you personally?", 71.5% of the in-person sample of youth defined it as: "the liberation of historic Palestine (from the river to the sea), the return of refugees, and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state therein." Conversely, only 7.5% defined the Palestinian national project as "The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, along with an agreed-upon solution to the refugee issue."[12]

Support for the option of full liberation and the dismantling of the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime is higher among youth in farther exile (the online sample), reaching 82.2%, whereas support for the two-state solution based on 1967 borders, including an agreed-upon solution for the refugee issue, drops to just 2.2%.[13]

Infograph 4: Defining "Palestine": Findings from the In-person Sample, by Region



12 See Question 1: "What Does the Palestinian National Project Mean to You?" Table 1 in Appendix 2: Results of the In-person Sample.

13 See Question 1: "What Does the Palestinian National Project Mean to You?" Table 1 in Appendix 2: Results of the In-person Sample.

A clear and wide gap exists between the views of Palestinian youth and the official Palestinian political discourse, party positions, and the prevailing international solutions. The former predominantly endorse the dismantling of the Israeli system of colonial domination, while the latter are entrenched in the so-called two-state solution and an agreed-upon settlement for the refugee issue.

This divergence is neither merely formal nor superficial; but a fundamental difference particularly when considering the high level of political awareness and national commitment among the survey respondents.[14] Firstly, it manifests in low levels of trust in the current Palestinian leadership and representative bodies (see Thematic Section 4: Trust in the Palestinian Leadership, Political Parties, and Representative Bodies) and in the international community, including individual states and UN agencies (see Thematic Section 3: Means and Tools for Realizing the Palestinian National Project).

Secondly, this explains the divergence in concepts between the youth and official Palestinian and international discourse regarding the pillars and scope of the Palestinian national project. For 82.2% of the youth in the in-person sample and 95.2% in the online sample, "Palestine" signifies historic Palestine (from the river to the sea);[15] not the Palestine defined by the 1967 borders (the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and east Jerusalem) as referenced in official Palestinian and international discourse. Furthermore, according to 81.4% of the youth in the in-person sample[16] and 97% of those in

14 See Table: "Level of interest in public affairs and the Palestinian cause", p8; as well as Question 2 on identity and political awareness in Table 2, Appendix 2 (In-person sample), and Table 2, Appendix 3 (Online Sample).

15 See Question 3: "What Does Palestine Mean to You?" in Table 3, Appendix 2 (In-person sample), and Table 3, Appendix 3 (Online Sample).

16 This includes the 61.6% who view the Palestinian people as consisting of anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants, regardless of current nationality/citizenship or place of residence; added to this is the view of the 19.8% who believe the Palestinian people also includes anyone of Palestinian origin who wishes to return to Palestine. Question 2 on identity and political awareness in Table 2, Appendix 2 (In-person sample), and Table 2, Appendix 3 (Online Sample).

the online sample,[17] the Palestinian people comprise all individuals of Palestinian origin, including their descendants, regardless of their current citizenship or place of residence, as well as any Palestinian who wishes to return to Palestine.[18] Thus, the youth's definition of the Palestinian people differs from that found in official discourse, which excludes those who have acquired citizenship in another state, including Palestinians who have obtained Israeli citizenship,[19] as well as refugees in exile who are pushed to integrate or resettle without the option of return.[20]

This aligns with the fact that over 90% of the in-person sample and 96.1% of the online sample (combining those who agree and strongly agree) affirm that their Palestinian identity constitutes an essential part of their personal identities. Furthermore, 71.4% of the in-person sample (adding 46.3% who agree plus 25.1% who strongly agree) and 85.2% of the online sample view their connection to Palestinians living outside their own areas of residence as both emotional and political.[21] Despite clear divergences on several fundamental issues between Palestinian youth from 1948 Palestine and those in the other surveyed regions (see the graph below), 81.9% of youth in 1948 Palestine still consider their Palestinian identity an essential component of their personal identities.[22]

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17 This includes the 91.3% who view the Palestinian people as consisting of anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants—regardless of current nationality/citizenship or place of residence—as well as anyone wishing to return to and reside in Palestine (5.7%). See Question 4: "Who Makes Up the Palestinian People?" in Table 4, Appendix 2 (In-person sample), and Table 4, Appendix 3 (Online Sample).

18 See Question 4: "Who Makes Up the Palestinian People?" in Table 4, Appendix 2 (In-person sample), and Table 4, Appendix 3 (Online Sample).

19 See: Article 17 of the 1995 Taba Agreement (Oslo II) regarding the personal jurisdiction of the Council and the exclusion from this jurisdiction of Palestinians residing in Palestine colonized since 1948 who hold "Israeli citizenship"; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), "Taba Agreement 1995 (Oslo II)," Palestinian National Information Center (WAFA Agency), September 28, 1995. https://info.wafa.ps/pages/details/30268.


20 United States, White House Office, *Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People* (Washington, DC: White House, January 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf.

21 See Question 2 on identity and political awareness in Table 2, Appendix 2 (In-person sample), and Table 2, Appendix 3 (Online Sample).

22 Ibid., "National Identity and Political Awareness."

Undoubtedly, this sense of national belonging reflects a deep-seated consciousness which often remains latent due to Israeli repression and the absence of mobilization efforts by official Palestinian bodies and/or political factions.

Infograph 5: The Palestinian Identity Forms an Essential Part of my Personal Identity, by Region



It is worth noting here that 52.4% of Palestinian youth from the 1948 territory supported the option of "the liberation of historic Palestine (within its borders from the river to the sea), the return of refugees, and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state" – the lowest compared to the other regions. This group also expressed the highest level of support for the option of establishing an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, reaching a total of 39.9%.[23] This trajectory may be attributed to: the impact of "Israelization"[24]

23 Among youth in 1948 Palestine, 17.1% view the Palestinian national project as the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, accompanied by an agreed-upon solution for refugees; 13.3% envision a state based on the 1967 borders with the return of refugees to the state's borders (rather than to their original homes); and 9.5% favor a state based on the 1967 borders, even without the return of refugees.

24 Israelization refers to Israeli colonial policies and practices aimed at dismantling Palestinian society through the erasure of Palestinian national identity, the imposition of Israeli terminology and categories, and the fragmentation of the Palestinian people, thereby advancing the broader process of de-Palestinianization. See: BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2016 - 2018,* Survey (BADIL, 2019), 145, https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2021/06/04/survey2016-2018-eng-1622811412.pdf.

programs on the consciousness of Palestinian youth in 1948 Palestine; the discourse of coexistence, seeking equality with the colonizer, and citizenship promoted by parties participating in Knesset elections; the official Palestinian discourse that excludes 1948 Palestinians from the Palestinian national project; or, most likely, a combination of all these factors. It is understandable that younger generations in 1948 Palestine may be reluctant to embrace the dismantling of the colonial system, particularly when the dominant discourse to which they are continually exposed is shaped by Israeli narratives that promote normalization[25] and advance political solutions premised on the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and the exclusion of Palestinians in 1948 Palestine.

Although not formulated into a specific question within this survey, the insistence on the right of return to their original homes was clearly present in the minds of young people as they answered. This is evident in the fact that the option of dismantling the existing colonial system and returning to historic Palestine tops the list of preferences, with support among the youth declining as the scope of the right of return is curtailed. For example, the option of a state based on the 1967 borders, including an agreed-upon solution to the refugee issue, ranks higher than the option of a state with return limited to only that territory, which in turn ranks higher than the option of a state with no mention of return whatsoever.[26] Evidently, the responses of the majority of young people across various regions reflect a commitment to the right of return, while simultaneously confirming that this return is inextricably linked to the scope of a political solution.

25 Normalization (tatbee') refers to treating the Israeli settler-colonial apartheid regime as a normal or acceptable reality, thereby legitimizing its structures of oppression and obscuring the unequal relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, rather than challenging and dismantling the regime and its underlying structures. See: BDS Movement, *The BDS Movement's Anti-Normalization Guidelines Explained*, October 29, 2022, https://bdsmovement.net/news/bds-movement-anti-normalization-guidelines.

26 See Question 1: "What Does the Palestinian National Project Mean to You?" Table 1 in Appendix 2: Results of the In-person Sample.

The survey findings highlight the level of confusion and lack of clarity regarding Palestinian national identity among youth. Across the regions covered by the in-person survey, 28.3% is the combined percentage of those who agree or strongly agree that they are confused about their identity. Categorically, this high percentage should sound an alarm, as a clear national identity is essential for realizing the national project. This confusion can be seen in the decline of national mobilization and state of neglect and marginalization experienced by young people. It may also accurately reflect the transformation of the Palestinian struggle which has been driven by the requirements of the Oslo Accords into an elitist political endeavor monopolized by a group of leaders who occupy national and international platforms on behalf of the Palestinian people.[27]

According to the online survey results, the level of identity confusion among youth in the distant *shatat* are at only 15.7% (combining those who agreed and strongly agreed), lower than those in the regions covered by the in-person survey. This may be attributed to a sense of alienation within their host state that drives youth in the distant *shatat* to develop a deeper understanding of and a stronger attachment to their national identity. Alternatively, it may stem from the fact that they are not directly exposed to programs of "Israelization," normalization, and the distorted and fragmented culture associated with the Oslo Accords.

By region within the in-person survey sample, 37.1% of Palestinian youth from 1948 Palestine selected either agree or strongly agree to experiencing confusion regarding their Palestinian national identity. This can be attributed to the aforementioned targeting of identity through policies of "Israelization," compounded by the marginalization and exclusion of these communities and the lack of, or complete absence of, Palestinian political mobilization.

27 See Question 2 on identity and political awareness in Table 2, Appendix 2 (In-person sample), and Table 2, Appendix 3 (Online Sample).

Among youth in the West Bank, 34.6% reported identity confusion. This can be traced to the decline in national mobilization under the Oslo Accords and the reduction in direct confrontation with the colonizer, alongside the PA's marginalization of the youth.

In the Gaza Strip, 31.7% of youth reported identity confusion which can be attributed to a sense of abandonment by fellow Palestinians and other Arabs from being left to face genocide alone, resulting in their disillusionment.

Among Palestinian youth in Lebanon, 27.6% reported identity confusion. This may be attributed to: declining national mobilization; the neglect of youth following the Oslo Accords; the decline of *fedayeen* (resistance fighters) activity; decreasing direct confrontation with the colonizer; and, escalating discrimination by the Lebanese government. The aforementioned factors serve to reinforce a sense of alienation.

Finally, in Jordan, the rate of identity confusion among Palestinian youth was 16.4%. This lower percentage – relative to other regions – may stem from the fact that participants residing in Jordan were exclusively camp-based refugees. Such settings may provide an environment in which Palestinian identity and its expression are more strongly reinforced than among those who have become more integrated into urban environments alongside the wider population.

It is also important to distinguish national identity from citizenship and social integration: while the majority of registered Palestine refugees in Jordan hold Jordanian citizenship and enjoy the same formal citizenship rights as other Jordanian nationals, this does not necessarily mean that social and political equality is fully realized in practice.[28]

28 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2019 - 2021*, Survey (BADIL, 2022), 47, https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2022/10/31/survey2021-eng-1667209836.pdf.

From the above findings, the Palestinian national project, as envisioned by Palestinian youth, differs from the national project outlined in the programs of the Palestinian leadership and political factions, as well as from the perceptions held by the international community, including individual states and UN bodies. This gap is reflected in the divergent definitions of the project's core concepts: Palestine, the Palestinian people, the state, the right of return amongst other principles. While the youth's responses demonstrate political awareness and a sense of national belonging, a blurring of national identity is also clearly apparent in areas directly exposed to policies of "Israelization" and normalization, as well as the entrenchment of fragmentation and individualism at the expense of collective unity, reinforced by the Oslo framework and the neoliberal order it facilitated.

Thematic Section 2:
National Priorities

This section examines national priorities within the context of "the current phase" referring to the prevailing local, regional, and international realities, which was explained to the youth respondents. These realities include: Israeli crimes; the declining role of the PLO, the PA, political factions, and Arab states; the ineffectiveness of the UN and its agencies; the influence of powerful colonial states active in the region; and the role of international solidarity movements supporting Palestine.

Survey Question 7 provided 19 options to cover the widest possible range of priorities, including those declared by the PLO and PA leadership; more specifically, those concerning the establishment of a state based on the 1967 borders, securing recognition of the "State of Palestine"; holding public general for the Palestinian National and Legislative Councils, and the presidency; and reforming the PA.

Even though these priorities dominate official Palestinian discourse, some stem from a need to align with UN resolutions with the cover of international legitimacy, while others are shaped to meet the conditions set by donor and colonial states. It is worth noting here that UN resolutions of international legitimacy do not necessarily uphold or implement international law. The decision to incorporate the Balfour Declaration into the Mandate for Palestine (1922);[29] UN General Assembly Resolution 181 on the Partition of Palestine (1947);[30] UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86 (1991), revoking the earlier resolution that

29 Arthur James Balfour, "Balfour Declaration," *Institute for Palestine Studies*, November 2, 1917, https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1653368.

30 The United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 181 (II). Future Government of Palestine," November 29, 1947, https://doi.org/A/RES/181(II).

classified Zionism as a form of racism;[31] the Oslo Accords and their annexes (1993-1995);[32] UNSC Resolution 1515 (2003)[33] adopting the "Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution";[34] and UNSC Resolution 2803 (2025) adopting President Trump's Twenty Point Plan regarding the Gaza Strip[35] are all prime examples. These decisions acquired the status of international legitimacy within the prevailing imbalance of power at the time of their adoption, even though, in essence, they contravene and violate international law. At the leadership level, these priorities are linked to meeting the demands of Western colonial powers, such as holding legislative and presidential elections for the PA[36] and promoting democracy and human rights, which are typically included in what is known as the PA reform program.[37]

In contrast, other national priorities that frequently surface in different platforms, such as the statements of certain factions, popular conferences, and grassroots movements, have been established. These priorities include ending colonialism, ending the internal fragmentation and achieving national unity, returning to grassroots resistance in all its

31 The United Nations General Assembly, "Racism and Racial Discrimination/Revocation of Resolution 3379 ('Zionism as Racism')," *Question of Palestine*, December 16, 1991, https://doi.org/A/RES/46/86.

32 United Nations, "Agreement—Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (a.k.a. 'Oslo Accord')," September 13, 1993, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180015/.

33 UN Security Council, "Resolution 1515 (2003)," November 19, 2003, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/506761?v=pdf.

34 United Nations Secretary-General, "Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," April 30, 2003, https://doi.org/S/2003/529.

35 United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2803 (2025),* S/RES/2803 (United Nations, 2025), https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

36 This can be inferred from the letter sent by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to French President Emmanuel Macron on June 9, 2025, and Macron's reply on July 24, 2025—in which Macron linked the Palestinian Authority's commitments to undertaking deep reforms and holding legislative and presidential elections in 2026 with France's recognition of the State of Palestine; see: "Full translation of the letter written in French and addressed by French President Emmanuel Macron to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas," Embassy of the State of Palestine in Mauritania, July 24, 2025. https://www.palemb.mr/?q=node/8179 And Emmanuel Macron, post on the X platform, June 11, 2025, https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1933058469084463154.

37 Board of Peace, "President Donald J. Trump's Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict," September 29, 2025, https://boardofpeace.org.

forms, dismantling the PA, strengthening resistance, and safeguarding national identity, among others.

From a list of 19 options designated as national priorities, respondents were asked to identify their top three choices[38] with the table below presenting the top six national priorities according to the youth.

#	National Priorities: Findings of the In-person Sample	Count	%
1	Ending Israeli settler-colonialism in historic Palestine and achieving the right of return for refugees	601	58.7%
2	Lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip and undertaking reconstruction	272	30.6%
3	Improving the economic and living conditions of Palestinians	121	15.8%
4	Strengthening Palestinian steadfastness/sumoud and preventing displacement	97	10.7%
5	Ending the fragmentation and achieving Palestinian national unity	82	8.0%
6	Safeguarding Palestinian national identity	76	7.4%

#	National Priorities: Findings of the Online Sample	Count	%
1	Ending Israeli settler-colonialism in historic Palestine and achieving the right of return for refugees	92	40.0%
2	Ending the fragmentation and achieving Palestinian national unity	61	26.5%
3	Lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip and undertaking reconstruction	22	9.6%
4	Improving the economic and living conditions of Palestinians	21	9.1%
5	Strengthening Palestinian steadfastness/sumoud and preventing displacement	20	8.7%
6	Resuming Palestinian resistance in all its forms	20	8.7%

A review of the tables above reveals that the ranking of priorities in this question aligns with the responses given by Palestinian youth, in both sample groups, regarding the nature of the Palestinian national project. The top priority selected, namely, ending colonialism throughout Palestine and achieving the right of return was supported by 58.7% of the in-person sample and 40.0% of the online sample –

38 See Question 7 in the appendix 1 regarding the national priorities that should be of greatest importance to the Palestinian people at the current stage.

reaffirming youth's understanding of the Palestinian national project as a liberation-oriented endeavor. This project entails dismantling the colonial system in historic Palestine, securing the return of refugees to their original homes, and establishing a democratic Palestinian state there. Furthermore, an examination of the top six priorities indicates a shared national perspective that reflects and aligns with the youth's strong interest in national affairs with 75.4% of the in-person sample and 97% of the online sample describing themselves as interested or very interested.[39]

Significant similarities are observed between the priorities identified by the in-person and online sample groups, despite slight variations in their ranking. The only discrepancy concerns the sixth priority listed in the table above: for the in-person sample, it was the protection of the Palestinian national identity, whereas for the online sample, it was returning to grassroots resistance in all its forms. While the top five priorities were consistent across both groups, the first two priorities were identical in ranking. Crucially, the current national priorities – as perceived by the youth in both samples – differ from those held by the leadership of the PLO and the PA.

Establishing a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders garnered an average of only 4.53% among the top three choices of the in-person sample, and just 1.73% in the online sample. This reflects the gap between the leadership's preference (viewing the current phase of the struggle as one of state-building under colonialism) and the youth's preference for dismantling the colonial system (viewing this phase as one of national liberation).

Securing further international recognition of the Palestinian state received an average of only 2% among the top three choices of the in-person sample, and just 0.56% in the online sample. This highlights the

39 See Table: "Level of interest in public affairs and the Palestinian cause", p8

vast disparity between the official leadership and the youth regarding the definition of an operational strategy (see Thematic Section 3: Means and Tools for Realizing the Palestinian National Project).

Holding general elections for the PNC of the PLO, as well as legislative and presidential elections for the PA, garnered only 1% averaged across the top three choices in the in-person sample, and 2.1% in the online sample. This stance aligns with the views of young people against the imposed requirement for prior acceptance of the PLO's political program and international legitimacy resolutions as a prerequisite for running in general elections.[40] The youth's opposition for this condition was 71.5% of the in-person respondents and 90.4% of the online respondents.[41]

In the same context, 42.7% of the in-person sample and 21.7% of the online sample believe that the true objective behind holding legislative elections is to renew the legitimacy of the PA and its current leadership. Meanwhile, 29.9% of the in-person sample and 60.4% of the online sample view the goal as meeting the conditions set by Western states. Additionally, 12.9% of the in-person sample and 6.5% of the online sample see the objective as unifying the Palestinian people; while 17.6% of the in-person sample and 11.3% of the online sample believe the goal is to revitalize political life.[42] Consequently, under the current circumstances, young people do not view general elections as a national priority. This does not imply a rejection of political renewal, nor does it deny the urgent need to unite the Palestinian people or the pressing need for radical, comprehensive change within the political system and

40 This conditionality clause encompasses the acceptance of agreements concluded by the PLO, including the Oslo Accords and various UN Security Council Resolutions such as Resolution 242 of 1967, Resolution 151 (the 2003 Roadmap for Peace) and Resolution 2803 of 2025 (Trump's 20-point Plan). Mahmoud Abbas, *Decree-Law No. (10) of 2026 Concerning the Amendment of Decree-Law No. (1) of 2007 Concerning General Elections, and Its Amendments*, June 14, 2026, https://www.elections.ps/Portals/0/Decree-Law%20No_%2810%29of2026.pdf

41 See Question 13 of the questionnaire in Appendix 1, and Table 13 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

42 See Question 14 on the purpose of calling for Palestinian general elections, Table 14 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

leadership (see Thematic Section 4: Trust in the Palestinian Leadership, Political Parties, and Representative Bodies). Rather, it reflects the youth's focus on revitalizing the methods of the struggle to confront ongoing settler-colonialism, the blockade, and the erosion of the Palestinian people's sources of resilience.

The option of forming an Arab list to participate in Israeli Knesset elections garnered an average of only 1.46% across the top three choices of the in-person sample, whereas it was selected only twice in the online sample, representing 0.86%.

Replacing the Basic Law with a provisional Palestinian constitution ranked lowest on the list of priorities, garnering only 0.4% as an average among the top three choices of the in-person sample and did not appear at all among the choices of the online sample. Work on drafting the provisional constitution had commenced pursuant to a decree issued in August 2025, by the Palestinian President,[43] presented as a national priority and a distinctive national achievement. However, the view of young people surveyed reveals that it was nothing more than a response to the requirements of the so-called PA reform plan, dictated by the agendas of Western colonial states.

Notably, recourse to international justice mechanisms ranked lowest on the list of priorities; it garnered only 0.5% support among the in-person sample, and only appeared twice among the choices of the online sample. This significantly low ranking demonstrates the lack of confidence in the ability of international justice mechanisms to secure redress for the Palestinian people, as well as the international community's inability to enforce its resolutions, despite their inconsistency with international law, in the face of the Israeli colonial system. The failure of international judicial bodies and the international community to

43 Official Gazette Bureau, "The Official Gazette Bureau Issues Issue No. (229) of the Official Gazette (Palestine Gazette)," https://www.ogb.gov.ps/en/Article/13595/The-Official-Gazette-Bureau-issues-issue-No-(229)-of-the-Official-Gazette-(Palestine-Gazette)

enforce the International Court of Justice's provisional measures to halt genocide[44] or to allow the unconditional entry of humanitarian aid,[45] alongside the failure or delay in initiating criminal proceedings before the International Criminal Court,[46] remain present in the minds of young people.

The priority of strengthening democracy and human rights ranked low on the list of priorities garnering less than 1% of the in-person sample and 1.4% of the online sample. Importantly, it shouldn't be assumed that young Palestinians dismiss the importance of promoting democracy and human rights. Rather, it reflects their understanding of the current period as one of national liberation which is distinct from performative gestures aimed at gaining recognition for a non-existent state. In their view, priority must be given to accomplishing the tasks of national liberation that lead to the dismantling of the entire Israeli colonial project, instead of yielding to the political agendas of funding institutions that have mired the Palestinian people in issues far removed from national liberation.

Interestingly, the priority of ending political division and achieving national unity ranked fifth at 8.2% in the in-person sample, while ranking second at 26.5% in the online sample. Despite this discrepancy, the significance of this priority becomes even more apparent when considering Question 9 regarding the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle,[47] where this option received the highest response

44 International Court of Justice. 2024. "Order of 26 January 2024: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)." *International Court of Justice.* 26 January 2024. https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203447.

45 International Court of Justice. 2024. "Order of 28 March 2024: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)." *International Court of Justice.* 28 March 2024. https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203847.

46 Gizem Nisa Çebi Demir, "Gaza Tribunal's Final Session Opens in Istanbul, Spotlighting Legal Failures, Global Inaction, Colonial Legacies," Anadolu, October 23, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/gaza-tribunal-s-final-session-opens-in-istanbul-spotlighting-legal-failures-global-inaction-colonial-legacies/3724632.

47 See Question 9 regarding the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle, Table 9 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

rate in the in-person sample (84.3%) and ranked fifth in the online sample (85.7%). Thus, at a time when the official leadership boasts about the division from the podium of the UN,[48] young people surveyed view ending the division and achieving national unity as a continuing national priority and a highly influential factor in the success of the Palestinian struggle. When this trend is viewed in combination with the youth's stance on the call for general elections, it can be concluded that young people do not regard elections as a path to achieving unity – particularly given the lack of consensus among Palestinian political parties on a "minimum program" (see Thematic Section 4: Trust in the Palestinian Leadership, Political Parties, and Representative Bodies).

The survey clearly exposes the vast gap between the youth's perspective on national priorities and the vision held by the Palestinian leadership and reflected in their official discourse. **The priorities per official Palestinian discourse – such as establishing a state within the territory occupied in 1967, securing further international recognition for the State of Palestine, holding general elections or participating in Knesset elections, and drafting a constitution – do not align with the priorities of the youth. The latter prioritize dismantling the colonial system, lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip and implementing reconstruction, ending the internal political division, improving socio-economic conditions for Palestinians, and returning to grassroots resistance in all its forms. Indeed, the Palestinian leadership's priorities ranked at the very bottom of the list of priorities identified by the youth in both the in-person and online results.**

48 See, for example, the address by President Mahmoud Abbas at the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 25, 2025, as well as his address to the high-level international conference on the peaceful agreement of the Question of Palestine and the implementation of the two-state solution on September 22, 2025; both are published at: Palestine Liberation Organization, "Speeches of President Mahmoud Abbas ('Abu Mazen') 2025," Palestinian National Information Center (WAFA). https://info.wafa.ps/pages/details/35727. For English subtitles of the speeches, see "Mahmoud 'Abu Mazen' Abbas," C-SPAN.Org, 2026, https://www.c-span.org/person/mahmoud-abu-mazen-abbas/32641/.

Thematic Section 3:
Means and Tools for Realizing the Palestinian National Project

This section examines the strategies currently employed, or those that could be adopted, to realize the Palestinian national project. It explores youth perspectives on the methods, means, and tools of the struggle; assessing their suitability, effectiveness, and impact on the success of the Palestinian cause.

A wide range of forms and tactics of struggle – whether official, grassroots, partisan, or even individual – have been provided. Question 8, which addressed the effectiveness of these forms of struggle, included a list of 16 options.[49] The options ranged from diplomatic efforts across all levels and arenas to widespread resistance, employing various methods and approaches, as well as international solidarity initiatives, creative media and artistic endeavors, and more. Question 9, concerning factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle, covered 13 options. While Question 15, regarding the impact of various forms of international solidarity, included 12 options. For clarity and consistency of meaning, the questionnaire provided explanations of certain terms and phrases, when necessary. According to observations from the field research teams across the various regions, these explanatory notes were crucial for avoiding confusion and enabling respondents to select the answers that truly reflect their convictions.

A close examination of young people's responses to Question 8 (**"To what extent do you consider the following actions and means to be effective in achieving the Palestinian national project?"**) clearly

49 See Question 8 on the effectiveness of means of struggle, Table 8 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

reveals a divergence between the views of the youth and the choices made by the official Palestinian leadership.

The majority of Palestinian youth indicated that **returning to grassroots resistance in all its forms** is an effective or highly effective approach; 61.5% of the in-person sample and 75.7% of the online sample. This stands in contrast to the leadership's strategy, which has transformed the struggle into a series of conferences, speech-filled rallies, and diplomatic appeals.

Conversely, 39.6% of the in-person sample and 29.6% of the online sample view **official state-level diplomatic work** as effective or highly effective. **Diplomatic and political work within UN bodies** garnered 37.4% of the in-person sample and 26.5% of the online sample. While **legal action involving or pursued through international judicial bodies** was backed by 35.3% of the in-person sample and 27.8% of the online sample. These lower figures reflect youth's lack of confidence in the efficacy of these methods, which historically have failed to secure the Palestinian people's rights or even protect them from genocide. The results align with the youth's inclination to support reliance on internal Palestinian capabilities and domestic change – such grassroots resistance in all its forms, ending the political division to achieve national unity, and fostering popular participation – to realize their national rights. Notably, the figures for the online sample are lower than those for the in-person sample. This may be attributed to the former's awareness of the extent of complicity and/or the failure of the states where they reside to take practical action against the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime.

Critically, this diplomatic or legal activity differs from states' official solidarity which manifests through statements of condemnation of Israeli crimes, recognition of the State of Palestine based on the 1967 borders, and political and economic support for international resolutions. Regarding Question 9, which addressed the extent to which

surrounding factors influence the success of the Palestinian struggle,[50] 52.1% of the in-person sample and 62.2% of the online sample believed that official state solidarity does have an impact or a strong impact on the success of the liberation struggle. This view reflects two points: first, that official diplomatic action is not a priority for young people; and second, that support for such action depends on the practical steps taken by states. In other words, diplomatic action is not sought for its own sake; rather, continuing it or relying on it as a strategy is contingent upon its effectiveness. Needless to say, official diplomatic efforts have produced no changes, whether in halting the genocide, protecting UNRWA, stopping the colonization of the West Bank and the Judaization of Jerusalem, or even providing the bare minimum of international protection for the Palestinian people.

The approach associated with the PA leadership and political parties aligned with the Oslo framework, described in the questionnaire as "the approach of not responding to Israeli forces and colonizers' violations under a pretext of not giving them excuses/opportunities for escalating their attacks," was considered effective or highly effective by 34.3% of the in-person sample, the second-lowest level of support among the strategies examined, and 36.1% of the online sample, the fifth-lowest. Clearly, this sentiment stems from youth's realization that passivity and subjugation are futile in the face of violations, leading only to further abuses. Surprisingly, the Gaza Strip which continues to endure the Israeli genocide, expressed the lowest level of support for the "blocking pretexts" strategy at 19.5% in the in-person sample. This may be attributed to the prevalence of a culture of resistance among the youth, their conviction regarding the strategy's futility following the failure of the fake ceasefire announced in October 2025, or perhaps their reliance on the hope that Arab allies would intervene to support them.

The findings regarding the effectiveness of various forms of

50 See Question 9 regarding the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle, Table 9 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

struggle (Question 8) and the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle (Question 9) show that the rates of youth support for resistance and defiance options are significantly higher than those for the approaches favored by the official leadership.

Popular resistance was selected by 52.1% of the in-person sample and 64.8% of the online sample as effective or highly effective. In the questionnaire, popular resistance was defined as encompassing all forms of confrontation – excluding armed resistance – that engages the masses, such as strikes, protests, sit-ins, mass marches, confrontational demonstrations, and the like.

Comprehensive civil disobedience – defined in the questionnaire as a total rebellion against, and absolute refusal to comply with all colonial laws and measures – was selected as effective and highly effective by 57.9% of the in-person sample and 73.9% of the online sample.

Regarding the impact of mass participation, 70.6% of the in-person sample and 89.5% of the online sample believe that it has a significant or very significant impact on the success of the Palestinian struggle. These views align closely with the youth's strong preference for widespread resistance and civil disobedience.[51] The perceived impact is even greater when considering the specific role of youth, with 73.5% of the in-person sample and 88.7% of the online sample confirming the importance of youth's participation to the success of the Palestinian struggle.[52] As previously noted, this runs counter to the Oslo approach and the political parties associated with it, which confines the Palestinian struggle to an elite-driven political initiative controlled by a group of influential figures, who are often described as historic, seasoned, balanced, legitimate or internationally accepted leadership. This, in turn, aligns with the views of 52.7% of the in-person sample and 64.3% of the online sample, who believe that withdrawing from the Oslo

51 See Question 9 regarding the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle, Table 9 for the In-person and Online Sample in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

52 Ibid.

Accords and completely disengaging from those obligations would have a significant or very significant impact on the success of the Palestinian struggle.[53] Furthermore, 24.2% of the in-person sample and 17.4% of the online sample believe the impact of this political move would be moderate, reflecting the youth's skepticism regarding the entire process. **In other words, young people do not see the Oslo approach – which marginalized the masses and stripped the Palestinian people of a key source of strength, namely broad popular participation in the struggle – as one that serves the cause of liberation.**

In contrast, only 36.9% of the in-person sample and 33.9% of the online sample consider peaceful popular resistance – the approach adopted by the current Palestinian President, leadership and factions associated with the Oslo path – to be effective or very effective.[54] This form of resistance was defined in the questionnaire as encompassing all types of non-confrontational protest, including cultural and artistic activities that are devoid of any violence or incitement to violence.[55]

In terms of effectiveness in Question 8, 63.3% of the in-person sample and 77.4% of the online sample favored the option of a comprehensive boycott – encompassing political, military, economic, cultural, academic, and athletic sectors at both local and international levels. Conversely, this trend indicates that young people do not see the merit in the performative and superficial approach adopted by the European Union and the PA, which limits boycotts to specific products, restricts their scope to the 1967 borders or to specific colonizer individuals and entities. Instead, they believe boycotts and sanctions must be comprehensive, targeting the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime itself rather than limiting them geographically or individually.

53 Ibid.

54 See Question 8 on the effectiveness of means of struggle, Table 8 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

55 See the questionnaire in Appendix 1.

Participation in the Israeli Knesset ranked lowest among the options; only 28.2% of the in-person sample and 15.3% of the online sample viewed such participation as effective or highly effective. Notably, 47.5% of the in-person sample and 69.1% of the online sample considered participation in the Knesset ineffective or completely ineffective, reflecting the youth's perception of the method's futility. Meanwhile, 24.3% of the in-person sample and 15.7% of the online sample held a middle-ground position, reflecting genuine skepticism regarding the viability of this approach.

Perceived Effectiveness of Intervention and Means in Achieving the Palestinian National Project: Findings from the In-person Sample			
Forms of Intervention and Means	% Who Considered Them Effective/Very Effective	Forms of Intervention and Means	% Who Considered Them Slightly Effective/Not at All Effective
Steadfastness and remaining on the land	84.0%	Participation of Palestinians from 1948 in the Israeli Knesset	47.5%
Media and social media	63.6%	The approach of not responding to Israeli forces and colonizers' violations under a pretext of not giving them excuses/ opportunities for escalating their attacks	42.6%
Boycotts (political, economic, cultural, academic, and sports-related) domestically and internationally	63.2%	Legal action with/ through the international courts	37.7%
Grassroots resistance in all its forms	61.5%	Peaceful popular resistance	37.0%
Mass and comprehensive Civil Disobedience	57.9%	Diplomatic and political action within the United Nations	36.9%

Perceived Effectiveness of Intervention and Means in Achieving the Palestinian National Project: Findings from the Online Sample			
Forms of Intervention and Means	% Who Considered Them Effective/Very Effective	Forms of Intervention and Means	% Who Considered Them Slightly Effective/Not at All Effective
Steadfastness and remaining on the land	83.0%	Participation of Palestinians from 1948 in the Israeli Knesset	69.1%
Boycotts (political, economic, cultural, academic, and sports-related) domestically and internationally	77.4%	Diplomatic and political action within the United Nations	47.4%
Grassroots resistance in all its forms	75.7%	The approach of not responding to Israeli forces and colonizers' violations under a pretext of not giving them excuses/ opportunities for escalating their attacks	46.5%
Mass and comprehensive Civil Disobedience	73.9%	Legal action with/through the international courts	44.3%
Global grassroots solidarity	70.4%	Peaceful popular resistance	39.6%

Thematic Section 4:
Trust in the Palestinian Leadership, Political Factions, and Representative Bodies

This section highlights the role of current Palestinian actors – including the leadership, factions, representative bodies, and institutions – in realizing the Palestinian national project. In this context, the survey explores Palestinian youth's level of trust in and satisfaction with these actors (both as institutions and individuals) and their willingness to either participate in existing political bodies or engage in the creation of new political frameworks and leadership.

In response to Question 12 regarding the need to renew Palestinian political leadership and frameworks, 81% of the in-person sample and 94% of the online sample expressed the need for significant or very significant renewal, or for "comprehensive and radical change."[56] This reflects a high level of dissatisfaction with current leadership and institutions while largely explaining the youth's reluctance to participate in the existing political landscape.[57] The lowest figure – which is still high – was recorded in the Gaza Strip (69.5%), while the highest was expressed by Palestinian youth living within 1948 Palestine (95.3%). In Gaza, this result may be attributed to a moderate level of satisfaction – contrasting with the near-total lack of satisfaction found elsewhere – or to the sense of futility in seeking change and the inability to exert influence, stemming from the despair and frustration caused by the prolonged blockade and ongoing

56 See Question 12 on the need to renew the Palestinian political system, Table 12 in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

57 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2019–2021*, Survey (BADIL, 2022), Chapter 5, "Youth Political Participation," https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2022/10/31/survey2021-eng-1667209836.pdf

genocide. The situation of 1948 Palestinians can be attributed to growing dissatisfaction regarding the role of political frameworks and leaderships. It is important to note that youth's dissatisfaction may be confined to the leaderships and parties within 1948 Palestine, or extend to all Palestinian frameworks and leaderships – regardless of their location – or encompass both.

The levels of trust when examining the extent of youth confidence in the role of Palestinian entities in defending national rights and achieving progress were found to be strikingly low.[58]

Youth's Level of Trust in Current Palestinian Entities/Bodies				
Bodies/Entities in defending Palestinian rights and achieving national progress	In-person sample		Online Sample	
	Very High + High Trust	Low + No Trust at All	Very High + High Trust	Low + No Trust at All
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	24.9%	47.3%	7.0%	74.8%
Palestinian National Authority(PA)	20.0%	59.3%	0.9%	90.9%
Political factions that believe in and support the Oslo path (all or any of them)	17.0%	62.8%	0.9%	90.0%
Political factions that adopt the approach of armed resistance (all or any of them)	51.6%	22.3%	51.8%	20.0%
Palestinian grassroots and youth movements	55.4%	15.3%	59.6%	11.8%
Palestinian human rights and civil society organizations	43.7%	22.5%	42.1%	17.9%

The percentage of youth expressing high or very high trust in the PLO stood at 24.9% in the in-person sample and 7.0% in the online sample. Conversely, the percentage expressing low trust or

58 See Question 10 on trust in the ability of Palestinian parties to achieve the national project, Table 10 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

no trust at all reached 47.3% in the in-person sample and 74.8% in the online sample. Despite the constant, repetitive assertion that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by those in positions of influence and by proponents of the organization's potential for reform and democratization, the share of respondents agreeing with this view did not exceed 27.3% in the in-person sample and 7.4% in the online sample.[59] The remaining respondents in both samples hold divided views: some regard the PLO as a political entity dominated by the PA; others see it as a political body that has lost its status as the inclusive representative of the Palestinian people; **and still others view it as merely a nominal entity with no actual role in shaping national policies** (see Thematic Section 1: The Nature of the Palestinian National Project, as well as Question 6 in Appendices 2 and 3). By extension, youth's lack of confidence in the PLO additionally reflects their lack of confidence in its main leadership and policies.

Youth's trust in the PA – specifically the categories of high trust and very high trust – stood at 20% for the in-person sample and 0.8% (less than 1.0%) for the online sample. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing low trust or no trust at all reached 59.3% in the in-person sample and 90.9% in the online sample. When asked to define the nature of the PA, 30.6% of the in-person sample and 9.6% of the online sample viewed it as a Palestinian political entity serving as an alternative to the PLO, while 27.6% of the in-person sample and 46.1% of the online sample regarded it as serving colonial political agendas in managing the conflict.[60] Particularly among youth in historic Palestine, these figures reflect a sense that the PLO is absent and has been supplanted by the PA, even if the latter has been designated as the

59 See Question 6, Table 6, for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

60 See Question 5 on what the Palestinian Authority means to respondents, Table 5, for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3.

"State of Palestine under occupation."[61] They also reflect a conviction among young people that the PA is merely a tool employed by Western colonial powers to perpetuate and legitimize the Zionist-Israeli colonial project in Palestine.[62]

Youth expressing high to very high trust in the factions that subscribe to the Oslo path (whether all or some of them), stood at 17.0% in the in-person sample and 0.8% (less than 1.0%) in the online sample. Conversely, youth expressing low trust or no trust at all in these parties reached 62.8% in the in-person sample and 90% in the online sample. This aligns with the aforementioned findings regarding the PLO and the PA, given that the Oslo-era factions are the very same groups that control both these entities.

Youth expressing high to very high levels of trust in any or all factions that have an armed resistance approach, were almost identical across both samples, standing at a combined average of 51.7%. Conversely, those expressing low trust or no trust at all in these factions reached 22.3% in the in-person sample and 20% in the online sample. Youth's trust in political parties that support armed resistance does not necessarily reflect their actual affiliation with them. Rather, this support may stem from viewing them as an available avenue for rejecting the Oslo approach, or as an expression of support for the resistance strategy in general. Both would serve as a means to challenge the prevailing approaches of global supplication and the approach of not responding to violations by Israeli forces and colonizers under the pretexts of not giving them excuses or opportunities to escalate their attacks at the national level.

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61 Palestine Liberation Organization, "Speeches of President Mahmoud Abbas ('Abu Mazen') 2025," Palestinian National Information Center (WAFA). https://info.wafa.ps/pages/details/35727. For English subtitles of the speeches, see "Mahmoud 'Abu Mazen' Abbas," C-SPAN.Org, 2026, https://www.c-span.org/person/mahmoud-abu-mazen-abbas/32641/.

62 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Palestinian Youth Perspectives on the Oslo Peace Process: Successes, Failures and Alternatives*, Working Paper no. 27 (BADIL, 2021), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2021/09/15/wp27-pal-youth-vs-oslo-eng-1631700884.pdf.

The results above align with the findings of Question 9 regarding **public trust in political leadership figures** as a factor that influences the success of the Palestinian struggle. The level of public trust in these figures, ranging from influential to very influential, was 52.2% in the in-person sample and 75.2% in the online sample. These figures reflect the youth's recognition of the need for such confidence to ensure complementary roles between the leadership and the public at large. Regarding their capacity to influence the success of the Palestinian struggle, the **level of trust in existing representative Palestinian political institutions (the PLO, the PA, and the Knesset Joint/ United Lists)** was low among the in-person sample, (28.7%) while it was moderate among the online sample (40.9%). This discrepancy may be attributed to the fact that the leadership's influence or lack thereof is more visible to the in-person sample than to the online sample, given the former's direct, daily observation of the leadership's actions and behavior.

This low trust regarding the PLO, the PA, and the leadership and parties associated with the Oslo Accords is linked to the views of young people regarding the need for a unified national strategy and the emergence of new Palestinian political parties. Young people responding to the in-person questionnaire view the necessity of having a comprehensive national strategy as influential and very influential at rates of 70.5% and 88.7%, respectively. Furthermore, 60.5% of the in-person sample and 72.6% of the online sample believe that the emergence of new Palestinian political factions would be an influential or highly influential factor in the success of the Palestinian struggle.[63]

Palestinian human rights and civil society organizations garnered a high to very high level of public trust with 43.7% of the in-person sample and 42.1% of the online sample; reflecting high percentages when compared to the trust levels given to Palestinian official bodies and factions.

63 See Question 9 regarding the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle, Table 9 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

However, this trust appears to be contingent upon these organizations refusing to align themselves with donor agendas as 48.5% of the in-person sample and 60.9% of the online sample support the view that the refusal to align with donor agendas is a factor contributing to the success of the Palestinian struggle.[64] **In other words, the relatively high level of trust in Palestinian human rights and civil society organizations – as opposed to official bodies – is neither absolute nor a substitute for official institutions. Rather, it is contingent upon these organizations' ability to adhere to national priorities in the face of political funding agendas.**

It is evident from the percentages above that the majority of Palestinian youth view the significant, radical, and comprehensive renewal of the Palestinian political system as a necessity. Furthermore, most young people are dissatisfied with the performance of influential leaders and the Oslo-era parties; resulting in widespread distrust regarding the role of these individuals and institutions in the Palestinian liberation struggle. Consequently, a large segment of the youth has refrained from political participation through existing official bodies and institutions, despite a strong belief in resistance as a path to liberation. This sentiment is also reflected in the broad support for a unified Palestinian liberation strategy and for the establishment of new Palestinian political parties. The findings presented above call for the development of revolutionary approaches that transcend ready-made formulas and piecemeal, superficial reforms, driving instead toward comprehensive change to steer the Palestinian national liberation movement back onto the right path.

64 See Question 9 regarding the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle, Table 9 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

Thematic Section 5:
Forms of Global Support for Palestine

This section focuses on the various forms of global grassroots and official support and its impact on upholding Palestinian rights. The significance of this section stems from the unprecedented and widespread growth of the global solidarity movement with Palestine. This importance is further underscored by the fact that the movement has persisted for nearly three consecutive years, continuing even after the October 2025 ceasefire declaration in the Gaza Strip. While Questions 8 and 9 of the survey addressed global solidarity in general terms regarding effectiveness and impact, Question 15 examines these forms in greater detail to determine which specific types of solidarity are perceived by the youth to be the most influential in supporting Palestinian rights.

Beyond examining global solidarity in general terms, the analysis explores young people's views on specific forms of solidarity, seeking to identify which are perceived as most influential in supporting Palestinian rights. Undoubtedly, this insight will prove valuable for developing global solidarity strategies of movements across various locations and enhancing cross-border and intersectional solidarity.

Overall, 68.3% of the in-person sample and 81.3% of the online sample perceive global mass solidarity including demonstrations, comprehensive boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, blocking port operations (loading and unloading), and disrupting the operations of companies complicit with the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime, as having significant or very significant impact on the success of the Palestinian struggle. Similarly, official state solidarity such as denouncing and condemning Israeli crimes, recognizing the State of Palestine based on the 1967 borders, politically supporting international resolutions, and providing economic support to Palestine was viewed as having a significant or

very significant impact on the success of the Palestinian national project by 62.1% of the in-person sample and 62.2% of the online sample.

The Impact of Various Forms of Solidarity: Findings from the In-person Sample				
#	Forms of Solidarity	% Who Considered it to Have Significant Influence/Very Significant Influence	Forms of Solidarity	% Who Considered it to Have Minor Influence/No Influence at All
1	Severing of military and economic relations with the Israeli regime by states	73.3%	Lawsuits before international courts	33.0%
2	Severing of economic, academic, and cultural relations with the Israeli regime by states and companies	68.7%	Sanctions imposed by states on individuals (colonizers within the Israeli regime)	23.4%
3	Severing of diplomatic relations with the Israeli regime by states	67.4%	Production of artistic works addressing the Palestinian cause and Israeli violations	23.3%
4	Mass global boycott campaigns against the Israeli regime	66.5%	Campaigns by international human rights organizations	23.1%
5	Refusal by shipping workers at airports and ports to load or unload goods destined for the Israeli regime	63.7%	International student and academic activism	19.7%

The Impact of Various Forms of Solidarity: Findings from the Online Sample				
#	Forms of Solidarity	% Who Considered it to Have Significant Influence/Very Significant Influence	Forms of Solidarity	% Who Considered it to Have Minor Influence/No Influence at All
1	Severing of military and economic relations with the Israeli regime by states	84.8%	Lawsuits before international courts	23.9%
2	Severing of economic, academic, and cultural relations with the Israeli regime by states and companies	81.7%	Sanctions imposed by states on individuals (colonizers within the Israeli regime)	18.3%
3	Severing of diplomatic relations with the Israeli regime by states	78.3%	Campaigns by international human rights organizations	14.3%
4	Actions to disrupt the production/ operations of complicit companies	77.0%	Production of artistic works addressing the Palestinian cause and Israeli violations	9.6%
5	Refusal by shipping workers at airports and ports to load or unload goods destined for the Israeli regime	77.0%	Global grassroots protests and demonstrations	8.7%

As shown in the tables above, both the in-person and online samples identified the same top three forms of solidarity, out of 12 options, in terms of their perceived impact on advancing Palestinian rights. These were rated as having a significant to very significant impact and ranked as follows:

1. Severing military and arms trade relations with the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime, identified by 73.3% of the in-person sample and 84.8% of the online sample.

2. Severing economic, academic, and cultural relations with the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime, identified by 68.7% of the in-person sample and 81.7% of the online sample.

3. Severing diplomatic relations with the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime, identified by 67.4% of the in-person sample and 78.3% of the online sample. [65]

These findings reflect the youth's belief in the necessity for **states to take practical, punitive measures against the Israeli system of foreign domination over the Palestinian people**. Rather than reflecting a lack of conviction regarding other forms of solidarity such as grassroots or student solidarity, these findings assert youth's awareness of the primary objective of global solidarity activities: changing states' policies and compelling states to fulfill their obligations toward the Palestinian people and their rights.

Conversely, both youth samples concurred in identifying the forms of solidarity perceived to have the weakest impact on supporting Palestinian rights, rating them as having a weak impact or no impact at all. The three lowest-ranked approaches to solidarity, in descending order, were as follows:

1. Lawsuits and complaints before international courts garnered 33% support with the in-person sample and 23.9% with the online sample.

2. Sanctions imposed by states on individuals garnered 23.4% support with the in-person sample and 18.3% with the online sample.

3. "Production of artistic works addressing the Palestinian cause and Israeli violations" was selected by 23.3% of the in-person sample; and "campaigns by international human rights organizations" was selected by 14.3% of the online sample.

65 See Question 15 regarding the impact of various forms of international solidarity, Table 15, for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

Despite widespread support for comprehensive grassroots boycott campaigns and direct actions – such as disrupting the production of goods and impeding shipments to the Israeli regime – **the broadest support among Palestinian youth lies in the imposition of state-level sanctions, viewed as the most impactful tangible measure**.[66] This reflects the youth's conviction that states are obligated to take tangible, practical measures to confront Israeli crimes – actions that go beyond mere statements of condemnation and denunciation. In this context, these results reflect the lack of confidence in the international justice system, which has failed to provide any form of justice for the Palestinian people, let alone hold the Israeli regime accountable. Furthermore, the continued impunity enjoyed by the Israeli regime, alongside the support it receives from Western colonial powers, raises broader questions about the role of these powers in perpetuating impunity and their complicity – if not actual participation – in Israeli crimes.[67]

This stands in stark contrast to the most prevalent rhetoric of the Oslo-era leadership and parties, whose state-directed discourse focused primarily on calls to recognize the State of Palestine, rather than on imposing sanctions against the Israeli regime - even in the midst of genocide.[68] The perspective held by the youth clearly indicates that the credibility of states and their adherence to their obligations centers on their willingness to take rigorous punitive measures against the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime. Mass demonstrations, comprehensive boycott campaigns, the disruption of shipping and production activities enabling Israeli crimes, and other forms of direct action serve as means to alter the positions and policies of complicit states.

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66 See Question 15 regarding the impact of various forms of international solidarity, Table 15, for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

67 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Colonial States' Complicity in Gaza: Arming and Shielding Genocide*, Working Paper no. 32 (BADIL, 2025), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2025/07/29/wp32-complicity-eng-1753786452.pdf.

68 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Palestinian Youth Perspectives on the Oslo Peace Process: Successes, Failures and Alternatives*, Working Paper no. 27 (BADIL, 2021), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2021/09/15/wp27-pal-youth-vs-oslo-eng-1631700884.pdf.

The above findings indicate that young people recognize the importance and value of the global solidarity movement and its actions. Despite the lack of clear outcomes or the absence of significant, visible achievements, youth possess a clear, adaptable strategic vision aimed at making the global solidarity movement more influential in shaping states' policies.[69] There is a fundamental difference between the vision held by Oslo-era leadership and parties which stake their success on maintaining good relations and cooperation with colonial states and the vision of Palestinian youth, who see the necessity of forging global alliances and working with other liberation and decolonial movements to achieve mutually desired results.

69 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Colonial States' Complicity in Gaza: Arming and Shielding Genocide*, Working Paper no. 32 (BADIL, 2025), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2025/07/29/wp32-complicity-eng-1753786452.pdf.

Thematic Section 6:
The Role of Youth and Political Paralysis/Inaction

Critically, 81% of the in-person sample and 94% of the online sample of young people believe that Palestinian political life requires a renewal of leadership and political structures to a significant, very significant, or radical and comprehensive extent.[70]

In addition, 60.6% of the in-person sample and 72.6% of the online sample view the emergence of new Palestinian political parties as an influential or highly influential factor in the success of the Palestinian struggle.[71]

While 73.5% of the in-person sample and 88.7% of the online sample view the political participation of Palestinian youth as an influential or highly influential factor in the success of the Palestinian struggle.[72]

Furthermore, 65.3% of the in-person sample and 71.8% of the online sample believe that Palestinian youth are capable to a great or very great extent of developing new and more impactful tools and methods of struggle.[73]

When the findings above are taken into consideration, many questions arise: Where do young people stand in the change process? What is the

70 See Question 12 on the need to renew the Palestinian political system, Table 12 in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

71 See Question 9 regarding the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle, Table 9 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

72 See Question 9 regarding the factors influencing the success of the Palestinian struggle, Table 9 for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

73 See Question 11 on the ability of Palestinian youth to develop new means and methods of struggle, Table 11, for the In-person and Online Samples in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively.

role of youth in transforming Palestinian political life, frameworks, and leadership? What role do they play in forging new Palestinian political forces? And, critically, why does their belief in their ability to develop new tools and methods of struggle not translate into actual practice and tangible realities?

The survey findings have demonstrated that there is a wide and seemingly unbridgeable gap between the convictions and orientations of the youth and the Palestinian leadership, particularly the rhetoric of the Oslo-era leadership and its associated factions. At the same time, a vast gulf also exists between the youth's views and the reality on the ground.

These observations neither diminish the role Palestinian youth play in the local and international struggle nor dismiss their efforts to forge new models of resistance. Rather, they highlight the tension between navigating and engaging with the existing political status quo and pursuing the transformative change and renewal that young people seek.

This political paralysis and inaction can be attributed to several factors. It stems partly from young people gravitating toward unstructured social movements and civil society organizations rather than formal political structures. This shift is linked to a waning belief in the necessity of forming organized party frameworks resulting from the consequence of lost confidence in or witnessing the failure and political self-destruction of existing parties and their approaches. This also reflects young people's limited ability to draw lessons from the experiences of established movements and political parties, alongside the latter's failure to transmit their accumulated knowledge and experience to younger generations. Instead, those in the existing Palestinian political system cling to their roles based on past history, viewing renewal as unnecessary, and even opposing, questioning, and branding it as an act of betrayal. There is also, perhaps, a fear of failure arising from the absence of a strategic

and reliable international ally in a world defined by alliances. Naturally, the impact of Western hegemony cannot be overlooked, as it has eroded the very notion of the political faction as a cohesive, organized vehicle for collective struggle. Similarly detrimental has been the influence and culture of the Oslo-era, which has eroded collective values, entrenched individualism and utilitarianism, and confined the notion of "struggle" to a circle of influential politicians.[74] Finally, the suppression of youth-initiated attempts to change or challenge the status-quo – whether through obstruction, skepticism, exclusion, accusations of treason, or even direct physical repression – cannot be discounted.

74 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Palestinian Youth Perspectives on the Oslo Peace Process: Successes, Failures and Alternatives*, Working Paper no. 27 (BADIL, 2021), https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2021/09/15/wp27-pal-youth-vs-oslo-eng-1631700884.pdf.

Conclusion

The deterioration of the Palestinian national project, specifically the shift from liberating all of Palestine within its Mandate-era borders and Palestinians' return to their original homes to a demilitarized Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, featuring land swaps and a guarantee of peaceful coexistence with neighbors including the Israeli regime[75] did not happen all at once. The PLO's 1974 Ten-Point Program marked an initial shift towards seeking a place at the negotiating table, while explicitly rejecting participation in a peaceful settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967).[76] The official text of the 1988 Declaration of Independence made no reference to Resolution 242 but stated that the 1947 Palestine Partition Plan Resolution 181 "attach conditions to international legitimacy that guarantee the Palestinian Arab people the right to sovereignty and national independence."[77] Then, at the 19th PNC session, Resolution 242 was explicitly recognized as the basis for the convening an international conference and the PLO's desire to participate in it. Furthermore, the second clause of the political program, limited the scope of the sought-after Palestinian state to the territories occupied in 1967. This was followed by the Madrid Conference (1991) and the mutual recognition between the PLO and the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime, culminating in the 1993 Declaration

75 Address by President Mahmoud Abbas at the High-Level International Conference on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, September 22, 2025. https://info.wafa.ps/pages/details/35727. For English subtitles of the speech, see "U.N. Holds Special Conference on Two-State Solution," C-SPAN.Org, September 22, 2025, https://www.c-span.org/program/united-nations/un-holds-special-conference-on-two-state-solution/666081.

76 Palestine National Council, "Political Programme of 9 June 1974," adopted at the Twelfth Session of the Palestine National Council, Cairo, June 1–9, 1974, United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-206681/.

77 Palestine National Council, "Declaration of Independence," annex III to "Letter Dated 18 November 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General," UN document A/43/827–S/20278, November 18, 1988, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-178680/

of Principles and the subsequent agreements and annexes – collectively known as the Oslo Accords.[78] None of the Oslo Accords documents contained a single mention of a Palestinian state or even the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. Moreover, they abandoned the use of Resolution 242 as a framework for implementing a final settlement, limiting its role to merely a basis for negotiation, despite ongoing disputes regarding its text and interpretation.[79]

These far-reaching concessions, formalized through agreements, declarations and accords, did not end with the signing of the Oslo Accords. Rather, they were extended through a series of written and unwritten protocols, understandings and international resolutions that eroded the substance of the Palestinian people's inalienable rights. In this sense, the assertion that the Palestinian national project has diverged from the founding objectives of the PLO and the political factions is substantiated by the historical record and political reality. Moreover, the Palestinian national project can no longer be understood as a unified undertaking, as its meaning and objectives have become increasingly divergent across political factions and even among individuals.

While the genocide continues in the Gaza Strip, forced displacement and settler-colonialism are accelerating in the West Bank, the Judaization of Jerusalem is increasing, restrictions and violations against Palestinians in 1948 Palestine are growing, and the rights of refugees in exile are actively denied. As international complicity and inaction persist, official Palestinian discourse continues to conform to externally imposed conditions, pursuing statehood through a piecemeal and convoluted process that falls far short of the Palestinian people's inalienable rights

78 United Nations, "History of the Question of Palestine," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.un.org/unispal/history/; United Nations, "Agreement—Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (a.k.a. 'Oslo Accord')," September 13, 1993, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180015/.

79 United Nations, "Agreement—Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (a.k.a. 'Oslo Accord')," September 13, 1993, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180015/.

and national aspirations. This political failure cannot be attributed to a lack of clarity in vision, but must instead be understood in relation to the class interests underpinning the Palestinian leadership's composition and political positioning, particularly its bourgeois character. Leadership projects such as building the institutions of a Palestinian state, establishing a Palestinian state under occupation, or securing further international recognition of the State of Palestine serve to dissolve the stage of national liberation. This entailed a comprehensive and fundamental review of the settlement project, which produced a beneficial Palestinian political class that seeks a state without liberation, and legitimized the Israeli colonization of Palestine by waiting for acts of good faith from the Israeli colonial-apartheid regime.

Results of the youth opinion poll reveal a wide gap between the orientations of the youth and those of political leadership and factions, particularly the parties and leaders associated with the Oslo path. The findings also indicate that the youth remain at a standstill regarding their role in the desired process of comprehensive and radical change. The current political reality demands more than calls to: dismantle the Oslo Accords; halt security coordination between the Israeli regime and the Palestinian Authority; convene the secretaries-general of Palestinian factions; reach a reconciliation agreement; or express dissatisfaction with presidential decrees governing electoral procedures and eligibility. Such measures, while addressing specific aspects of the political crisis, remain piecemeal responses to a much deeper structural impasse. Consequently, the essence, components, realization methods, and the roles of the Palestinian actors within the Palestinian national project require radical political, intellectual and structural reconstruction.

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

Survey Introduction

This survey aims to understand Palestinian youth's perceptions and opinions regarding the Palestinian national project, the means of struggle to achieve it, and the roles of relevant Palestinian actors.

This survey targets Palestinian youth (ages 18–35) in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, 1948 Palestine (lands colonized since 1948), Jordan, and Lebanon, where the survey will be completed in person. Youth in the more distant *Shatat* (Exile) around the world are invited to participate via an online survey. Since it is not possible to administer the survey in person in Syria, it has been included under the *Shatat* category.

If you reside in an area where in-person data collection is being conducted, but are unable to participate in this format, you are invited to complete the survey online.

The results of this survey will be used solely for research purposes; all responses will be treated with strict confidentiality, and no personal information that could reveal the participants' identities will be used.

Your opinions help deepen our understanding of Palestinian youth perceptions toward the Palestinian cause and the future of Palestinian national rights, thereby contributing to the development of knowledge, liberation-oriented policies, and initiatives related to Palestinian youth.

First: Background Information

V01. Age Group

1. 18–24 2. 25–29 3. 30–35

V02. Gender

1. Male 2. Female

V03. Current Place of Residence

1. West Bank 2. Gaza Strip 3. Jerusalem
4. Palestinian territory colonized since 1948 5. Jordan
6. Lebanon 7. Other countries .....

V04. Refugee Status

1. Refugee (inside a refugee camp) 2. Refugee (outside a refugee camp)
3. Internally displaced person (see explanation below)*
4. Never displaced 5. Do not know

* Anyone displaced from their home of origin who remained in Palestine without crossing international borders, and their descendants. Palestinians displaced during the Nakba from land colonized in 1948 to 1967 land are considered refugees, not IDPs.

V05. Place of Origin in Palestine (ancestral home) .....

V06. Place of Residence

1. Refugee camp 2. City 3. Village
4. Bedouin community 5. Other ....

V07. Educational Level

1. High school or less 2. Associate Degree/ Diploma
3. Bachelor's degree 4. Graduate studies/ Postgraduate
5. Other .....

V08. Level of Interest in Public Affairs and the Palestinian Cause

1. Not interested 2. Somewhat interested
3. Generally interested 4. Very interested

Second: the Palestinian National Project

Q1. What is the Palestinian National Project?

What does the term "Palestinian National Project" mean to you personally? (Select only one answer)

1. The liberation of historic Palestine (within its borders from the river to the sea), the return of refugees, and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state
2. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, along with an agreed-upon solution to the refugee issue
3. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and the return of refugees to the borders of the Palestinian state

4. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders
5. The return of Palestinian refugees to their original ancestral homelands from which their ancestors were displaced, regardless of the existing state
6. The existence of an authority/government—regardless of its identity—dedicated to improving economic and social conditions
7. I don't know
8. Other.....

Q2. National Identity and Political Awareness

#		1. I strongly disagree	2. I disagree	3. Neutral	4. I agree	5. I strongly agree
Q2.1	The Palestinian identity forms an essential part of my personal identity					
Q2.2	My Palestinian national identity is confused and unclear					
Q2.3	My connection to Palestinians living in countries other than my own is purely emotional					
Q2.4	My connection to Palestinians, wherever they may be, is both emotional and political					
Q2.5	I identify as Palestinian wherever I am and whenever I have the opportunity					
Q2.6	The existing Palestinian political parties, or one of them, represent me politically					

Third: Common terms: what do the following common terms mean to you? (Select only one answer)

Q3. What does Palestine mean to you?

1. Historic Palestine (from the river to the sea)
2. Palestine within the 1967 borders (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem)
3. The West Bank and East Jerusalem
4. The West Bank only
5. The Gaza Strip only
6. Something else .....

Q4. Who Makes up the Palestinian People?

1. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants, regardless of current nationality/citizenship or place of residence
2. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who has not acquired the nationality/citizenship of another country
3. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who are residents of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip
4. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who wish to return to historic Palestine and reside there
5. Something else.....

Q5. What does the Palestinian Authority Mean to you?

1. A Palestinian political body that serves as an alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
2. A Palestinian political body that serves the objectives and interests of influential powers and states in managing the conflict.
3. A temporary Palestinian political body established for the purpose of building a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.
4. A political body representing Palestinians in the territory occupied in 1967.
5. Something else.....

Q6. What does the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Mean to you?

1. The sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
2. A political body controlled by the Palestinian Authority.
3. A political body that has lost its status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.
4. A nominal political body with no actual role in determining national policies.
5. Something else.....

Fourth: National Priorities

Q7. In your opinion, what priorities do you believe are most important for the Palestinian people at this stage? (Select up to 3 answers only, ranking them in order of priority, with 1 being your top choice)

#	Priorities	Rank
1	Ending Israeli settler-colonialism in historic Palestine and achieving the right of return for refugees	
2	Establishing a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders	
3	Securing further international recognition of the State of Palestine within the 1967 borders	
4	Ending the fragmentation and achieving Palestinian national unity	

5	Lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip and undertaking reconstruction	
6	Strengthening Palestinian steadfastness/sumoud and preventing displacement	
7	Empowering the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and preventing its dismantlement	
8	Improving the economic and living conditions of Palestinians	
9	Resuming Palestinian resistance in all its forms	
10	Dissolving/dismantling the Palestinian Authority	
11	Eradicating corruption within the Palestinian Authority	
12	Increasing litigation with international courts	
13	Holding general elections for the Palestinian National Council of the PLO, as well as legislative and presidential elections for the Palestinian Authority	
14	Forming a unified Arab list to participate in Knesset elections	
15	Stopping widespread crime among Palestinians in the 1948 territory	
16	Replacing the Palestinian Basic Law with a provisional Palestinian constitution	
17	Safeguarding Palestinian national identity	
18	Enhancing the participation of Palestinian youth	
19	Enhancing democracy and human rights	

Fifth: Means and Tools for Achieving the National Project

Q8. In your opinion, to what extent do you consider the following actions and means to be effective in achieving the Palestinian national project?

#	Forms of Intervention and Means	Level of Effectiveness				
		1. Not at all effective	2. Slightly effective	3. Moderately effective	4. Effective	5. Very effective
Q8.1	Steadfastness and remaining on the land					
Q8.2	Peaceful popular resistance (see explanation below)*					
Q8.3	Popular resistance (see explanation below)**					
Q8.4	Boycotts (political, military, economic, cultural, academic, and sports-related) domestically and internationally					
Q8.5	Global grassroots solidarity					
Q8.6	Diplomatic and political action within the United Nations					
Q8.7	Diplomatic action at the state level					

Q8.8	Legal action with/through the international courts					
Q8.9	Participation in Knesset elections					
Q8.10	Media and social media					
Q8.11	Cultural and Artistic Activities					
Q8.12	Community and youth initiatives					
Q8.13	The approach of not responding to Israeli forces and colonizers' violations under a pretext of not giving them excuses/opportunities for escalating their attacks					
Q8.14	Mass and comprehensive Civil Disobedience (see explanation below)***					
Q8.15	Grassroots resistance in all its forms					
Q8.16	Other					

* All forms of peaceful protest that do not involve any manifestation of violence or incitement to violence, as well as cultural and artistic activities

** All non-armed confrontations involving broad segments of the public, such as strikes, sit-ins, marches, demonstrations, and others

*** Defiance of and refusal to comply with all colonial laws and measures

Q9. In your Opinion, to what Extent do the Following Factors Influence the Success of the Palestinian Struggle in General?

#	Factor	Level of Influence				
		1. Very significant influence	2. Significant influence	3. Moderate influence	4. Minor influence	5. No influence at all
Q9.1	Ending the division and achieving national unity					
Q9.2	Level of popular participation					
Q9.3	Existence of a comprehensive unifying national strategy					
Q9.4	Public trust in political leadership figures					
Q9.5	Trust in representative Palestinian political institutions (PLO, PA, Joint List – Knesset members)					
Q9.6	Participation of Palestinians from 1948 in the Israeli Knesset					

Q9.7	Complete withdrawal, disengagement, and annulment of the Oslo Accords					
Q9.8	Refusal of Palestinian civil society organizations to align with donor agendas					
Q9.9	Global popular solidarity (see explanation below)*					
Q9.10	Official solidarity from states (see explanation below)**					
Q9.11	International media coverage					
Q9.12	Participation of Palestinian youth					
Q9.13	Emergence of new Palestinian political parties					

* Global popular solidarity includes: demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, blocking loading and unloading at ports, disrupting the operations of companies complicit with the regime, and more

** This includes denouncing and condemning the Israeli regime's actions, recognizing the State of Palestine within the 1967 borders, and providing political support for international resolutions as well as economic support

Sixth: The Role of Palestinian Actors

Q10. In your Opinion, to what Extent do you Trust the Ability of the Following Palestinian Entities/Bodies to Defend Palestinian Rights and Achieve National Progress?

#	Entity/ Body	Level of Trust				
		1. Very high trust	2. High trust	3. Moderate trust	4. Low trust	5. No trust at all
Q10.1	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)					
Q10.2	Palestinian National Authority(PA)					
Q10.3	Political factions that believe in and support the Oslo path (all or any of them)					
Q10.4	Political factions that adopt the approach of armed resistance (all or any of them)					
Q10.5	Palestinian grassroots and youth movements					
Q10.6	Palestinian human rights and civil society organizations					

Q11. To what Extent do you Think Palestinian Youth are Capable of Developing New and More Effective Tools and Methods of Resistance?

1. To a very large extent 2. To a large extent 3. To a moderate extent

4. To a small extent 5. Not capable at present

Q12. In your Opinion, to what Extent does Palestinian Political Life Need a Renewal of Leadership and Political Structures?

1. Does not need it at all 2. Needs it to a minor extent

3. Needs it to a moderate extent 4. Needs it to a great extent

5. Needs it to a very great extent 6. Needs comprehensive, radical change

Q13. What is your Opinion on the Requirement of Prior Acceptance of Agreements Concluded by the PLO (including Oslo) as a Condition for Participating and Competing in Palestinian Public Elections: do you Support this Condition or Not?

1. I support it 2. I oppose it

Q14. In your Opinion, what is the Objective of Holding the General Elections (for the Legislative Council, the National Council, and the Presidency) Scheduled for November 2026 and Early Next Year:

1. To revitalize Palestinian political life

2. To renew the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and the current leadership

3. To unite the Palestinian people

To meet the conditions set by Western countries (including combating Palestinian "terrorism," holding public elections, addressing corruption, changing the Palestinian curriculum and regulating media, suspending salaries for prisoners, the wounded, and the families of martyrs, and potentially serving as a distraction from the Israeli genocide and colonization)

Q15. In your Opinion, to what Extent do the Following Forms of Solidarity Influence Support for Palestinian Rights?

#	Form of Solidarity	1. No influence at all	2. Minor influence	3. Moderate influence	4. Significant influence	5. Very significant influence
Q15.1	Global grassroots protests and demonstrations					
Q15.2	Mass global boycott campaigns against the Israeli regime					
Q15.3	Refusal by shipping workers at airports and ports to load or unload goods destined for the Israeli regime					
Q15.4	Actions to disrupt the production/operations of complicit companies					
Q15.5	International student and academic activism					
Q15.6	Production of artistic works addressing the Palestinian cause and Israeli violations					
Q15.7	Campaigns by international human rights organizations					
Q15.8	Lawsuits before international courts					
Q15.9	Severing of military and economic relations with the Israeli regime by states					
Q15.10	Severing of diplomatic relations with the Israeli regime by states					
Q15.11	Severing of economic, academic, and cultural relations with the Israeli regime by states and companies					
Q15.12	Sanctions imposed by states on individuals (colonizers within the Israeli regime)					

Thank you for participating in this survey.

Appendix 2:
Results of the In-person sample

Second: the Palestinian National Project

Q1. What does the term "Palestinian National Project" mean to you personally? (Select only one answer)

Table 1	
Option	**%**
1. The liberation of historic Palestine (within its borders from the river to the sea), the return of refugees, and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state	71.5%
2. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, along with an agreed-upon solution to the refugee issue	7.5%
3. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and the return of refugees to the borders of the Palestinian state	7.0%
4. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders	2.6%
5. The return of Palestinian refugees to their original ancestral homelands from which their ancestors were displaced, regardless of the existing state	6.6%
6. The existence of an authority/government—regardless of its identity—dedicated to improving economic and social conditions	2.9%
7. I don't know	1.8%

Q2. National Identity and Political Awareness

Table 2					
	1. I strongly disagree	2. I disagree	3. Neutral	4. I agree	5. I strongly agree
Q2.1: The Palestinian identity forms an essential part of my personal identity	1.1%	3.1%	5.8%	43.5%	46.6%
Q2.2: My Palestinian national identity is confused and unclear	25.3%	31.8%	14.6%	21.9%	6.4%
Q2.3: My connection to Palestinians living in countries other than my own is purely emotional	13.7%	31.1%	14.6%	31.5%	9.1%
Q2.4: My connection to Palestinians, wherever they may be, is both emotional and political	3.5%	12.0%	13.1%	46.3%	25.1%
Q2.5: I identify as Palestinian wherever I am and whenever I have the opportunity	0.7%	4.8%	9.2%	41.2%	44.1%
Q2.6: The existing Palestinian political parties, or one of them, represent me politically	19.7%	21.1%	20.1%	30.3%	8.8%

Third: Common terms: what do the following common terms mean to you? (Select only one answer)

Q3. What does Palestine mean to you?

Table 3	
Option	%
1. Historic Palestine (from the river to the sea)	82.2%
2. Palestine within the 1967 borders (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem)	13.5%
3. The West Bank and East Jerusalem	2.6%
4. The West Bank only	1.0%
5. The Gaza Strip only	0.4%
6. Something else.....	0.3%

Q4. Who makes up the Palestinian people?

Table 4	
Option	%
1. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants, regardless of current nationality/citizenship or place of residence	61.6%
2. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who has not acquired the nationality/citizenship of another country	8.0%
3. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who are residents of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip	10.4%
4. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who wish to return to historic Palestine and reside there	19.8%
5. Something else.....	0.2%

Q5. What does the Palestinian Authority mean to you?

Table 5	
Option	%
1. A Palestinian political body that serves as an alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).	30.6%
2. A Palestinian political body that serves the objectives and interests of influential powers and states in managing the conflict.	27.6%
3. A temporary Palestinian political body established for the purpose of building a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.	17.5%
4. A political body representing Palestinians in the territory occupied in 1967.	13.0%
5. Something else.....	11.3%

Q6. What does the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) mean to you?

Table 6	
Option	**%**
1. The sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.	27.3%
2. A political body controlled by the Palestinian Authority.	26.8%
3. A political body that has lost its status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.	19.4%
4. A nominal political body with no actual role in determining national policies.	21.4%
5. Something else.....	5.1%

Fourth: National Priorities

Q7. In your opinion, what priorities do you believe are most important for the Palestinian people at this stage? (Select up to 3 answers only, ranking them in order of priority, with 1 being your top choice)

Table 7	
Priorities	**% / Rank**
1. Ending Israeli settler-colonialism in historic Palestine and achieving the right of return for refugees.	58.7%
2. Lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip and undertaking reconstruction.	30.6%
3. Improving the economic and living conditions of Palestinians.	15.8%
4. Strengthening Palestinian steadfastness/sumoud and preventing displacement.	10.7%
5. Ending the fragmentation and achieving Palestinian national unity.	8.0%
6. Safeguarding Palestinian national identity.	7.4%

Fifth: Means and Tools for Achieving the National Project

Q8. In your opinion, to what extent do you consider the following actions and means to be effective in achieving the Palestinian national project?

Table 8

Forms of Intervention and Means	Level of effectiveness				
	1. Not at all effective	2. Slightly effective	3. Moderately effective	4. Effective	5. Very effective
Q8.1: Steadfastness and remaining on the land	2.1%	3.6%	10.3%	35.7%	48.2%
Q8.2: Peaceful popular resistance (see explanation below)	18.3%	18.8%	26.1%	26.0%	10.9%
Q8.3: Popular resistance (see explanation below)	9.0%	12.4%	26.6%	37.7%	14.4%
Q8.4: Boycotts (political, military, economic, cultural, academic, and sports-related) domestically and internationally	6.1%	12.0%	18.8%	35.3%	27.9%
Q8.5: Global grassroots solidarity	4.7%	13.1%	25.7%	35.3%	21.3%
Q8.6: Diplomatic and political action within the United Nations	10.5%	26.4%	25.7%	26.6%	10.8%
Q8.7: Diplomatic action at the state level	11.2%	19.2%	29.5%	29.6%	10.4%
Q8.8: Legal action with/through the international courts	14.0%	23.6%	27.1%	26.9%	8.4%
Q8.9: Participation in Knesset elections	26.3%	21.2%	24.3%	20.0%	8.2%
Q8.10: Media and social media	3.7%	10.5%	22.2%	36.2%	27.3%
Q8.11: Cultural and Artistic Activities	6.6%	18.9%	28.8%	33.2%	12.4%
Q8.12: Community and youth initiatives	4.4%	14.4%	30.7%	35.9%	14.6%
Q8.13: The approach of not responding to Israeli forces and colonizers' violations under a pretext of not giving them excuses/ opportunities for escalating their attacks	25.9%	16.7%	23.1%	23.4%	10.8%
Q8.14: Mass and comprehensive Civil Disobedience (see explanation below)	7.1%	11.9%	23.0%	34.8%	23.1%
Q8.15: Grassroots resistance in all its forms	5.2%	10.8%	22.5%	33.3%	28.2%

Q9. In your opinion, to what extent do the following factors influence the success of the Palestinian struggle in general?

Table 9

Factor	Level of influence				
	1. Very significant influence	2. Significant influence	3. Moderate influence	4. Minor influence	5. No influence at all
Q9.1: Ending the division and achieving national unity	51.8%	32.5%	11.9%	2.8%	1.0%
Q9.2: Level of popular participation	30.4%	40.2%	23.9%	4.7%	0.8%
Q9.3: Existence of a comprehensive unifying national strategy	36.4%	34.1%	23.1%	5.0%	1.4%
Q9.4: Public trust in political leadership figures	20.5%	31.7%	25.1%	13.6%	9.1%
Q9.5: Trust in representative Palestinian political institutions (PLO, PA, Joint List – Knesset members)	9.3%	19.4%	27.3%	18.7%	25.3%
Q9.6: Participation of Palestinians from 1948 in the Israeli Knesset	10.4%	23.7%	28.6%	18.8%	18.5%
Q9.7: Complete withdrawal, disengagement, and annulment of the Oslo Accords	27.3%	25.4%	24.2%	15.8%	7.2%
Q9.8: Refusal of Palestinian civil society organizations to align with donor agendas	19.7%	28.8%	34.9%	12.6%	4.0%
Q9.9: Global popular solidarity	28.9%	39.4%	24.5%	5.4%	1.9%
Q9.10: Official solidarity from states	26.7%	35.4%	26.5%	8.4%	3.0%
Q9.11: International media coverage	31.2%	35.6%	23.8%	7.5%	1.9%
Q9.12: Participation of Palestinian youth	35.0%	38.5%	20.5%	4.7%	1.4%
Q9.13: Emergence of new Palestinian political parties	29.3%	31.3%	24.2%	8.9%	6.3%

Sixth: The Role of Palestinian Actors

Q10. In your opinion, to what extent do you trust the ability of the following Palestinian entities/bodies to defend Palestinian rights and achieve national progress?

Table 10

Entity/ Body	Level of trust				
	1. Very high trust	2. High trust	3. Moderate trust	4. Low trust	5. No trust at all
Q10.1: Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	11.6%	13.3%	27.7%	18.9%	28.4%
Q10.2: Palestinian National Authority(PA)	8.4%	11.6%	20.7%	16.2%	43.1%
Q10.3: Political factions that believe in and support the Oslo path (all or any of them)	6.9%	10.1%	20.1%	23.0%	39.8%
Q10.4: Political factions that adopt the approach of armed resistance (all or any of them)	24.1%	27.5%	26.0%	11.6%	10.7%
Q10.5: Palestinian grassroots and youth movements	19.0%	36.4%	29.2%	9.0%	6.3%
Q10.6: Palestinian human rights and civil society organizations	15.0%	28.7%	33.8%	13.3%	9.2%

Q11. To what extent do you think Palestinian youth are capable of developing new and more effective tools and methods of resistance?

Table 11

Level of belief or confidence	%
1. To a very large extent	35.6%
2. To a large extent	29.7%
3. To a moderate extent	19.5%
4. To a small extent	7.3%
5. Not capable at present	7.8%

Q12. In your opinion, to what extent does Palestinian political life need a renewal of leadership and political structures?

Table 12	
Level of need	%
1. Does not need it at all	1.4%
2. Needs it to a minor extent	4.1%
3. Needs it to a moderate extent	13.5%
4. Needs it to a great extent	19.5%
5. Needs it to a very great extent	19.8%
6. Needs comprehensive, radical change	41.7%

Q13. What is your opinion on the requirement of prior acceptance of agreements concluded by the PLO (including Oslo) as a condition for participating and competing in Palestinian public elections: do you support this condition or not?

Table 13	
Answer	%
1. I support it	28.5%
2. I oppose it	71.5%

Q14. In your opinion, what is the objective of holding the general elections (for the Legislative Council, the National Council, and the presidency) scheduled for November 2026 and early next year:

Table 14	
Objective	%
1. To revitalize Palestinian political life	17.6%
2. To renew the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and the current leadership	42.7%
3. To unite the Palestinian people	12.9%
4. To meet the conditions set by Western countries	26.9%

Q15. In your opinion, to what extent do the following forms of solidarity influence support for Palestinian rights?

Table 15

Forms of solidarity	Level of influence				
	1. No influence at all	2. Minor influence	3. Moderate influence	4. Significant influence	5. Very significant influence
Q15.1: Global grassroots protests and demonstrations	3.4%	9.9%	29.8%	39.3%	17.7%
Q15.2: Mass global boycott campaigns against the Israeli regime	3.8%	8.8%	20.9%	32.1%	34.4%
Q15.3: Refusal by shipping workers at airports and ports to load or unload goods destined for the Israeli regime	6.0%	11.2%	19.1%	35.3%	28.4%
Q15.4: Actions to disrupt the production/ operations of complicit companies	5.3%	11.5%	24.3%	34.6%	24.3%
Q15.5: International student and academic activism	4.6%	15.1%	30.6%	33.3%	16.4%
Q15.6: Production of artistic works addressing the Palestinian cause and Israeli violations	6.1%	17.3%	31.4%	29.9%	15.3%
Q15.7: Campaigns by international human rights organizations	6.2%	17.0%	30.2%	31.4%	15.2%
Q15.8: Lawsuits before international courts	12.2%	20.8%	27.1%	25.4%	14.5%
Q15.9: Severing of military and economic relations with the Israeli regime by states	3.6%	8.0%	15.0%	34.5%	38.9%
Q15.10: Severing of diplomatic relations with the Israeli regime by states	4.3%	8.1%	20.2%	33.4%	34.0%
Q15.11: Severing of economic, academic, and cultural relations with the Israeli regime by states and companies	4.4%	7.5%	19.4%	34.1%	34.6%
Q15.12: Sanctions imposed by states on individuals (colonizers within the Israeli regime)	10.0%	13.5%	20.7%	24.4%	31.4%

Appendix 3:
Results of the Online Sample

Second: the Palestinian National Project

Q1. What does the term "Palestinian National Project" mean to you personally? (Select only one answer)

Table 1	
Option	**%**
1. The liberation of historic Palestine (within its borders from the river to the sea), the return of refugees, and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state	82.2%
2. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, along with an agreed-upon solution to the refugee issue	2.2%
3. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and the return of refugees to the borders of the Palestinian state	2.2%
4. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders	0.4%
5. The return of Palestinian refugees to their original ancestral homelands from which their ancestors were displaced, regardless of the existing state	5.7%
6. The existence of an authority/government—regardless of its identity—dedicated to improving economic and social conditions	1.7%
7. I don't know	1.7%

Q2. National Identity and Political Awareness

Table 2					
	1. I strongly disagree	2. I disagree	3. Neutral	4. I agree	5. I strongly agree
Q2.1: The Palestinian identity forms an essential part of my personal identity	0.9%	1.3%	1.7%	22.6%	73.5%
Q2.2: My Palestinian national identity is confused and unclear	44.8%	25.7%	13.9%	12.2%	3.5%
Q2.3: My connection to Palestinians living in countries other than my own is purely emotional	24.3%	43.0%	18.3%	12.2%	2.2%
Q2.4: My connection to Palestinians, wherever they may be, is both emotional and political	2.2%	2.2%	10.4%	35.2%	50.0%
Q2.5: I identify as Palestinian wherever I am and whenever I have the opportunity	0.9%	3.0%	1.7%	23.0%	71.3%
Q2.6: The existing Palestinian political parties, or one of them, represent me politically	25.2%	23.5%	27.4%	17.0%	7.0%

Third: Common terms: what do the following common terms mean to you? (Select only one answer)

Q3. What does Palestine mean to you?

Table 3	
Option	%
1. Historic Palestine (from the river to the sea)	95.2%
2. Palestine within the 1967 borders (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem)	2.2%
3. The West Bank and East Jerusalem	0.4%
4. The West Bank only	0.0%
5. The Gaza Strip only	0.4%
6. Something else.....	1.7%

Q4. Who makes up the Palestinian people?

Table 4	
Option	%
1. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants, regardless of current nationality/citizenship or place of residence	91.3%
2. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who has not acquired the nationality/citizenship of another country	0.9%
3. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who are residents of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip	0.9%
4. Anyone of Palestinian origin and their descendants who wish to return to historic Palestine and reside there	5.7%
5. Something else.....	1.3%

Q5. What does the Palestinian Authority mean to you?

Table 5	
Option	%
1. A Palestinian political body that serves as an alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).	9.6%
2. A Palestinian political body that serves the objectives and interests of influential powers and states in managing the conflict.	46.1%
3. A temporary Palestinian political body established for the purpose of building a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.	9.6%
4. A political body representing Palestinians in the territory occupied in 1967.	6.1%
5. Something else.....	28.7%

Q6. What does the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) mean to you?

Table 6	
Option	%
1. The sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.	7.4%
2. A political body controlled by the Palestinian Authority.	18.3%
3. A political body that has lost its status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.	32.6%
4. A nominal political body with no actual role in determining national policies.	33.5%
5. Something else.....	8.3%

Fourth: National Priorities

Q7. In your opinion, what priorities do you believe are most important for the Palestinian people at this stage? (Select up to 3 answers only, ranking them in order of priority, with 1 being your top choice)

Table 7	
Priorities	% / Rank
1. Ending Israeli settler-colonialism in historic Palestine and achieving the right of return for refugees.	40.0%
2. Lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip and undertaking reconstruction.	26.5%
3. Improving the economic and living conditions of Palestinians.	9.6%
4. Strengthening Palestinian steadfastness/sumoud and preventing displacement.	9.1%
5. Ending the fragmentation and achieving Palestinian national unity.	8.7%
6. Safeguarding Palestinian national identity.	8.7%

Fifth: Means and Tools for Achieving the National Project

Q8. In your opinion, to what extent do you consider the following actions and means to be effective in achieving the Palestinian national project?

Table 8

Forms of Intervention and Means	Level of effectiveness				
	1. Not at all effective	2. Slightly effective	3. Moderately effective	4. Effective	5. Very effective
Q8.1: Steadfastness and remaining on the land	3.5%	3.9%	9.6%	29.6%	53.5%
Q8.2: Peaceful popular resistance (see explanation below)	14.3%	25.2%	26.5%	20.9%	13.0%
Q8.3: Popular resistance (see explanation below)	2.2%	11.7%	21.3%	35.7%	29.1%
Q8.4: Boycotts (political, military, economic, cultural, academic, and sports-related) domestically and internationally	2.2%	5.7%	14.8%	38.3%	39.1%
Q8.5: Global grassroots solidarity	1.7%	4.3%	23.5%	37.0%	33.5%
Q8.6: Diplomatic and political action within the United Nations	17.4%	30.0%	26.1%	18.7%	7.8%
Q8.7: Diplomatic action at the state level	9.6%	27.8%	33.0%	21.3%	8.3%
Q8.8: Legal action with/through the international courts	13.9%	30.4%	27.8%	18.7%	9.1%
Q8.9: Participation in Knesset elections	41.7%	27.4%	15.7%	10.9%	4.3%
Q8.10: Media and social media	1.7%	6.5%	25.7%	40.9%	25.2%
Q8.11: Cultural and Artistic Activities	1.7%	16.5%	30.4%	35.7%	15.7%
Q8.12: Community and youth initiatives	1.7%	8.3%	26.5%	40.9%	22.6%
Q8.13: The approach of not responding to Israeli forces and colonizers' violations under a pretext of not giving them excuses/ opportunities for escalating their attacks	33.9%	12.6%	17.4%	24.8%	11.3%
Q8.14: Mass and comprehensive Civil Disobedience (see explanation below)	6.1%	4.8%	15.2%	36.5%	37.4%
Q8.15: Grassroots resistance in all its forms	4.8%	6.1%	13.5%	25.2%	50.4%

Q9. In your opinion, to what extent do the following factors influence the success of the Palestinian struggle in general?

Table 9

Factor	Level of influence				
	1. Very significant influence	2. Significant influence	3. Moderate influence	4. Minor influence	5. No influence at all
Q9.1: Ending the division and achieving national unity	59.6%	26.1%	10.4%	3.5%	0.4%
Q9.2: Level of popular participation	54.3%	35.2%	9.1%	1.3%	0.0%
Q9.3: Existence of a comprehensive unifying national strategy	58.7%	30.0%	10.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Q9.4: Public trust in political leadership figures	43.5%	31.7%	15.2%	4.8%	4.8%
Q9.5: Trust in representative Palestinian political institutions (PLO, PA, Joint List – Knesset members)	18.3%	22.6%	23.0%	19.6%	16.5%
Q9.6: Participation of Palestinians from 1948 in the Israeli Knesset	9.1%	12.2%	23.9%	26.1%	28.7%
Q9.7: Complete withdrawal, disengagement, and annulment of the Oslo Accords	55.2%	19.1%	17.4%	3.5%	4.8%
Q9.8: Refusal of Palestinian civil society organizations to align with donor agendas	33.5%	27.4%	26.1%	9.1%	3.9%
Q9.9: Global popular solidarity	49.1%	32.2%	15.2%	2.2%	1.3%
Q9.10: Official solidarity from states	32.6%	29.6%	23.9%	10.9%	3.0%
Q9.11: International media coverage	44.3%	35.2%	17.8%	1.3%	1.3%
Q9.12: Participation of Palestinian youth	57.8%	30.9%	10.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Q9.13: Emergence of new Palestinian political parties	39.1%	33.5%	22.6%	3.5%	1.3%

Sixth: The Role of Palestinian Actors

Q10. In your opinion, to what extent do you trust the ability of the following Palestinian entities/bodies to defend Palestinian rights and achieve national progress?

Table 10

Entity/ Body	Level of trust				
	1. Very high trust	2. High trust	3. Moderate trust	4. Low trust	5. No trust at all
Q10.1: Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	1.3%	5.7%	18.3%	33.5%	41.3%
Q10.2: Palestinian National Authority(PA)	0.4%	0.4%	8.3%	13.9%	77.0%
Q10.3: Political factions that believe in and support the Oslo path (all or any of them)	0.4%	0.4%	9.1%	27.0%	63.0%
Q10.4: Political factions that adopt the approach of armed resistance (all or any of them)	29.6%	22.2%	28.3%	10.4%	9.6%
Q10.5: Palestinian grassroots and youth movements	25.7%	33.9%	28.7%	8.3%	3.5%
Q10.6: Palestinian human rights and civil society organizations	11.7%	30.4%	40.0%	12.2%	5.7%

Q11. To what extent do you think Palestinian youth are capable of developing new and more effective tools and methods of resistance?

Table 11

Level of belief or confidence	%
1. To a very large extent	29.6%
2. To a large extent	42.2%
3. To a moderate extent	20.9%
4. To a small extent	6.1%
5. Not capable at present	1.3%

Q12. In your opinion, to what extent does Palestinian political life need a renewal of leadership and political structures?

Table 12	
Level of need	%
1. Does not need it at all	1.7%
2. Needs it to a minor extent	0.0%
3. Needs it to a moderate extent	4.3%
4. Needs it to a great extent	13.5%
5. Needs it to a very great extent	19.6%
6. Needs comprehensive, radical change	60.9%

Q13. What is your opinion on the requirement of prior acceptance of agreements concluded by the PLO (including Oslo) as a condition for participating and competing in Palestinian public elections: do you support this condition or not?

Table 13	
Answer	%
1. I support it	9.6%
2. I oppose it	90.4%

Q14. In your opinion, what is the objective of holding the general elections (for the Legislative Council, the National Council, and the presidency) scheduled for November 2026 and early next year:

Table 14	
Objective	%
1. To revitalize Palestinian political life	11.3%
2. To renew the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and the current leadership	21.7%
3. To unite the Palestinian people	6.5%
4. To meet the conditions set by Western countries	60.4%

Q15. In your opinion, to what extent do the following forms of solidarity influence support for Palestinian rights?

Table 15

Forms of solidarity	Level of influence				
	1. No influence at all	2. Minor influence	3. Moderate influence	4. Significant influence	5. Very significant influence
Q15.1: Global grassroots protests and demonstrations	2.2%	6.5%	32.6%	34.3%	24.3%
Q15.2: Mass global boycott campaigns against the Israeli regime	0.9%	6.1%	17.4%	36.5%	39.1%
Q15.3: Refusal by shipping workers at airports and ports to load or unload goods destined for the Israeli regime	0.4%	4.3%	18.3%	35.7%	41.3%
Q15.4: Actions to disrupt the production/ operations of complicit companies	0.4%	3.9%	18.7%	34.8%	42.2%
Q15.5: International student and academic activism	0.4%	4.8%	21.7%	40.4%	32.6%
Q15.6: Production of artistic works addressing the Palestinian cause and Israeli violations	1.3%	8.3%	38.7%	31.7%	20.0%
Q15.7: Campaigns by international human rights organizations	2.6%	11.7%	41.3%	26.5%	17.8%
Q15.8: Lawsuits before international courts	7.8%	16.1%	40.4%	20.4%	15.2%
Q15.9: Severing of military and economic relations with the Israeli regime by states	0.0%	2.6%	12.6%	30.9%	53.9%
Q15.10: Severing of diplomatic relations with the Israeli regime by states	0.0%	4.3%	17.4%	31.3%	47.0%
Q15.11: Severing of economic, academic, and cultural relations with the Israeli regime by states and companies	0.0%	0.9%	17.4%	33.5%	48.3%
Q15.12: Sanctions imposed by states on individuals (colonizers within the Israeli regime)	5.7%	12.6%	36.1%	22.6%	23.0%

Results of the youth opinion poll reveal a wide gap between the orientations of the youth and those of political leadership and factions, particularly the parties and leaders associated with the Oslo path. The findings also indicate that the youth remain at a standstill regarding their role in the desired process of comprehensive and radical change. The current political reality demands more than calls to: dismantle the Oslo Accords; halt security coordination between the Israeli regime and the Palestinian Authority; convene the secretaries-general of Palestinian factions; reach a reconciliation agreement; or express dissatisfaction with presidential decrees governing electoral procedures and eligibility. Such measures, while addressing specific aspects of the political crisis, remain piecemeal responses to a much deeper structural impasse. Consequently, the essence, components, realization methods, and the roles of the Palestinian actors within the Palestinian national project require radical political, intellectual and structural reconstruction.

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